From the preface of the Harpre Torchbooks Edition of THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS published 1965, copyright Basil Blackwell, 1958

Rush Rhees writing:

"Wittgenstein dictated the 'Blue Book' (though he did not call it that) to his class in Cambridge during the session 1933-34, and he had stencilled copies made. He dictated the "Brown Book" to two of his pupils (Francis Skinner and Alice Ambrose) during 1934-35. He had only three typed compies made of this, and he showed them only to very close friends and putpils. But people who borrowed them made their own copies, and there was a trade in them. If Wittgenstein had named these dictations, he might have called them "Philosophical Remarks" or "Philosophical Investigations". But the first lot was bound in blue wrappers and the second in brown, and they were always spoken of that way.

"He sent a copy of the Blue Book to Lord Russell later on, with a covering note."

Rhees reproduces that covering note (which I have elsewhere transcribed and posted onto this list earlier on.

Then Rhees continued:

"That was all the Blue Book was, though: a set of notes. The Brown Book was rather different, and for a time he thought of it as a draft of something he might publish. He started more than once to make revisions of a German version of it. The last was in August 1936. He brought this, with some minor changes and insertions, to the beginning of the discussion of voluntary action -- about page 154 in our text. Then he wrote, in heavy strokes, "Dieser ganze 'Versuch einer Umarbeitung' vom (Anfang) bis hierher ist nichts wert". ("This whole attempt at a revision, from the start right up to this point, is worthless.") That was when he began what we now have (with minor revisions) as the first part of the Philosophical Investigations.

"I doubt if he would have published the Brown Book in English, whatver happened. . . . What we are printing here are notes he gave to his pupils, and a draft for his own use; that is all.

"Philosophy was a method of investigation, for Wittgenstein, but his conception of the method was changing. We can see this in the way he uses the notion of 'language games', for instance . . ."


--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> Because Stuart has on many occasions on this list proclaimed, falsely, that the Blue and Brown Books represent Wittgenstein in a transitional period between Tractarian thought and Philosophical Investigations, I thought I would take a few moments to hopefully see such erroneous information stop. I believe this sentence here is the latest incarnation of something completely false:
>

> "[Stuart said:] ... the Blue Book reflects his transitional phase and is only the result of notes taken in his classes by some of his students. At least the Brown Book had the merit of being supervised and corrected by him with an eye toward possible publication. I don't think we can take anything said in the Blue Book as dispositive for Wittgenstein's ideas. It is, at best, helpful and somewhat indicative of where he was going."
>

    
> In point of fact, the only "transitional" work offered by Wittgenstein is known today as Philosophical Remarks, reflecting his thoughts during the period of 1929-1930. This manuscript was generated so he could continue to receive a stipend to lecture at Cambridge, something he had only been doing 1 year before. He had to present the ideas to Russell so Russell could vouch for Wittgenstein's continued funding by the college. It is this work that is, paradoxically, most Kantian while it is also seemingly-most verificationist. (See Ray Monk, 292).
>

Assuming you mean he offered it as a transitional work, why would he have considered himself doing transitional work while in transition? How would he know he would end up in a different place, when such work was behind him?

As to the transitional nature of the material, I refer, again, to Rhees characterization, Rhees being a contemporary and acquaintance of Wittgenstein. While this isn't evidence he has it right he is at least a credible witness in the case. Of course, being in transition says nothing about the locus on the transitional continuum and it is fairly obvious that his thinking in the Blue and Brown Books is more like what we later find in the Investigations than in the Tractatus. Still, Wittgenstein himself rejected the material, if Rhees is to be believed, and, more the material reveals a continued evolution in his thinking in terms of certain concepts (e.g., "language games") which play a significant role in his later Investigations.

I did make one mischaracterization though in an earlier reference I made to the Blue and Brown Books, which I noticed on returning to Rhees' preface for the purpose of answering Sean's comment. I said before that at least the Brown Book had the benefit of his oversight while the Blue Book did not. It turns out that Rhees reports in that same preface, based on the cover note of Wittgenstein to Russell, that Wittgenstein did review and edit the material in what was being called the Blue Book and which he was sending on to Russell.

As to Sean's statement that "There is no indication that he intended the Brown Book to be published" (I'm paraphrasing here as have already snipped out the relevant part of the text in keeping with the usual rules of cutting away excess verbiage -- I inadvertently cut too much when I snipped!), please see Rhees' comment above. So the Blue Book, too, had the benefit of his attention.

