Messages In This Digest (16
Messages)
Messages
- 1a.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 7:01 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, J DeMouy <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> SWM,
>
> If I attempted to point out and address each and every misrepresentation, false dilemma, or non sequitur in our discussion, I'd be engaged in a war of attrition. I'll address whatever I think worth my time and ignore the rest.
>
I'll pass on responding to this passage of yours myself, thanks.
> As I understand it, you want to distinguish between truisms that are indisputable and truisms that are obvious, pointing out that what is indisputable may not be obvious.
Yes, to this.
> You also want to favor a reading of Wittgenstein that has him saying indisputable things but not obvious ones.
>
I don't have him saying anything. He says what he says. He is not always on the mark though often is. He, himself, found great fault with some of his own remarks and, certainly, with a lot of his earlier work whether today's Wittgensteinophiles want to acknowledge that or not.
My point was that when he urges philosophy as 'looking at the obvious', his meaning is that we should be looking to uncover what is often hidden in plain sight and that this is done by paying attention to what we otherwise have a tendency to miss, to overlook.
> Something indisputable but that we tend to forgot has a point. Something simply obvious has no point whatsoever. And we shouldn't read Wittgenstein as simply pointless.
>
We should read Wittgenstein for his insights. When his remarks go nowhere for whatever reason (don't really get at what he is trying to say, misstate something or just miss the mark) we don't need to hang onto them merely because he said them.
> Is that a fair summary?
>
As further explicated by me, it would be.
> If I understand you correctly here, then what you're saying makes very good sense. And it has some prima facie plausibility as a defense of Martin against my charges. I'd even say that I agree with your position, though with some caveats..
>
> But first, for what it's worth, having previously pointed out all the things I don't consider good arguments, let me say that this actually is a good argument. And it directly addresses my point, as your remarks in previous posts have not.
>
They are the same things I said previously.
> Now, the caveats:
>
> 1. Even where all are in agreement, what was obvious to one individual may have have been noticed or may have been forgotten by another.
>
Yes. It's not a science but a process, involving an almost aesthetic sensibility.
> 2. What is obvious to people in one group, at one place and time, may not be obvious to another group at a different place and time.
>
> 3. What is obvious in one context may be forgotten in another, as when someone repairing a car does not forget that machine parts can warp and break but does forget while doing philosophy and using machine metaphors (PI 193)
>
That's why he makes the point that we should go back to ordinary usages, what we actually do or say in real circumstances.
> 4. It is not always apparent, even after the fact, whether a point was really obvious to someone. One person may be more reluctant to admit, "That hadn't occurred to me but of course you're right," or "I never noticed that!" than another.
>
> 5. Given points 1-4, a speaker cannot always know whether what she says will be obvious to her audience.
>
That's the way the world is, isn't it? However, a good speaker, one audiences typically want to hear and respond to will have more skills at saying the sorts of things that are needed to achieve such an audience response.
> 6. Given all of this, someone who professes to be dealing in indisputable truths may understandably sometimes state truths that might be taken as obvious as well.
>
I see no reason to dispute that.
> Applying this to the case at hand, do not assume that observations about religion that may have been obvious to someone who grew up as a religious minority in the US in the latter half of the 20th century, where religious matters may be openly discussed and debated, and who has expored faiths of other cultures as well (like yourself?) would have been obvious to young men who grew up in the first half of the century and led sheltered lives before going off to Cambridge. And don't assume that a man who struggled with his cultural and religious identity and his faith, had religious experiences during a time of war, read various mystical and religious writers from various cultures, and so on, would necessarily have a perfectly clear idea of what would and would not be obvious to these sheltered young men. (Note, in regard to our discussion of biography/gossip: I consider this relevant because I can clearly connect the biographical information to the
> interpretive question.
So did I when I invoked what we know about his religious activities from the record.
> It's simply obvious that Wittgenstein had good reason to think that his observations about religion might not be obvious to his audience, because he was coming from a very different place.)
>
I don't make any presumptions about what he thought his audience thought or what his motivations were with regard to that in communicating his points in the document in question. I was referring to the points he makes in those lectures in the context of his personal history and his later philosophy.
> Some further caveats:
>
> 7. As I was attempting to explain with the example of truisms leading to questioning whether "game" can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, a serious of obvious (not just indisputable but obvious) truisms may lead to an insight that is not obvious. The individual observations may not merit argument or even discussion taken by themselves, but when these reminders are
> assembled, a deeper insight may emerge.
That seems true and not something I would be inclined to object to.
> And this can be compared to argument, though that may be misleading, because it is not a matter of conclusions following from the premisses.
>
> (And note: the insight is not a generalization as we normally think of them: rather than "so all games involve an element of chance" or whatever, the response is "so there may be no one thing that all and only the activities we call 'games' have in common." We could even call this an "anti-generalizatio n".)
>
> One more comment on this point about obviousness: you also wondered what my point was in emphasizing the distinction between "truisms" and "hinges". Actually, this supports your point about "obvious" vs. "indisputable" truths. "Hinges" may be obvious, but reporting the "truism" that they are treated as such may not be (otherwise, there may have been less need for _On_Certainty_ )
>
>
Okay.
>
>
> You made the perfectly reasonable request that I provide an example, outside of the disputed case of Martin, where Wittgenstein has wrongly been taken as making a more general claim than the text itself actually supports.
>
> An example so common and scarcely in need of citations is when Wittgenstein is held to have said, "meaning is use", or worse "credited" with a "Use Theory of Meaning". I'm sure you've encountered this.
>
Yes. As I recall, he actually said meaning is use in a large number of cases. He didn't present a formal theory of this nor explicitly generalize to all cases.
> The source? PI 43, which says:
>
> "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.."
>
Yes.
> As we can see, he explicitly says "not for all" cases. He also says that it "can" be defined that way.
Yes, but I am not (nor was I ever) disputing this.
