J, I shall try to respond here if time permits. Your comments below are quite lengthy and I will do a bit of snipping in keeping with Sean's dictum here, if I can. I trust that nothing will be lost because, as Sean has often said, we can see what was said by going back up the thread.
--- In
Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, J DeMouy <wittrsamr@.
..> wrote:
>
> SWM
>
> Since you've expressed some confusion as to my position and purpose in participating on this thread, I thought it might be useful for me to start out by stating my position clearly (though I've attempted to do so previously), also specifying some things I am not arguing, before proceeding to reply more directly to your last post.
>
> So, my position:
>
> It is generally a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as making contentious assertions when an interpretation that has him saying something that isn't contentious is readily available.
>
My response to your comments had to do with whether there are distinctions of importance to be made between different kinds of non-controversialit
y. I suggested that when Wittgenstein says that what a philosopher in the course of doing philosophy can only be non-controversial if it is philosophical is a reference to the idea that philosophers don't argue about facts, that they all accept the same facts about the world as everyone else and that, when we don't, the disputes at issue are disputes of an empirical nature, the subject of science and similar type investigations, not the philosophical kind. I proposed that the quintessential philosophical claims to be found in Wittgenstein may be seen in a work like On Certainty where he is engaged in pointing out subtle elements in the way we speak about things in order to explain how we come by or use certain ideas. He offers no new facts, nothing that anyone who is being honest would not agree with. What he offers, instead, is a different way of thinking about these things.
This is a different notion of "non-controversial" than the one Michael Martin presented in which he claimed that certain of the things Wittgenstein was saying about religion could be interpreted in such a way as to add nothing to our existing grasp of religious practices. Now we can dispute whether this is true or not but my point was addressed to your claim which was that Martin's point that Wittgenstein'
s suggestions could be read in a way no one would dispute added nothing was wrongheaded because Wittgenstein'
s method WAS to add nothing, i.e., to only offer statements we could all agree to.
The point of my response was to note that there was a yawning gap between just stating truisms and reminding us of truisms we may have forgotten or failed to notice in the hurly burly of everyday life and language.
> More specifically, it is generally a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as making a broader, more general claim when a narrower, less general claim is as well or better supported by the text.
>
Can you give some specific examples of this general mistake aside from what you are, in my view wrongly, imputing to Martin?
> Finally, it is no ground for rejecting an interpretation of Wittgenstein that the interpretation would read him as saying something with which no one would disagree.
>
True. But if all he is saying is the obvious rather than the indisputable that would be a ground and this pivots on the distinction between what we notice and what we don't.
> I have argued that Michael Martin makes these mistakes and that they are mistakes. Those are my only concerns in posting on this thread.
>
<snip>
> The only value I see in Martin's reading is as an object lesson in one mistake that we can make in reading Wittgenstein generally.
>
And this is an interesting point though I think you are mistaken in your judgement of Martin's piece here for the reasons already noted.
> For my part, in my various readings on the Wittgenstein and religion topic, the closest to the views I've come to would be in chapter 5 of Duncan Richter's _Wittgenstein_
At_His_Word_
. Frankly, I don't see that I could add much to his discussion of the topic, save perhaps elaboration on the basic points that he makes as I understand them.
>
That would be interesting if you would care to offer such an elaboration.
<snip>
> Furthermore, I am not interested in debating whether Martin's arguments against the positions he ascribes to Wittgenstein are correct. They may well be and I am at least sympathetic with some his points against them. Many of the claims he thinks Wittgenstein was making are wrong-headed claims. But whether the positions he's attacking actually are Wittgenstein'
s positions and whether the arguments Martin uses in supporting his ascription of those views to Wittgenstein are valid are separate matters from whether those positions are wrong-headed and whether Martin is right to find fault with those positions.
>
> Lastly, before I get to responding directly to your last post in this thread, I want to mention some general arguments that I think fail to address what I am saying.
>
> It is no argument against my point for you to point out that philosophers do put forth theses while doing philosophy.
I rather thought my point in that was clear but I can make it again. I noted that it is a strange claim on Wittgenstein'
s part to say that philosophy never involves controversial claims when philosophers, both before and after Wittgenstein, and even Wittgensteinians themselves are always embroiled in disputing one another's opinions which is to say in controversy.