SWM

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The readers on this list will have to forgive me for not being intimately familiar with the entire background of SWM's previous emails, because I routinely have these routed directly to my SPAM folder and thence to the Trash. To put it as politely as possible they are oh so "b=ooooooooooooooo-ring".

On Dec 5, 2009, at 6:31 PM, SWM wrote:

> From the preface of the Harpre Torchbooks Edition of THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS published 1965, copyright Basil Blackwell, 1958
>
> Rush Rhees writing:
>
> "Wittgenstein dictated the 'Blue Book' (though he did not call it that) to his class in Cambridge during the session 1933-34, and he had stencilled copies made. He dictated the "Brown Book" to two of his pupils (Francis Skinner and Alice Ambrose) during 1934-35. He had only three typed compies made of this, and he showed them only to very close friends and putpils. But people who borrowed them made their own copies, and there was a trade in them. If Wittgenstein had named these dictations, he might have called them "Philosophical Remarks" or "Philosophical Investigations". But the first lot was bound in blue wrappers and the second in brown, and they were always spoken of that way.
>
> "He sent a copy of the Blue Book to Lord Russell later on, with a covering note."
>
> Rhees reproduces that covering note (which I have elsewhere transcribed and posted onto this list earlier on.
>
> Then Rhees continued:
>
> "That was all the Blue Book was, though: a set of notes. The Brown Book was rather different, and for a time he thought of it as a draft of something he might publish. He started more than once to make revisions of a German version of it. The last was in August 1936. He brought this, with some minor changes and insertions, to the beginning of the discussion of voluntary action -- about page 154 in our text. Then he wrote, in heavy strokes, "Dieser ganze 'Versuch einer Umarbeitung' vom (Anfang) bis hierher ist nichts wert". ("This whole attempt at a revision, from the start right up to this point, is worthless.") That was when he began what we now have (with minor revisions) as the first part of the Philosophical Investigations.
>
> "I doubt if he would have published the Brown Book in English, whatver happened. . . . What we are printing here are notes he gave to his pupils, and a draft for his own use; that is all.
>
> "Philosophy was a method of investigation, for Wittgenstein, but his conception of the method was changing. We can see this in the way he uses the notion of 'language games', for instance . . ."
>
>
> -The readers on this list will have to forgive me for not being intimately familiar with the entire background of SWM's previous emails, because I routinely have these routed directly to my SPAM folder and thence to the Trash. To put it as politely as possible they are oh so "b=ooooooooooooooo-ring".
>

But since on this occasion I had some interest in the useful point that had been made by Sean in regard to the surprisingly early developmnent of the first sections of the Philosophical Investigation, so many years before their publication, and because I had myself been struck by the closeness of the pattern of thought of Wittgensteins Lectures on Religion of 1937-8 with the first sections of the Inviestions, the pungent aroma of SWM's missive tempted me to go to my SPAM and retrieve it, despite knowing full well that awaiting me was merely another instance of SWM "going through the motions" of doing yeoman's "philosophical" work and eeeek! I actually opened it. Here's what I found.

Sean had made an interesting and useful point:

"Because Stuart has on many occasions on this list proclaimed, falsely, that the Blue and Brown Books represent Wittgenstein in a transitional period between Tractarian thought and Philosophical Investigations, I thought I would take a few moments to hopefully see such erroneous information stop. I believe this sentence here is the latest incarnation of something completely false:


To which Stuart responded, by not unusually quoting himself quoting himself misquoting and mis-paraphrasing someone else:

Stuart here said that Stuart had said:

> "[Stuart said:] ... the Blue Book reflects his transitional phase and is only the result of notes taken in his classes by some of his students. At least the Brown Book had the merit of being supervised and corrected by him with an eye toward possible publication. I don't think we can take anything said in the Blue Book as dispositive for Wittgenstein's ideas. It is, at best, helpful and somewhat indicative of where he was going."