> A further point, even more subtle, is that Anscombe's mostly superb translation is problematic here. "Defined" is a translation of "erklaren" (forgive the missing umlauts) where she translates "erklart" (later in the same remark) as "explained". I would argue (as have others) that a better translation would be "...it can be explained thus..."
>
> So, the obvious form of the mistake (the mistake of imputing a more contentious and more general claim than has actually been made) is ignoring the "not for all", though he makes it perfectly explicit, and assuming that he means to make a universal claim that can be refuted by a few counter-examples.
>
Yes but I have not made that mistake nor is there any evidence Michael Martin did in the paper under discussion. So why is it relevant here?
> The less obvious way to make the same mistake is to neglect the word "can" and read it as "is" or perhaps "should be", so that he is claiming to present the correct definition, one that would compete with other definitions.
>
> The more subtle and much more understandable (given the translation) form of the mistake is focus on the word "defined" and to assume that therefore any other way of explaining "meaning" must involve equivocation. (Significantly different definitions of a word mean different senses. But the same word might well be explained in different ways without changing the sense of the word.)
>
I appreciate the trouble you are going to here but I'm not quite sure of your point.
> Read carefully, we have nothing so "grand" as a "theory of meaning", but instead a homely observation about one way that we can sometimes explain the word "meaning". And who would dispute that?
>
>
>
>
> Regarding the "Five Ways of Zen", my point is that Zongmi, who presumably qualifies as a "serious religionist" , in originating what has been a part of Zen Buddhist pedagogy for more than a millenium, answered your question about the point of continuing in a practice without holding many of the relevant beliefs.
>
> Yes, doing so for the sake of martial arts or to acquire magical powers would be a perversion of the Buddha's teachings. And yes, even doing it for health or even for moral improvement would being "missing the point" from a Buddhist standpoint. And still, Zen Masters have recognized that they can be of service, even to nonbelievers (who may or may not eventually come to Buddhism) and nonbelievers have recognized the value of the practice even without
> converting.
That there can be other reasons to engage in a practice does not mean that there is not some religious reason. I'm reminded of a sangha meeting where our roshi went round the room asking everyone why they were there, why they had become involved with Zen. There were many different answers, from self-improvement, to seeking god, to wanting to find some kind of personal peace. When he came to me I couldn't think of an answer and just said "I want to be better than I am." Afterwards he summed up everyone's reasons, noting that some were there for religious reasons, some for psycholgical reasons, some to expunge their demons and, when he came to me, he said some were there for spiritual reasons. I thought about that afterwards. It struck me that "spiritual" was as good a catch-all as any for what I had blurted out. But that it really said very little beyond what I had said myself, especially once you made the distinction between "spiritual" and "religious" as he had done. Anyway, long story to short, we all recognized that one goes to Zen or anything for many reasons. The point is why does one continue and how can you continue if you discard the underlying narrative, which contains the whole point of pursuing the practice.
I have to cut this short as am being called away. I'll try to address the rest at some later point if it needs addressing.
SWM
>
>
>
>
>
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- 1b.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 9:27 am (PST)
wtf?
In Message #3350, I wrote:
"More specifically, it is generally a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as making
a broader, more general claim when a narrower, less general claim is as well or
better supported by the text."
This prompted you to ask, in Message #3364:
"Can you give some specific examples of this general mistake ASIDE FROM what you
are, in my view wrongly, imputing to Martin?" (my emphasis added)
So, in Message #3373, I provided such an example, an extended discussion of how this type of plays out with regard to PI 43. I even prefaced that with a reminder of your question, so you'd recall your own request and understand why I was providing the example:
"You made the perfectly reasonable request that I provide an example, outside of
the disputed case of Martin, where Wittgenstein has wrongly been taken as making
a more general claim than the text itself actually supports."
I then provided that example, the aforementioned misreadings of PI 43, but what I got from you in Message #3376:
"Yes, but I am not (nor was I ever) disputing this."
"Yes but I have not made that mistake nor is there any evidence Michael Martin
did in the paper under discussion. So why is it relevant here?"
"I appreciate the trouble you are going to here but I'm not quite sure of your
point."
It's not that you forgot that you'd actually requested me to provide such an example. That would be somewhat understandable, given delays and the lengths of our respective posts. But you IGNORED the explanation, IN THE VERY POST TO WHICH YOU WERE RESPONDING, wherein I REMINDED you of YOUR previous REQUEST!
SWilson observed, in another thread, Message #3369:
"I think the culprit is that you seem to sit at
the computer and type your thoughts right as you see a sentence. May I suggest
reading the whole thing and absorbing the point before you reply?"
I think he's absolutely correct about your modus operandi, but this example even MORE ridiculous, because in this case, EVEN if you were replaying as you read - rather than reading the whole message first - you'd still have encountered my EXPLANATION and REMINDER of what I was doing BEFORE you started asking "why is it relevant"?
I am having great difficulty assuming GOOD FAITH here. It's difficult not to read you as being WILLFULLY OBTUSE, alleging irrelevancy where you know PERFECTLY WELL the CONTEXT, so you can somehow "SCORE POINTS".
The only alternative seems to be that you are merely OBTUSE simpliciter, no "willfullness" about it. Perhaps you simply cannot READ very well and have the ATTENTION SPAN of a naughty 8 YEAR OLD.
That explanation, incidentally, has the virtue of explaining any number of things, including some of your "readings" and "interpretations" .
Or maybe you were just busy and tired.
You did answer SW's observation in Message #3372
"Fair enough. Although there are times when I write line by line I always go back
and refine if subsequent information further down the post suggests I have
missed something, etc. I'm afraid I haven't the time to treat list posts as full
fledged documents though, at times, when they are written like that and I do
have the time to read them, I will."
(Note that in the present case, it is not "subsequent information" that should have led you to "refine". The explanation of what I was doing was IMMEDIATELY PRIOR to the remarks whose relevancy you questioned.)