Now I am not arguing that any one side is more right than another, only that controversy seems to be the stuff of philosophy and even Wittgenstein couldn't avoid it. I did not offer an argument about this when I commented, I only noted that it seemed a strange statement, worth unpacking a bit to see what he meant. Somehow you seem to have taken that, itself, as a controversial claim, which only serves to further point up my original statement, that controversy seems to be the lifeblood of philosophy!
I went on to ask if perhaps Wittgenstein were just being polemical in his claim, if he meant something else than we might ordinarily take him to mean or if there were some other possibility. Somehow that comment and suggestion by me has now become the source of a new argument!
<snip>
>
> It is not even an argument to say that Wittgenstein on occasion puts forth contentious theses and argues for them. If he does that, he is being inconsistent. (I think we should be very careful in ascribing such inconsistency to him but I don't rule out the possibility that he wasn't always consistent.) But even if he was sometimes inconsistent, that doesn't license us to favor interpretations that point to further inconsistency when interpretations that don't inculpate him in further inconsistent are readily available.
>
I have no idea what you are talking about here. I pointed up the oddness of a certain statement of his that you quoted and wondered aloud on this list if we oughtn't to think a bit more about it. Oddly, you have made a controversy of it when you could have simply taken up my suggestion to further unpack the statement for its possible meanings or else simply ignored it!
> And if you take your examples of contentious theses that Wittgenstein allegedly advanced from your interpretation of his remarks on religion, you are also engaging in a petitio principii, because the interpretation of those remarks is part of what is in dispute.
>
This misinterprets the point I was making which was that there is ample evidence in a plain reading of the quotations that this interpretation WAS what he was offering and that the alternative, just telling us the obvious which adds no new insights, is NOT the same thing as relying on claims to which we would all agree and which yield a new insight. Martin accuses him of the former which is not what, on my view, we should interpret his statement of non-controversialit
y to be about, i.e., I raised the question of how to interpret the statement in paragraph 128:
"If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them."
Recall that I raised the question of what he had in mind by "theses" in the above.
My point here was that his idea of non-controversial statements, that is, of "theses in philosophy" that "would never be possible to debate. . . because everyone would agree to them" has to do with exposing the obvious that is hidden to us, i.e., it is about achieving a better picture of things, seeing or understanding something more clearly. In the end it's about insight.Note that he follows 128 in paragraph 129 with:
"The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something -- because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. -- And this means we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and powerful."
Now, in fact, I think Wittgenstein DID believe his remarks on religious claims of belief were new in this sense and to an extent I think he was right right that a part of religion is done this way in many cases. But my larger point was that it fails as an account of religion per se or even of a certain, rather narrow class of some religions. Insofar as it fails on that level, we have gained very little from the perspective of better understanding religion because, in the end, the really important parts of the religious practices with which we are familiar cannot help but clash in different areas with the empirical.
> I also want to let you know that when you ascribe some claim to Wittgenstein and I ask where he said such a thing, I am asking for a direct quotation, a source. Telling me that it's a paraphrase without telling me what it is you're paraphrasing is not helpful and doesn't support your interpretation. And to instead ask me if I have > an alternate paraphrase is simply ridiculous!
Let me be very clear here. I did not ascribe a claim to Wittgenstein. I presented my understanding of what he was saying and never suggested it was anything but. Wittgenstein famously did not make lots of explicit claims but tended to examine, analyze examples, look at cases. I made a generalization reflecting MY understanding of his analyses in the area in question. You challenged that and I suggested you say what you considered to be a better way of putting it. This isn't about dueling quotations, at least not yet.
> An alternate paraphrase of what? Am I supposed to read your mind while digging through what Wittgenstein has written in hopes of
> hitting on whatever passage you may have misread?
I didn't offer a quote or citation nor did I say that I was doing so or even telling you something Wittgenstein had said. I offered MY interpretation of his position which is culled from extensive reading of his words, not founded on some explicit remark. You challenged me and I said I was offering my paraphrase of his idea and suggested that, if you thought I had it wrong, you could offer your own. Instead you've elected to call for quotes. When I quote something or allude to a quote, I will certainly supply it. For now my interest is in how and why your take on this aspect of Wittgenstein is different from mine.