So what do we have here from SWM : (1) "the Blue Book reflects his transitional phase" AND (2) "is only the result of notes taken in his classes by some of his students". A reasonable person might ask what (1) has to do with (2). And the answer would be 'NOTHING". This is just yet another of the perpetual and tedious stringing together of non-sequitors. (2) might indicate that the notes of the Blue Books (and Brown Books) were not 'polished" or "edited" or "refined" if one wishes to continue to impugn the basis of Wittgenstein's work but the fact that they were notes is completely irrelevant to whether they were "transitional" or not", a point to which SWM seems to have some sort fetichistic attachment...perhaps clinging to this notion also prompted SWM to mis-state that the Blue Books had ever been read or approved by Wittgenstein himself (apparently in another one of those tedious emails that went directly to my Spam)

Indeed, if we look at Sean's comments pointing out when the first 188 paragraphs of the PI were written we find that they guesstimate of when they were written is strikingly close to the time that the Brown Books were last edited by Wittgenstein in late, 1936

"In the first two months of 1937 -- and perhaps the last one or two of 36 -- Wittgenstein wrote the first 188 paragraphs of Philosophical Investigations (they are the same exact remarks as today). He came very close to publishing those remarks in 1938, but backed out".

As SWM himself notes,

"Then Rhees continued: The Brown Book was rather different, and for a time he thought of it as a draft of something he might publish. He started more than once to make revisions of a German version of it. The last was in August 1936."

However, this clearcut point of fact indicated that the Brown Books and the first 188 paragraphs of the Investigations were practically written at the very same time is ignored by SWM and does not stop him from further unburdening himself and boring us with his "going through the motions".....

SWM somehow cannot manage to address himself to the meaning of the words before him on the page, either those written by by Rhees or written by Sean, and continues to inflict upon us his "transitional" NON-argument.

SWM quotes Sean saying.

> In point of fact, the only "transitional" work offered by Wittgenstein is known today as Philosophical Remarks, reflecting his thoughts during the period of 1929-1930. This manuscript was generated so he could continue to receive a stipend to lecture at Cambridge, something he had only been doing 1 year before. He had to present the ideas to Russell so Russell could vouch for Wittgenstein's continued funding by the college. It is this work that is, paradoxically, most Kantian while it is also seemingly-most verificationist. (See Ray Monk, 292).

And then, in yet another monumental and mis-paraphrase and non-sequitur, SWM seeks to provoke our intellect but only succeeds in provoking a mild feeling of nausea when he states, without any justification or sign of an underlying rational process,

"Assuming you mean he offered it as a transitional work, why would he have considered himself doing transitional work while in transition? How would he know he would end up in a different place, when such work was behind him?"

How can anyone read this torrent of confusion and feel any sympathy for SWM insofar as he somehow now manages to insinuate that Sean is adhering to the preposterous belief that "transitional" work must somehow always known to be such by its author and that Sean is somehow denying the dismissal of the Brown Books and Blue Books by SWM as being merely transitional nature , not because it is just plain silly to do so based on their their nearly simultaneous drafting with the drafting of the first 188 paragraphs of the ) but because somehow Wittgenstein was not aware of or intentionally producing the Brown books as "transitional". Perhaps SWM confuses "transitional" with "tentative" or "unedited" ...but who's to say?

But there is more. SWM then tells us, seeking to shore up the nature of this "phantom" transitional nature of Wittgenstein's writings:

"As to the transitional nature of the material, I refer, again, to Rhees characterization, Rhees being a contemporary and acquaintance of Wittgenstein. While this isn't evidence he has it right he is at least a credible witness in the case. "

Rhees may indeed be a credible witness. But SWM is apparently far from a credible "paraphraser".. When one looks to the paragraphs from Rhees with which SWM begins this latest email, there is no mention by Rhees or thought or use or implication of there being anything being "transitional" about the Blue and Brown Books in the sense that SWM wishes us to accept. The word "transitional" simply does not appear. All we have is that the Books were based on Notes and were not meant for publication. Again, the man said that the ideas in the Blue and Brown Books were simply notes, not polished, and finally edited for publication. PERIOD. What the "F...K" does that have to do with corroborating some personal angst of SWMs about their "transitional" nature....except to disprove SWM's point, yet again.

Whenever will enough be enough.

Ah well. Perhaps I should have just left the latest of these emails from SWM in the SPAM.

Stuart:

I know of the preface to the publication. Thanks for offering that to the list. But it does seem that you have once again suggested something false or that you have not understood it. So just to be perfectly clear for those who are confused, I offer the following.

Academics are always working on their ideas in one format or another, particularly if they have original thoughts. If you have original and novel ideas, you'll give them in lectures. You'll make notes or outlines for your students (or they will). You'll generate manuscripts (conference papers), second and third drafts ("typescripts"), and so forth. In this day and age, you'll even have dictation and emails. Let us call the sum of these things the "paper-trail of your thoughts." Or better yet, let's call it by what the lawyers do: "work product."