If that's the case, please TAKE YOUR TIME. There is simply NO NEED to RUSH in replying to these posts. The Internet and this board will WAIT for you. Please.
JPDeMouy
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- 1c.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 10:42 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, J DeMouy <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> wtf?
>
> In Message #3350, I wrote:
>
> "More specifically, it is generally a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as making
> a broader, more general claim when a narrower, less general claim is as well or
> better supported by the text."
>
> This prompted you to ask, in Message #3364:
>
> "Can you give some specific examples of this general mistake ASIDE FROM what you
> are, in my view wrongly, imputing to Martin?" (my emphasis added)
> So, in Message #3373, I provided such an example, an extended discussion of how this type of plays out with regard to PI 43. I even prefaced that with a reminder of your question, so you'd recall your own request and understand why I was providing the example:
> "You made the perfectly reasonable request that I provide an example, outside of
> the disputed case of Martin, where Wittgenstein has wrongly been taken as making
> a more general claim than the text itself actually supports."
>
> I then provided that example, the aforementioned misreadings of PI 43, but what I got from you in Message #3376:
> "Yes, but I am not (nor was I ever) disputing this."
> "Yes but I have not made that mistake nor is there any evidence Michael Martin
> did in the paper under discussion. So why is it relevant here?"
> "I appreciate the trouble you are going to here but I'm not quite sure of your
> point."
>
>
> It's not that you forgot that you'd actually requested me to provide such an example. That would be somewhat understandable, given delays and the lengths of our respective posts. But you IGNORED the explanation, IN THE VERY POST TO WHICH YOU WERE RESPONDING, wherein I REMINDED you of YOUR previous REQUEST!
>
Yes, you're right. I did forget, nor did I pick up on the intervening text you apparently provided for context as a reminder. In fact I didn't notice that if it was there and, if it was, you most assuredly did answer that question I had raised by your example, whatever.t.f.
> SWilson observed, in another thread, Message #3369:
>
> "I think the culprit is that you seem to sit at
> the computer and type your thoughts right as you see a sentence. May I suggest
> reading the whole thing and absorbing the point before you reply?"
> I think he's absolutely correct about your modus operandi,
I don't deny that I sit at the computer and type out my responses! Nor did I deny it to Sean. I don't know too many other ways to do this. Of course Sean meant that I don't first read the entire response and then formulate a full response. And that is true generally (though not in every case), too. I do, of course, go back and make changes if, as I am responding, I pick up something along the way that alters the way I have previously responded so the final response generally reflects that.
But, of course, I am not perfect and do make mistakes, sometimes overlooking something, sometimes missing a point or mistaking a meaning. Sometimes, too, I have been known to remember something differently than the facts make it out to be on review. I do make mistakes though I always try to own up to them. Needless to say when I don't own up to them it's because I don't think I've made them -- even if my interlocutor( s) think otherwise. In this I suspect I am not much different than anyone else here.
> but this example even MORE ridiculous, because in this case, EVEN if you were replaying as you read - rather than reading the whole message first - you'd still have encountered my EXPLANATION and REMINDER of what I was doing BEFORE you started asking "why is it relevant"?
And this is why it's an example not of what Sean alleged but of the fact that I obviously missed the intervening statements as I read along and thus missed the context of what you were saying. I agree that you were justified in providing that example and that it did answer the specific question I had posed.
>
> I am having great difficulty assuming GOOD FAITH here. It's difficult not to read you as being WILLFULLY OBTUSE,
Or that I just missed the intervening text? Do you think that is excluded here as a serious possibility?
Look, you have been calling me some names for a while now, including that post you had removed and which I had decided not to respond to. I presumed that by your choosing to have it removed you were acknowledging that you had gone too far in the name calling business. And yet here you are doing it again, accusing me of lacking "GOOD FAITH and being "WILLFULLY OBTUSE". Frankly, I find that both offensive and unnecssary and will try not to respond in kind. But I would like to respectfully suggest that it doesn't speak especially well of you.
> alleging irrelevancy where you know PERFECTLY WELL the CONTEXT, so you can somehow "SCORE POINTS".
>
I don't play for "POINTS". That's in your mind. I told you, I missed it and have acknowledged the error. Since my acknowledgment comes after you have made this rather baseless accusation I will assume that my statement clears this up.
> The only alternative seems to be that you are merely OBTUSE simpliciter, no "willfullness" about it.
I see you do go on about this. How many more ways do you think you can come up with this kind of insult? (This is one of the downfalls of reading and responding as I do, i.e., after I think I have answered something there is still more to come.)
> Perhaps you simply cannot READ very well and have the ATTENTION SPAN of a naughty 8 YEAR OLD.
>
I should ignore this I suppose. Sean would want me to. I'll try then.
> That explanation, incidentally, has the virtue of explaining any number of things, including some of your "readings" and "interpretations" .
>
And this!
> Or maybe you were just busy and tired.
>
Hmmm, the first generous interpretation you've offered. Perhaps you've got it out of your system by this point?
> You did answer SW's observation in Message #3372
>
> "Fair enough. Although there are times when I write line by line I always go back
> and refine if subsequent information further down the post suggests I have
> missed something, etc. I'm afraid I haven't the time to treat list posts as full
> fledged documents though, at times, when they are written like that and I do
> have the time to read them, I will."
>
> (Note that in the present case, it is not "subsequent information" that should have led you to "refine". The explanation of what I was doing was IMMEDIATELY PRIOR to the remarks whose relevancy you questioned.)
>
As I've explained above, this is a different case than the one Sean and I were discussing. I have already said that I missed the context you'd provided (my prior question to you). As to the possible reason for that miss: It wasn't that I was tired, as you so generously if belatedly suggest, but that I was writing quickly and did not have time to read what I'd written over as I had promised to drive my wife somewhere and she was angrily reminding me from upstairs as I rushed to finish as much as I could. THAT DID PRECLUDE MY USUAL EFFORT TO RE-READ BEFORE CLICKING SEND.