> If you ascribe a position to Wittgenstein, the burden is on you to support your reading. the burden is not on me to guess how you arrived at such a reading and show you the alternative.
>
Again, I offered my interpretation of Wittgenstein'
s claims about religion. However, there certainly are quotations available, some of them already cited by Martin in that paper Gerardo posted here. Nearby I actually went back to that paper and posted some text from it (including relevant quotes from Wittgenstein offered by Martin). I haven't seen your response to it, yet.
> And whether Wittgenstein could be called "contentious" as a person is quite separate from whether he though one should try to advance contentious claims in the course of doing philosophy. One might be quite contentious, in doing philosophy or in other aspects of one's life, while still refraining from trying to advance theses while doing philosophy.
>
The issue of "contentious" insofar as it means "controversial"
, something informed parties would be likely to contest (argue about), is what we were addressing of course. But my point was that Wittgenstein himself was famously contentious in that sense though more so in his early years than his later. (In his later years he seems to have mostly held forth to those who wanted to hear him and ignored the rest, such as Popper when he shows up at that famous meeting of the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge.) Note, as well, that Russell found Wittgenstein particularly contentious in the early years in matters of philosophy (up to and including the rhinocerous in the room).
Anyway, I made the point of his contentiousness as a way of opening up the question of what he must actually have meant in his enigmatic sentence at paragraph 128 in the PI. It wasn't advanced as a basis for an argument or part of an argument about the subject.
> Further, it is also not an argument (and I don't think I should even have to point this out) to say that we're arguing now. We're not doing philosophy!
I think you have confused my suggestion that we examine what the statement at PI 128 means, in light of certain facts (about philosophers and the role of argument) with an argument against the "truth" of that statement. Thus you have chosen to argue about something I wasn't arguing about! Let me reiterate: I suggested we consider what 128 actually means, especially in regard to his use of "theses."
> Literary exegesis is not philosophy, even if the literature in question is philosophical. History is not philosophy, even if the historian is writing on the history of philosophy. Of course, in discussing interpretations of what Wittgenstein said, we're going to be putting forth theses! But that's not what we should call "doing philosophy".
>
See above.
><snip>
> It is also not an argument to simply tell me that I should look further" and "consider" that Wittgenstein is using "theses" in some
> unusual sense.
For someone who is keen on doing philosophy in a Wittgensteinian way (defined as not arguing) you are awfully keen to impute arguments to me! But if I am not arguing, then your imputation that I am is the only argument in play here.
> I've already considered and rejected that and I presented my reasons for doing so. Unless you propose something more substantial than a vague and totally unsupported suggestion that he's using the word differently, unless you specify what that different usage might be and show some textual basis for reading him that way, all you're really saying amounts to is, "Maybe we should just ignore what he said".
>
First, I suggested we do a little intellectual digging re: his use of the term "theses" in this context. I did NOT make a claim about what he meant but only about some of the things he MIGHT have meant.
Second, I never said anything about ignoring what he said. My point was that just because those are his words, it does not necessarily mean we know what he meant. All words are not equally transparent as to meaning and Wittgenstein was famously difficult at times to penetrate.
Third, I HAVE offered several alternative proposals including that he meant "theses" in a specialized sense, that he was polemicizing, that he was being inconsistent, and that he may have been confused himself.
I didn't ARGUE for any of these. I raised the possibilities.
Fourth, as to textual citation, above I offered paragraph 129 as support for my claim that he meant, in 128, the kind of thing what involves seeing the obvious that we do not always notice, rather than seeing the obvious that everyone knows (which is the criticism leveled against him by Martin).
> Alluding to various elements from Wittgenstein'
s private life and his personal religious views and struggles and vaguely insisting that there's some connection there between that biographical information and the views you or Martin ascribe to him without actually spelling > out what that connection is supposed to be is engaging in
> irrelevancy.
Some on this list have taken the position that one cannot fully understand Wittgenstein unless one also is familiar with his private life, his personal history. While that is not generally my position we have often discussed such things on this list but, beyond this, since we are speaking of his views on religion, his practices vis a vis religion do happen to be relevant in the present case (though I would not generally pay too much attention to such concerns in some other areas).