Wittgenstein had a particular style of "work product." He wrote remarks in notebooks. He then went back into the notebooks and created manuscripts from the remarks he thought more worthy. From these manuscripts, he created a further selection which he dictated to a typist. These were called "typescripts." According to Monk (319), he used these typescripts either for the creation of other (more-edited) typescripts or began re-arranging the content by cutting up remarks, clipping them together and so forth. Monk says that he would then start the process all over again! (lol). This entire reflective and regurgitive process continued for over twenty years for the period we are talking about. He never reached a final version of anything that he found fit for publishing. His literary executors, therefore, were left with the task of rummaging through all the various typescripts, tangents, remarks, clipped segments and so forth in order to
reconstruct his views as best as can be. (Go read the preface to Zettel, which apparently is a bunch of remarks Wittgenstein clipped together and stored in a box). That is what true Wittgensteinianism is --  it's a reconstruction. It's the same sort of thing you would need to understand (historical) Jesus or Socrates. 

Now, what you are saying is that somehow the Blue and Brown books should be cast aside for some reason. You've also included Culture and Value (in the past) and, I assume, biography (letters, diaries and so forth). But when it is all said and done, I don't know what it is that you are pointing to as "the finished work" or "the real thing." People who truly read Philosophical Investigations find very important help in this regard in all the other manuscripts and remarks. In fact, there is no indication at all that Wittgenstein ever wanted his Cambridge lectures retracted. Rather, he always wanted them UNDERSTOOD. So the Blue Books are not some weird collection of odd views that have to be set aside because they are "transitory."

Now, let's deal with the Brown Book and the publication issue. This is another misunderstanding. Monk is correct when he asserts of the Brown Book, that it "reads almost like a textbook," (I prefer the term manual), because it is an application of his new method. Monk writes, "It is as though the book was intended to serve as a text in a course designed to nip in the bud any latent philosophizing." This is because there is "no philosophical moral ... drawn other than ... understanding" language games.(342-343). Monk goes on to say, "There is no indication that Wittgenstein considered publishing the Brown Book." (346). (Please do note that sentence).

Now, what Rhees is talking about appears to be something subtly different. He's talking about the fact that in 1936 Wittgenstein was going about his usual manners, regurgitating and reformulating his work product (making insertions here and there).  At this point in time, Wittgenstein isn't really working on "THE BROWN BOOK" per se (as it to publish "IT"), but upon the same "thing" that he is working on when he cuts and plays with his typescripts. He's just trying to find a way to birth his product. So he's using teh Brown Book AS A TYPESCRIPT.  In this respect, he makes some insertions and then later declares, "This whole attempt at revision, from the start right up to this point, is WORTHLESS". [allcaps substituted for italics in quote -- sw].  And so, he puts down that typescript and begins writing (I should say, completing!) what will be 1-188 in PI.

There is no contradiction between Rhees and Monk. There is only the language game and the failure to know biography. Rhees is saying the Brown Book might have been thought to be published one day because Wittgenstein chose to grind it up in his workmill. All that that means is that the Brown Book was input material for the mill. Monk is saying "the Brown Book" BEFORE IT IS MAKRED UP -- the historical one -- was not attempted to be published. That is an historical fact. That is true. It was not written to be published; it was written to serve as an application of the new method (apparently for his classes). (Or perhaps just as feed for the mill -- just another typescript).

Now, if I am wrong that Rhees and Monk are not really disagreeing, I must say that I would be suspicious of the claim that Wittgenstein thought of the Brown Book "for a time" as a draft of something he might publish. There is all sorts of historical information indicating that he did not want that stuff officially "out there." There is every bit of historical evidence to think of the Brown Book as just another Wittgensteinian typescript no different than the box files of Zettel or the manuscripts that form the various segments of PI.  

So I would hope that in the future you think better of your history of Wittgenstein's manuscripts.

Regards and thanks.      
        
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > That's probably because you're still hanging onto that rigid account
> of causality you have previously insisted on.

> Sometimes rigidity is helpful, sometimes not. Pick a causal account that
> comes as close to what you mean when you say "brain causes mind"....

'The behavior of the molecules of H2O on an atomic level cause the feature of wetness that we find in water.'