> If that's the case, please TAKE YOUR TIME. There is simply NO NEED to RUSH in replying to these posts. The Internet and this board will WAIT for you. Please.
>
> JPDeMouy
I have a great deal to do as I'm sure many of us do and cannot linger generally over these things. Moreover, since I write my responses directly onto the list, I usually cannot stop in the middle without losing what I have already written, obliging me to start again. Therefore I sometimes cut a response short as I did this morning. If I do that, it generally means I will also not have had time to read it over before sending.
Nevertheless, the mistake, clearly mine, is hardly sufficient to have occasioned your remarks above and I am quite surprised at their tone and vehemence. If we are to have useful discourse here, we ought to confine ourselves to generosity and civility in dealing with one another. Sean used to enforce a more proactive standard among the listees here but I think that has changed. Now it is up to each of us to police him or herself. I have tried to do that by not responding to some of your more egregious aspersions concerning me and will try to continue to do so. I will also try not to insult you, either inadvertently or intentionally, and I hope you will do the same.
In that spirit, I think, we ought to be able to continue these discussions.
SWM
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- 1d.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 11:08 am (PST)
Okay, I took the trouble to go back to the missive you were referring to in this thread. Here is the actual text:
J writes:
> You made the perfectly reasonable request that I provide an example, outside
of the disputed case of Martin, where Wittgenstein has wrongly been taken as
making a more general claim than the text itself actually supports.
>
> An example so common and scarcely in need of citations is when Wittgenstein is
held to have said, "meaning is use", or worse "credited" with a "Use Theory of
Meaning". I'm sure you've encountered this.
>
I reply:
Yes. As I recall, he actually said meaning is use in a large number of cases. He
didn't present a formal theory of this nor explicitly generalize to all cases.
J continues:
> The source? PI 43, which says:
>
> "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word
"meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the
language.."
>
I reply:
Yes.
J continues:
> As we can see, he explicitly says "not for all" cases. He also says that it
"can" be defined that way.
I reply:
Yes, but I am not (nor was I ever) disputing this.
J continues:
> A further point, even more subtle, is that Anscombe's mostly superb
translation is problematic here. "Defined" is a translation of "erklaren"
(forgive the missing umlauts) where she translates "erklart" (later in the same
remark) as "explained". I would argue (as have others) that a better
translation would be "...it can be explained thus..."
>
> So, the obvious form of the mistake (the mistake of imputing a more
contentious and more general claim than has actually been made) is ignoring the
"not for all", though he makes it perfectly explicit, and assuming that he means
to make a universal claim that can be refuted by a few counter-examples.
>
I reply:
Yes but I have not made that mistake nor is there any evidence Michael Martin
did in the paper under discussion. So why is it relevant here?
~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~
And so forth. What the above indicates is that we had a miscommunication however it is NOT readily apparent that you were responding to a question I posed for other examples of what you were accusing Martin of. In fact, even in re-reading the above, it looks to me like you were responding to this in relation to your criticism of Martin (which WAS the source of this exchange, after all).
It's true that I didn't recall that I had posed that question (as a request for general information concerning the nature of your allegation, rather than as a request for you to support your claim against Martin). But on the face of it and absent that recollection, it's not an outrageous point to note that this seems to have no direct relation to your charges against Martin or your subsequent charges against me for defending him.
Nevertheless, my acknowledgement that you had a legitimate reason for responding as you did still stands. On the other hand why you took my supposition that you were making the claim against Martin or me, given the context, as an effort to "SCORE POINTS" against you, be "WILLFULLY OBTUSE", etc. is beyond me. I assure you it was a simple mistake, driven partly by my being rushed but also partly by the ambiguity of the context in the post itself.
SWM
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- 1e.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 11:57 am (PST)
Some of what I said was obviously over the top and a waste of your time, the group's time, and my own time. I should either work on my patience (a lifelong struggle for me) or refrain from exercises that test it too much
Perhaps as well, my reactions have in part been the result of taking what you have to say in an uncharitable way. Apropos of what we were discussing about "obviousness" , I should not assume that an argument that seems so obviously wrong to me could not have been, just the same, offered in perfect sincerity and good faith. If that is the case and I have misjudged you, I apologize.
And not just to the group for creating a scene, but to you personally.
JPDeMouy
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- 1f.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 1:32 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, J DeMouy <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> Some of what I said was obviously over the top and a waste of your time, the group's time, and my own time. I should either work on my patience (a lifelong struggle for me) or refrain from exercises that test it too much
>
> Perhaps as well, my reactions have in part been the result of taking what you have to say in an uncharitable way. Apropos of what we were discussing about "obviousness" , I should not assume that an argument that seems so obviously wrong to me could not have been, just the same, offered in perfect sincerity and good faith. If that is the case and I have misjudged you, I apologize.
>
> And not just to the group for creating a scene, but to you personally.
>
Thanks for that. I also apologize if anything I said to you came off as offensive. If it did it wasn't meant to. I am also sometimes guilty of jumping to conclusions, taking offense too easily, and being, in my own way, sarcastic. (Not to mention skimming when I should be reading more in depth.) I'll also try to be less of all of these things going forward.
I really do enjoy talking philosophy, discussing Wittgenstein and his ideas and you are actually a good one to talk to for that because I can see you have a good sense of his work. Moreover, I think we share many common understandings about Wittgenstein (even if we disagree at times, e.g., with regard to the efficacy of Michael Martin's criticisms of Wittgenstein re: religious belief).
Sean has set up a good site here for these kinds of discussions and we can take the best advantage of it by respecting one another as we talk about these things.