> And adding more biographical information does not count as "spelling it out". "Spelling it out" would be making explicit how a given aspect of his life is supposed to make one interpretation of his ideas more plausible than another and more plausible than it would be without such biographical information.
>
> Just saying, "How could it not be relevant?" is using some plausible but vague intuition about his motives as an excuse to engage in gossip.
Then, no doubt, all biography insofar as it gets personal is gossip. Frankly, I have great unease that Culture and Value was even published (though I understand the expunged some of the really personal and, as they deemed it, irrelevant stuff). But it was and there IS useful information in it about his religious beliefs and ideas. Given that the Lectures we're discussing were compiled from student notes (in this case without his oversight, as I recall) and never intended for publication, why should they be anymore dispositive about his thinking than what is found in Culture and Value, his own writings (even if not intended for publication)
? More, given that we are dealing with the odds and ends of his philosophical life, why place anymore credence on one than the other? Don't they all need to be seen in common? Can we hope to draw the line here and exclude anything that is now in the public domain if it is relevant to what is being considered?
> Not that I am condemning gossip, per se, but it is a distraction if it isn't actually enriching our understanding of the text in a demonstrable way or providing an actual argument to support one interpretation or another.
>
I am suggesting it is enriching it, of course, since when discussing religion and his beliefs about what it means to profess religious beliefs it is useful to see how he did it and how it worked for him to the best that we can discern this.
> One more thing on that point: even if biographical data did somehow make Martin's reading more plausible, that would not undermine my main thesis. My point is that Martin's arguments for his interpretation are mistaken. But if there are other, better arguments, his interpretation itself might not be mistaken.
>
My point is that your thesis hinges on collapsing two different kinds of "non-controversiali
ty" which was the reason I suggested we consider in more depth what he may have meant by his statement in 128.
> SW has pointed out elsewhere that your remarks about the relationship Blue Book and the overall development of Wittgenstein'
s thought are mistaken.
Sean is wrong though, of course, he is entitled to his opinion.
> I have nothing to add to that but I will ask this: what was your point? Did you wish to claim that later, Wittgenstein had decided that "craving for generality" and "contempt for the particular case" were not in fact impediments to doing philosophy?
My point on that score was to say that you overreach in arguing that Wittgenstein'
s later emphasis on the particular (which is undisputed) obviates the criticisms made by Martin. Wittgenstein does not have to say that he was speaking of all religions, all the time, for some his points to be relevant to certain instances of religion since, if his point is right, then there ought to be some religious cases where it makes sense to say that belief in the facts of the claim are not held by the proponent to be relevant. At the least it's instructive to note that his more precise points in the Lectures about religion do not find their way into his later published work, the PI, while some of his pscyhological stuff does.
> Do I really need to marshal quotes from later texts where he similarly warns us about generality and reminds us to look at particular cases and attend to differences between them?
>
You can do as you like, of course. I always enjoy examining Wittgenstein'
s actual words in a group though I am unwilling most of the time to do the transcribing onto this list. If you do it, however, I have taken to keeping my PI and a few other books nearby so we can certainly engage in a little exegetical tete a tete.
> Finally, saying "no" and insisting that I misread Martin and should read him more closely is not an argument. You have to actually support such a claim.
>
That's what I was doing in what you ignored. However, having done it, I don't relish the idea of simply doing it again. Suffice it to say that I offered a "no" as you put it assuming you'd already read and understood what I had posted before. If you ignored it or didn't process it is not something I can know at the time.
> Here again are some quotations from Martin's text illustrating the mistake I've been talking about, with my own emphasis added:
>
Good, let's have a look:
>
> "Is an interpretation available that does not assume that Wittgenstein is making general claims about the nature of religion? There are a number but the more obvious ones are either dubious or NOT VERY INTERESTING.
"
>
> "For example, it might be suggested that some religious beliefs have the properties that he specifies. BUT FEW PEOPLE WOULD DENY THIS."
>
Here I take him to mean that few would do so because it is not one of those things that is hidden in plain sight as it were (see 129). The same for what follows:
> "One might suggest that some Protestant religious beliefs have the properties that he characterizes. BUT WHO WOULD DENY THAT THIS IS TRUE...?"