> > On the wetness-of-water model there is no reason to think one could
> not say of an experience
> > that it is an aspect of the workings, at a deeper (a purely physical)
> level, of a given brain activity

> As I wrote in a related Post, any object can yield any number of
> descriptions. But I've never heard of an object having the property of
> "experience",

That's why it's probably better not to use "property". While one can use the word in a broader fashion that is consonant with such a use, the term "property" too often conjures up physical properties for us such as color, texture, hardness, wetness, etc. As I have said in the past, I prefer "feature" or "characteristic" as either term seems to have a broader application. But, in English at least, we can and do sometimes use "property" in this way, too. I'm thinking for instance of the idea of a "system property" (as used by Marvin Minsky when referring to mental features). We can also speak of mathematical properties, etc.

>whether the object is stationary or in flux. Why? Because
> "experience" isn't a property like size, color, and weight, but what a
> person has.

Exactly! So let's use "feature" or "characteristic" since you find "property" so troubling in this context! I prefer to avoid it myself for the reasons already noted.

> A person finds the water wet. Even if the wetness is an
> aspect of the brain activity, you still need the person to notice the
> signals from his brain.
>

So? Wetness is certainly a property in this physical sense and, borrowing this from Minsky, feeling wetness can be described as a certain kind of system property if minds are describable as process-based systems occurring in brains (i.e., various interactive, ongoing physical brain events).

> This doesn't have to do with the use of words but what does or doesn't
> make sense. Which is not to say that we you do not, but, rather, I
> cannot, make sense of what you've said.
>
> bruce
>

So you've said. Well I cannot do any better. I have tried every which way to get my point across. I will agree that it is counter-intuitive in one sense, but then the other way, your way, runs counter to other intuitions we have. The problem as I once said is to reconcile these apparently conflicting intuitions. If they cannot be reconciled then presumably only a dualist account will be adequate. But I think they can be, and in fact have been, reconciled by people like Dennett.

SWM

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > Not all objects are physical.
>
> Sure. Aren't we talking about the brain, a physical object? Even if we
> are talking about electrical flow, that too is physical. And, yes, a
> wheel turning is physical. Is the turning itself physical? Yes, as it
> moves in space.

> Now the "object of my desire" is and is not physical. She is, if we mean
> her physical body. But "the way she moves" doesn't refer to the
> displacement of her limbs in space-time. No one else may see it. The
> workings of my imagination, not physical.
>

Is the object of your desire the feeling you have at watching your beloved move or is it her movement (do you just want to have that movement?) or is it the person who moves?

An object can be many things. Not all are physical objects. It seems we have a rare moment of agreement. So what is this mind we are speaking about? Well it's the object of our reference in this case but, of course, not a physical object. A mind isn't a brain though it may be fair to say it's the workings of particular kinds of brains in particular ways. Just as the spin is the turning of the wheel.

> > Just because minds aren't physical objects doesn't mean they are not
> part of the physical universe
>
> makes no sense. Is it you just what to call any noun physical?
>

Huh? As I have said in the past here and elsewhere, there are many things that are part of the physical universe that aren't physical objects. Movement is physical and gravity is physical and so is electromagnetism, light, etc. All physical. Do we need to invoke the idea of separation from the physical to speak of any of these things? No because they are part and parcel of what we mean by physical when looked at with a scientific eye.

> > they ARE physical in the causal sense, i.e., that it is physical
> phenomena that cause their occurrence, bring them about!
>
> That's circular. First you have to show "how" mind is caused.

That's the job of science, of course. But you want to say it's unintelligible to speak of minds being caused so, unless you are saying science deals with the unintelligible, you are telling us that this isn't the business of science. But it manifestly is!

> You keep
> on pointing out that we can say "that it is caused." I stimulate your
> brain and remember mama. Cool. But how? You say a "physical platform."

You cannot confuse the conceptual question with the scientific one!

> But that is just more matter. It's the transition that's the rub,
>

There is only a "rub" if you persist in thinking of mind as being non-physical, something outside the realm of physical causality.

> > Another way of seeing this confusion is to recognize that involves
> thinking that mind,
> > if it is not a physical object, must be utterly separate from physical
> objects.
>
> Yes, to see mind as a "separate thing" is quite confusing. But if one
> sees "mind" as a way of looking at a thing", the way we see a painting
> in the paint, then the confusion abates.
>

Then what's your problem with the scientific study of how brains produce minds?

> > Remove your brain or shut it off and poof, no more Bruce!
>
> Shows THAT brain is critical but doesn't show "how" it is related to
> mind. Surely, this demonstration isn't, in itself, evidence for
> causation.
>

Again, you confuse conceptual questions with scientific ones!

SWM

> > Go tell it to researchers like Dehaene
>
> When I get a chance. Thanks for the prompt.
>
> bruce

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