SWM
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- 2a.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 8:54 am (PST)
... yes Stuart, this is exactly where you continue to be confused. Note these two points:
TRANSITION
Stuart writes: "He returned to Cambridge and philosophy again in 1929. The ensuing decade saw a steady transition in his thinking. By the end of the decade his ideas had fairly firmed up in the new way. The period between that end point and the time he returned is generally thought of as transitional in his thinking as his ideas gradually morphed from the older Tractarian model to the new Wittgenstein. "
I mean, to dispell these things requires a course. And I'm not sure it would do any good. Let do this another way. Could you list for me which ideas he espoused that changed, from 1929 to 1939 and what ideas specifically "firmed up?" Provides cites if you can. I can do this. And my list has 29/30 as the Tractarian who entered his transition. From 30 to 39, what we really see is Wittgenstein providing different ways of showing his new ideas. Whatever changed from 30 to 38 was more in the nature of "production- line shifts" rather than rolling out a new model. It would be like getting a computer update from version 1.1 to 1.3 versus seeing the new product roll out. (Now, some would argue that Tractarian Wittgenstein really isn't that different of a product. These people might see it as going from 1.0 to 2.0, and then 1930-39 going to 2.1 and 2.2. After that, you get 2.4 and 2.5.).
Anyway, rather than argue about room coloring, tell us exactly what changed so we can see what on earth you are talking about? Please don't say "read the preface." Tell us in your own words what ideas, specifically changed.
METHODOLOGY
Stuart writes with respect to changes in 1929-39, "(After all, if there had been no change, then why keep re-writing the various manuscripts to get them right as he did? Or why write anything new at all? Better to just rest on one's laurels and teach the old stuff over and over or do like Russell and take to popularizations. )"
This is terribly confused. It's as if you are not familiar with the relationship of the content of the manuscripts to the typescripts and so forth. It's also as if you are not familiar with the way Wittgenstein wrote. Surely you are aware that when Wittgenstein wrote something that he thought was "polished," it very often was no more clear than the one he thought "rubbish?" In fact, one of the hallmark characteristics of Wittgenstein is that you could not understand his views until he himself explained them, and even then there was great difficulty. You seem to think he's working on a novel or that he's a journalist. Just because Wittgenstein has a typescript that he believes states his ideas better surely does NOT mean that the remarks he excised from the mother document are not equally helpful in understanding what in God's name he's trying to say.
Listen, let me do it this way. God doesn't leave errors; he leaves evidence. This is because there are no errors to leave. The only thing that a good Wittgensteinian does is understand what Wittgenstein beheld. To replicate his chain of thoughts. Wittgenste in does not want you to follow him anyway. He just wants you to "see it." Once you see it, you go about whatever your business is. "Seeing it" involves watching what his mind is doing. All that he is doing from 30-39 is trying to find a vehicle in which to show you you "the new way" (the new ideas). That they come in the format of lectures, a field manual, notebooks, letters, manuscripts, typescripted remarks, and clippings in a box-file is neither here nor there.
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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- 2b.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 10:16 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@ ...> wrote:
>
> ... yes Stuart, this is exactly where you continue to be confused. Note these two points:
>
> TRANSITION
>
> Stuart writes: "He returned to Cambridge and philosophy again in 1929. The ensuing decade saw a steady transition in his thinking. By the end of the decade his ideas had fairly firmed up in the new way. The period between that end point and the time he returned is generally thought of as transitional in his thinking as his ideas gradually morphed from the older Tractarian model to the new Wittgenstein. "
>
> I mean, to dispell these things requires a course. And I'm not sure it would do any good. Let do this another way. Could you list for me which ideas he espoused that changed, from 1929 to 1939 and what ideas specifically "firmed up?" Provides cites if you can.
I've already given you the citation: Rhees' preface to the Blue and Brown Books which you've said you had and had read. I don't plan to do extensive transcribing if it can be avoided but try looking at the following pages (the Harper Torchbook edition, possibly on different pages if yours is a later edition) for starters:
language games - starting at p. ix
the idea of "logical analysis of language" - p. xi
propositions - p. xii
how language relates to the world - p.xii
rules - p. xiii
philosophical puzzlement - p. xiii
meaning as use - p. xiii
the "calculus of language" - p. xiv
> I can do this. And my list has 29/30 as the Tractarian who entered his transition. From 30 to 39, what we really see is Wittgenstein providing different ways of showing his new ideas. Whatever changed from 30 to 38 was more in the nature of "production- line shifts"
> rather than rolling out a new model.
Well this, I suppose, would be one way of putting it though I am more inclined here to agree with Rhees' characterization, to wit, that Wittgenstein was groping his way to these new ideas during this extended timeframe. I expect we can agree that by the time he returned to Cambridge in '29 he figured there was something wrong with what he had already done or why return? (There could have been other reasons at work, of course, but that wouldn't have precluded a realization of past error as part of his overall reason for returning.) Moreover he credits both Sraffa and Ramsey, his colleagues in the decade following his return, with being influential in showing him his mistakes (see his preface to the Investigations) so it is he only realized some of his errors AFTER he'd returned. The question then is whether he realized them all of a piece in that first year as you suggest or whether he was engaged in an ongoing developmental process as I have argued for.
Note, though, that the reason the period in question is generally referred to as "transitional" is because that's how it appears based on the evidence (the record of his writings and his own testimony).
I guess there is a strong preference to see him as a genius full blown, right in the beginning and right at the end about everything but this is belied by his own explicit testimony as we know. I think Rhees' reading of the Blue and Brown Books is fairly astute and more in keeping with everything I know of Wittgenstein and his work, independent of Rhees. But Rhees encapsulates it pretty well in that preface where he systematically considers various concepts that appear in the Blue and Brown Books and shows how the understanding of them changed from the Blue to the Brown and, later, to what is seen in the Investigations.
If philosophy is method, not doctrine, why should we be concerned if it appears that Wittgenstein changed his views over time (or over a longer rather than a shorter period of time), becoming clearer, more precise, seeing things in new ways, etc.? Isn't that just the method at work?