>
> "Is there any interpretation that makes Wittgenstein'
s view NEITHER NONCONTROVERSIAL nor clearly wrong?"
>
> "WHO WOULD WANT TO DENY the thesis that some religious believers and nonbelievers talk past one another?"
>
The points of these quotes is to say that Wittgenstein'
s comments don't offer anything especially useful in the way of a new means of understanding religious practice and belief. It is an arguable view of course. My own criticism of Wittgenstein'
s ideas about religious practice and belief is that they don't accord with actual experience which is a related but slightly different point to the one Martin makes. But Martin is pointing out that philosophical claims about something that don't make that something more understandable are not good claims SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY EXPRESS SOMETHING EVERYONE WOULD AGREE TO.
I have already pointed out that I believe Wittgenstein'
s reference to non-controversialit
y (as found in paragraph 128) is NOT to that kind of claim at all. And I've further noted that Wittgenstgein, himself, left these specific notions out of his later work done for publication.
> I would add that these quotes also show that Martin does see ways of reading Wittgenstein that don't have him saying controversial things. He just rekects those interpretations. For bad reasons.
>
I think his reason is a good one and that your assessment of it is mistaken (and note that I am not simply gainsaying you here, I have gone to great lengths above to give my reasons.
> Now, responding to some remaining points.
>
> <snip>
> It is helpful to distinguish between what I'll call "truisms" (those familiar and simple truths with which no one would argue and which could not constitute "theses", i.e. which are not contentious, but of which we might "assemble reminders", as per PI 128 and surrounding remarks) and what some call "hinges" (those beliefs with which _On_Certainty_ is concerned).
>
> The verbal _expression_ of a "hinge" may have the appearance of a "truism" but it may also be nonsense outside of very special circumstances. A "truism" is not nonsense. A "truism" may seem beyond question but "your mileage may vary", as they say.
>
An interesting point.
> For example, if I point out that the game of poker incorporates an element of randomness and an element of concealment, while the game of chess involves neither, those are "truisms". But they are not "hinges". Doubting such things would not need to throw much else into doubt. They are not a "bedrock".
>
What do those cases have to do with my point that some things are uncontroversial while not obvious while other things are uncontroversial AND obvious and that the former are interesting from a philosophical point while the lkatter are not?
> PI 128 is not making a logical point, a la OC, about what it makes sense to question or claim to know. It is making a methodological recommendation about the sorts of assertions that have a place in the practice of (his style of) philosophy.
>
Again, what has that to do with my point? Granted that they are different claims (after all it would be awful if everything Wittgenstein said simply made the same point!), I am still asking what are we to take 128 to mean? You say it's a recommendation, not a point or claim. Yet it is phrased like a simple declarative senstence. Why shouldn't we consider how it relates to the truth of the things it seems to reference? To do so, it helps to look at the context which, of course, is what I have been proposing all along.
> The example "truisms" provides a nice segue to another point. I may assemble various truisms like those above in hopes that you would arrive at the conclusion, "So, despite what I thought, maybe there is no one element shared by all and only those activities we call 'games'!" and perhaps even, "So, many of the words we use may not have all their uses united by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions!"
>
> This process of assembling reminders might be compared to an argument. Nevertheless, I might not insist on the conclusion. And in fact, no such assembling of reminders would actually prove that someone really clever couldn't somehow come up with a "perfect" definition of "game".
>
Again, what is your point? I wasn't making an argument about any of these issues, merely citing certain facts and making certain claims based on interpretations I offered, AND I was asking, of course, if we oughtn't to look into the notion presented by 128 in more depth. You then converted this into an actual argument about something (my alleged claiming that we argue?) and now here we are with you telling me something about Wittgenstein'
s thinking that you (presumably) think I don't know. This is a very strange journey!
> At most, between such truisms and the simile about "family resemblances" (showing how such definitions may be quite unnecessary after all) my interlocutor might be persuaded to look at things differently. But if she insists, "Still, they must have something in common!" I may have to relent. Insisting she arrive at the conclusion I wish would constitute advancing a thesis.
>
>
> Calling this method "argument" could be misleading.
As with most words "argument" has a range of uses, from the arguments lawyers make in briefs to the argument between two motorists involved in an auto accident to the arguments of logical discourse, etc. What we have been doing here in this thread falls most closely into the realm of the motorists I suspect.