> It would be like getting a computer update from version 1.1 to 1.3 versus seeing the new product roll out. (Now, some would argue that Tractarian Wittgenstein really isn't that different of a product. These people might see it as going from 1.0 to 2.0, and then 1930-39 going to 2.1 and 2.2. After that, you get 2.4 and 2.5.).
>
> Anyway, rather than argue about room coloring, tell us exactly what changed so we can see what on earth you are talking about? Please don't say "read the preface." Tell us in your own words what ideas, specifically changed.
>
Ah, I see you want me to either paraphrase or transcribe after all. Knowing that paraphrasing isn't likely to be successful (since verbiage can always be picked apart based on nuances, etc.) I suppose it means transcribing again! Ouch.
> METHODOLOGY
>
> Stuart writes with respect to changes in 1929-39, "(After all, if there had been no change, then why keep re-writing the various manuscripts to get them right as he did? Or why write anything new at all? Better to just rest on one's laurels and teach the old stuff over and over or do like Russell and take to popularizations. )"
>
> This is terribly confused. It's as if you are not familiar with the relationship of the content of the manuscripts to the typescripts and so forth. It's also as if you are not familiar with the way Wittgenstein wrote. Surely you are aware that when Wittgenstein wrote something that he thought was "polished," it very often was no more clear than the one he thought "rubbish?" In fact, one of the hallmark characteristics of Wittgenstein is that you could not
> understand his views until he himself explained them,
In which case we're all out of luck then! More likey though it had to do with the difficulties of language (as we have seen so often on lists like these) where people want to insist on only saying precisely what they have said in the very same words, fearing or denying paraphrases, etc. More, my sense from reading about Wittgenstein is that he was a persnickety curmdugeon from his earliest days (Russell's bore, as it were) who just happened to have a substantial insight and a keen philosophical mind. Thus he wasn't overly eager to acknowledge others' ideas or work jointly with them to come up with new notions. (That may be true of most philosophers, though, and may even be a feature of being a philosopher. Russell, who worked with others in various intellectual partnerships, including Wittgenstein for a time, may have been one of the exceptions.)
> and even then there was great difficulty. You seem to think he's working on a novel or that he's a journalist. Just because Wittgenstein has a typescript that he believes states his ideas better surely does NOT mean that the remarks he excised from the mother document are not equally helpful in understanding what in God's name he's trying to say.
>
If you are asserting that the Brown Book acted as a "mother document" we surely have no argument because I never denied a relation between the Brown Book and the Investigations because. What I said, based on Rhees, was that: 1) the Brown Book was prepared differently than the Blue Book; 2) that it was more closely supervised by him; and 3) that he had it in mind at one point to turn it into a publishable work but eventually decided against that.
Rhees wrote all this in that preface and I was alluding to that in my comments, which you subsequently ascribed to my misreadings and called false, Sean.
When you did that, I offered some text, taken directly from that preface, which supported my assertion (showing that I was neither inventing this out of whole cloth nor relying on some questionable source).
Now Rhees could have it wrong, of course, but if he does, you need to show that, not simply declare it false. By presenting an alternative authority, Monk, all you do is tell us there is an apparent difference of opinions between Rhees, a philosophical contemporary, student and friend of Wittgenstein, and Monk a philosophical biographer of Wittgenstein. Assuming they ARE saying different things here, on what grounds are we to take Monk as more definitive or reliable than Rhees?
> Listen, let me do it this way. God doesn't leave errors; he leaves evidence. This is because there are no errors to leave.
Do you mean to liken Wittgenstein to God? Are we to suppose Wittgenstein could have made no errors, even when he asserts that he did, himself?
> The only thing that a good Wittgensteinian does is understand what Wittgenstein beheld.
A prophet then? Well, perhaps I am not that kind of "good Wittgensteinian" !
I think he developed a method and many useful insights about the way things are and, certainly, a better way of understanding often abstruse, and sometimes troubling, philosophical issues. That's enough as far as I can see to place him in the first rank of philosophers. But it doesn't make a god or prophet of him!
> To replicate his chain of thoughts. Wittgenste in does not want you to follow him anyway. He just wants you to "see it." Once you see it, you go about whatever your business is.
On this we are in agreement (I think).
> "Seeing it" involves watching what his mind is doing.
Better, it involves learning to do it oneself and doing it.
> All that he is doing from 30-39 is trying to find a vehicle in which to show you you "the new way" (the new ideas).
So YOUR view is that Wittgenstein either returned to Cambridge with the new way of thinking fully revealed to his philosophical eye or, on his return had a revelation and that he then spent the rest of his time there finding the best way to tell us about it?
I think that is a wrong picture. My view is that he returned to Cambridge as he began to have increasing doubts concerning the ideas he had developed and articulated in the Tractatus (perhaps reflecting his experiences with the Tractatus admirers in the Vienna Circle as wel as his experiences teaching grade school and certainly also reflecting his life experiences both in the trenches and afterwards in post-War Vienna and Austria generally). Once there he gradually worked out his new approach in terms of developing new and fairly innovative concepts (language games, forms of life, etc.) and a method of philosophical inquiry suitable to this way of thinking.
I think the internal evidence of his own writings, including his own testimony, better supports this picture than the one you give us of Moses returned from the mountain. Think rather of Buddha struggling for twenty years to realize his goal of enlightenment. When he reaches it, he doesn't hang around any longer engaged in the process. Rather, off he goes into nirvana! (I am not arguing FOR that picture of Buddha as being accurate but only noting it provides a better analogy with Wittgenstein during the decade after 1929 than the Moses picture does.)
> That they come in the format of lectures, a field manual, notebooks, letters, manuscripts, typescripted remarks, and clippings in a box-file is neither here nor there.
>
All writers (whether novelists, thinkers or some other kind) write and some of what they write is better than other things they write. It is a mistake to treat all output as being equal. Wittgenstein had reason to discard some of his work while focusing on and developing other material. There's nothing unusual or untoward in that. But it means we should not make the mistake of respecting the author instead of the work.
I suppose you still want me to transcribe text from the Rhees preface? Note that I will do so if you press for it. At the least it could provide the basis for a good discussion. But I say at the outset that I am not overly keen to sit here transcribing and will only do so if you insist and/or it looks like there's a serious audience for this for the purpose of a constructive discussion. Let me know on-line here. Thanks.
SWM
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- 2c.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 7:45 pm (PST)
Stuart:
You are once again wrong about the Rhees' preface. He does nothing close to what you are attributing to him. I'm going to summarize that here and then launch a separate mail summarizing the "transition" issue. I don't want readers to be misled by an ahistoric and factually-suspect critique. I'm also not going to attend to this mail in great detail because I fear it will only lead to "issue change" and 6 others that go nowhere. Ultimately, if you want to grasp this issue yourself, you need to re-read Monk (Chapters 12-14, 16 & 20). I would even take notes and make an outline of the chapters. Only then can you have any hope of seeing that you are reading things into Rhees that do not support your thesis.
First, Rhees isn't saying anything that supports the position that the Blue and Brown Books (B&BBs) represent a Wittgenstein that is intermediate to the Tractatus and the Investigations. What he says is that there are approaches in the Investigations that try to more comprehensively announce the new views. Wittgenstein isn't attempting a comprehensive account of them in the B&BBs. So, for example, B&BBs do not address the issue of "seeing as" (venturing in to what Wittgenstein called "philosophy of psychology") . Nor does the Brown Book (BrB) address the big philosophic questions, because it was specifically written to EXCLUDE such declarations. It doesn't tell us what philosophy's mission is in light of the new techniques; it just shows the new technique. This is entirely consistent with Monk, who describes the work as if it were attempted as a textbook. That, incidentally, is all the proof you need to see that Wittgenstein never intended to
offer the BrB for publishing. As I told you before, a close reading of Rhees doesn't dispute this. Rhees is saying that, because he started working on the BrB again in 38, that what he was working on THEN might have had an eye toward publishing. (But this argument would apply to any typescript he worked on, and is confronted by all sorts of historical declarations to the contrary, which is why Rhees says it so feebly --"might have," "an eye toward," "once").
Here's the bottom line. Every single theme that Rhees talks about being absent in the B&BBs is present in the historical record at or before the time period the books are written. So Wittgenstein is not in a transitory period with the Tractatus at this time. That is pure nonsense. For example, Monk notes that Wittgenstein had a clear conception of the correct method of doing philosophy as early as the autum of 1930. "His lectures for the Michaelmas term began on an apocalyptic note: 'The nimbus of philosophy has been lost,' he announced." (298). [It continues on]. So, the fact that Rhees is saying that the BrB leaves this stuff out does not mean that the BrB is transitory; it means that Stuart doesn't understand why it is left out. Read Monk. He tells you.
The reason why the BrB is the way it is, is because Wittgenstein only wanted to create an example of his technique, not a philosophic defense of it. The BrB should be understood to be the first Wittgensteinian training manual to be produced by the new thoughts. The Blue Book (BlB), in contrast, is only deficient in the sense that it represents what he said to STUDENTS about the new ideas. In this venue, one also would not attempt a comprehensive account. He's exposing his students to the new ideas. He' s not trying for a New Testament in that forum.
My point, of course, is not that there are not nuances in Wittgenstein' s new thought that developed from 30-39 (the period we are talking about). My point is that any nuances cannot be classified as being "in transition with the Tractatus."
Here's where you are fundamentally mistaken. The point that is transitory is the 1930 work that reflected the work during 1929-30 academic year (and the summer before, I believe). That's the one he had to get Russell to vouch for. That's Philosophic Remarks. It was completed in April of 1930. It's "transitory" because it adopts several "strange" views: it is especially Kantian, and it is, according to Monk, his most strident verificationist work (at least, seemingly). He backed off and completely overhauled this segment of thought, which we first see in Philosophic Grammar (1932), representing his thoughts from late 1930 to 1932. The point where Wittgenstein' s mind goes into the "new way" is in late 1930, Monk says, not long after he had just written Philosophic Remarks. He made comments to Drury to that effect (see Monk, 297). (See point above about his Fall lectures that year)
(You will also note that the updated version of the Tractatus that was planned to be written with Waisman's help was officially junked by Wittgenstein in late 1931. See Monk at 320).
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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- 3a.
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Mon Dec 7, 2009 8:57 am (PST)
--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> Gentile signora,
>
>
> "What personally attracts me is the fact that W. forces us to change completely our way of doing philosophy - and, also, I believe, our way of living."
>
> There's also, "What has to be overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will,"
>
> But then there's the notorious, "It (philosophy) leaves everything as it is," which some (mistakenly in my view) have read as insisting that philosophy is completely impotent or that it must be committed to the status quo.
>
.
>
>
>
> Grazie.
>
> JPDeMouy
>
>
>> Dear sir
Certainly there is a misreport regarding philosophy.Since most of the philosophizing done by religious people.They could attach ideas to the religious practices.Thus concepts derived strengthened religions.Till the era of Ludwig people never listened to new ideas without the garb of religion.
According to Wikipedia Philosophy means
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language.[1] [2]
There are at least two senses in which the term philosophy is used. In the more formal sense, philosophy is an intellectual endeavor focusing on the fields of metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology, and aesthetics. In the more informal sense, philosophy is a way of life whose focus is resolving the existential questions about the human condition. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing these questions (such as mysticism or mythology) by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on reasoned argument.[3] Philosophy comes from the Greek φι λο σο φί α [philosophia] , which literally translates to "love of wisdom".[4][ 5][6]
thank you
sekhar
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- 3b.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 11:50 am (PST)
Void/Sekhar
You are of course broadly correct about the gradual emancipation of philosophy in the West from the dictates of religious thinking or the need to connect philosophical with religious work. As a general outline, that's true. Still, I wonder about "Till the era of Ludwig".