<snip>
>
> Regarding the comments about "theories" in relation to "theses", I take "theories" to be related, but with further connotations of "conjecture" or of an analogy with scientific theories, i.e. as revealing some hidden underlying structure, e.g. to propositions,
as in Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions or the nature of predication, e.g. Russell's Theory of Types. I choose these examples because no one would accuse Russell of trying to do natural
> science in putting forth these theories.
I think a case can be made that Wittgenstein had precisely Russell's type of theorizing in mind when he opposed theorizing in philosophy, i.e., making the mistake of applying the methods of science to the realm of conceptual clarification.
> Wittgenstein'
s concern is wider than the the pretensions and wild speculations of the armchair "scientist" or the traditional metaphysician. Most philosophers in the classic period of analytic philosophy would take issue with their kind. But Wittgenstein fought against the temptation to "theorize" even in the way that Russell theorized, though most analytic philosophers would deem that sort of theorizing perfectly appropriate.
>
Of course.
> Finally, at the risk of losing focus even more, I wanted to comment on your remarks about your experiences with Zen Buddhism
>
> > Buddhism is a little trickier. The kind I was involved in,
> > Zen, eschews all doctrine and yet it involves its
> > practitioners dutifully sitting in meditation in order to
> > liberate themselves from the karmic cycle of death and
> > rebirth. If one doesn't believe in rebirth after death, then
> > what is the point of pursuing a practice to free yourself
> > from it?
>
> Are you asking rhetorically?
>
Yes but not without a point.
> Answers to your question can be found within Zen tradition itself, in the "Five Ways of Zen":
>
> Bonpu zazen is practiced solely for mental relaxation and physical health. Gedo zazen is practiced for self-control toward moral improvement (even if one's morality is, e.g. Confucian), or toward improvement of skills such as martial or fine arts, or the cultivation of magical powers. Sojo zazen is practiced to personally escape the cycle of rebirth (the Arhat ideal), Daijo zazen is practiced to achieve enlightenment toward the liberation of all sentient beings (the Bodhisattva ideal), and Saijojo zazen is to
> realize the buddha-nature in all appearances in the here and now.
All forms of Buddhism, including Zen Buddhism, are practiced to attain liberation. Otherwise it is not Buddhism since the practice is based on the narrative of the experiences of Guatama Buddha who left the world of material things and spent twenty years seeking enlightement via all the different traditions accessible to him in his day. When he attained enlightenment he is said to have been liberated. Liberation is defined differently in different traditions, of course, and there have been developments in the modern world that seek to emphasize other aspects of the practice, especially in Zen which specifically eschews dogma and metaphysics. But practicing for improving one's health or one's martial skills, etc., is all considered part of the path of illusion each practitioner must first travel before attaining the liberation of the Buddha.
Even Zen, while explicitly excluding reliance on dogma and metaphysics as it does, operates (is practiced) within a particular milieu that includes a belief system. It can be argued that the point of Zen is to break out of the belief system but, to seek THAT end, one has to be held by that belief system first. There's no point in breaking free of what doesn't bind one.
By the way, the idea of using Buddhism of any form as a gateway to magical powers as you reference above is clearly a corruption of the original teachings of the Buddha. This is not to say there are not some forms like this or that those practicing Buddhism of this sort don't feel they are on the right path. It does, though, show that the human penchant for interpretation is rather large, given that such a belief directly contradicts the actual Buddha narrative.
> All of these are explicitly recognized as legitimate forms of the practice by Zen Buddhists, though the order in which I named them roughly corresponds to the esteem in which they are held by orthodox Buddhists.
>
See above.
> In explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of these other forms of practice, are they no longer the "serious religionists" you'd spoken of?
>
Suppose we came on a culture where the people all believed the myths and objects of their religious veneration were hogwash but did it anyway. Would we still call what they practiced "religion"? I guess we might. But is THAT what we mean when we speak of the kinds of religious practices that most religions and cultures consider religion? Could a society of atheists that always pretended they were believers, to one another as well as to outsiders, be possible? And if possible, would we think of them as religious in the sense that non-atheist practitioners of a religion think makes one religious?
SWM
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