I suppose on could count Bertrand Russell's work as from the "era of Ludwig", but left Hegelians like David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, and most famously, Karl Marx? Or Nietzsche, for that matter? Are they all from the "era of Ludwig"? Whatever Hume's personal views on religion, it would be hard to make a case that his arguments strengthened it. And many of the French Philosophes were critical of religion, with some openly hostile, such as Baron d'Holbach and Jacques-André Naigeon. That's a bit before Wittgenstein' s time.
One could even argue that Renee Descartes did more to weaken religion's hold on philosophy than to strengthen it. Though he certainly wasn't hostile toward religion, organized religion showed some hostility toward him. But I wouldn't say that he's from the "Ludwig era" unless that simply means "Modern".
In light of that, I'm trying to make sense of your remarks. Certainly, there has been a transition from philosophy being a servant of philosophy but it seems like this was "old news" by the time Wittgenstein wrote.
I think I must be misunderstanding you.
JPDeMouy
> >> Dear sir
> Certainly there is a misreport regarding philosophy.Since
> most of the philosophizing done by religious people.They
> could attach ideas to the religious practices.Thus concepts
> derived strengthened religions.Till the era of Ludwig people
> never listened to new ideas without the garb of religion.
> According to Wikipedia Philosophy means
> Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental
> problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge,
> values, reason, mind, and language.[1] [2]
>
> There are at least two senses in which the term philosophy
> is used. In the more formal sense, philosophy is an
> intellectual endeavor focusing on the fields of metaphysics,
> logic, ethics, epistemology, and aesthetics. In the more
> informal sense, philosophy is a way of life whose focus is
> resolving the existential questions about the human
> condition. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of
> addressing these questions (such as mysticism or mythology)
> by its critical, generally systematic approach and its
> reliance on reasoned argument.[3] Philosophy comes from the
> Greek Ï?ιλοÏ?οÏ?ία
> [philosophia] , which literally translates to "love of
> wisdom".[4][ 5][6]
>
> thank you
> sekhar
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> >
>
>
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>
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- 4a.
-
Mon Dec 7, 2009 5:50 pm (PST)
- 4b.
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Mon Dec 7, 2009 7:46 pm (PST)
For the record, that is one of the oldest versions.
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/JastrowDuck.htm
--- On Tue, 12/8/09, Sean Wilson < whoooo26505@yahoo.com> wrote:
> From: Sean Wilson < whoooo26505@yahoo.com>
> Subject: [Wittrs] excellent duck-rabbit
> To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
> Date: Tuesday, December 8, 2009, 1:50 AM
> an excellent duck-rabbit
>
> http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/45/Duck-Rabbit_illusion.jpg
>
>
> Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
> Assistant Professor
> Wright State University
> Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
> SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
> Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
>
>
>
>
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- 4c.
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Mon Dec 7, 2009 7:55 pm (PST)
... dude, full body!! Now we're gettin somewhere. (Thanks for the link)
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/images/Jastrow/EhrenheitDuck.jpg
SW
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- 4d.
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Mon Dec 7, 2009 8:04 pm (PST)
An interesting tidbit. The "Peirce" with whom Jastrow collaborated on early research in psychology mentioned on that page is Charles Sanders Peirce, logician, semiotician, polymath, and philosopher. And someone whose ideas more than one scholar has compared on certain points to Wittgenstein' s.
--- On Tue, 12/8/09, Sean Wilson < whoooo26505@yahoo.com> wrote:
> From: Sean Wilson < whoooo26505@yahoo.com>
> Subject: [Wittrs] Re: excellent duck-rabbit
> To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
> Date: Tuesday, December 8, 2009, 3:54 AM
> ... dude, full body!! Now we're
> gettin somewhere. (Thanks for the link)
>
> http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/images/Jastrow/EhrenheitDuck.jpg
>
>
> SW
>
>
>
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>
>
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- 5.
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Mon Dec 7, 2009 10:28 pm (PST)
As the word signifies anything can be truth within its limited jurisdiction. Like if I say the climate is cold, its only cold to me and not to my friend. Wheras if I say the sun rises in the east it is true for all inhabitants of the earth but maynot be for someone from other planet. So what is absolute.? In general, absolute truth is whatever is always valid, regardless of parameters or context. The absolute in the term connotes one or more of: a quality of truth that cannot be exceeded; complete truth; unvarying and permanent truth. It can be contrasted to relative truth or truth in a more ordinary sense in which a degree of relativity is implied
The logical proof of the statement, "There exists an absolute truth," is almost trivial in its simplicity. Suppose we assert the negation of the statement, that is, that there is no such thing as absolute truth. By making that assertion, we claim that the sentence "There exists no absolute truth" is absolutely true. The statement is self-contradictory, so its negation, "There exists an absolute truth," is true.
We cannot separate heat from fire; heat is also fire, yet heat is not fire. This is the position of relative truth. As soon as we experience heat, we understand that there is fire. Yet we cannot say that heat is fire. Relative truth is like heat because it stands on the strength of the Absolute Truth, just as heat stands on the strength of fire. Because the Absolute is true, relative truth also appears to be true, although it has no independent existence. A mirage appears to be water because in actuality there is such a thing as water. Similarly, this material world appears attractive because there is an all-attractive spiritual world.
This is the relation between factuality (verbal) and the reality.Word by it self is dual undoubtedly.All verbatim got characterized dually, otherwise it can not function nor knowledge is stored as intellect.The very reason meaning is partial by its very existence.
That is the reason Ludwig Wittgenstein says meaning as its use or in use.
thank you
sekhar
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