>
> I definitely see a problem here in the sceptics argument, because it seems then, that we lose the use of 'knowlege' and thus he himselve would not even be able to state, that we can not speak of knowledge here (in the case of the tomato). But I feel just not clear about what to say against the sceptic or the rK. I still want to say: „he is right, what justification do we have to say, that we know... ?"
>
> This is my trouble. I think it has something to do with 'normal conditions' as Anscombe calls it (in 'On brute facts'). But I still can not 'stop doing philosophy' here. Can someone help me to stop?
>
> Sekhar says

We ignore simple things and land in a muddle.
Three limitations of language one must aware, 1 meaning is indirect 2 meaning is partial 2 meaning is not what it denotes.
How we acquired language in our child hood,same manner we are acquiring ideas even to day.
Essentially languages constructed for the sole purpose of ones own movement internally and externally.
Language is a divisive phenomena so what our vision is.
All these problems exist both in the language and humans since word apple is not real fruit.

thank you
sekhar
>
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 ... I think I have figured out the best way to describe language. It's a set of cue cards. Imagine a set of complicated cue cards. You are shown a card, and it cues your brain into certain functions and processes. We play the game of "cue cards" when we communicate.  The deck is not stagnant, of course, because new cues can be created out of existing ones. We learn the cues, and we learn the play for forming cues.  

Regards. 

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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... I think I have figured out the best way to describe language. It's a set of cue cards. Imagine a set of complicated cue cards. You are shown a card, and it cues your brain into certain functions and processes. We play the game of "cue cards" when we communicate.  The deck is not stagnant, of course, because new cues can be created out of existing ones. We learn the cues, and we learn the play for forming cues.  

Regards. 

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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... I don't mean cue cards as in the sense of television (having words). I mean the idea of cue in a social science sense. The idea of "cue" is of symbol or sign that prompts its receiver. Instead of playing Jacks, one plays the game of prompt. Just as in real card games where certain cards do more licentious things, there are cue cards that have special value. The face cards "pin" something particular. The ordinary cards only prompt for resemblance. When one assembles a "hand" and plays it, so to speak, one can offer a terrible play or perhaps be a terrible player (which is only to say that one is challenged by insight).   
 
Regards.

SW

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SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>I'm proceeding in the same manner as you. I don't presume to tell
>>scientists how to proceed scientifically. I confine myself to the
>>clarification of logical and linguistic issues; more or less as you
>>do.

>>I'll start with the clarification of the various theories of mind or
>>consciousness in relation to the fundamental question: what is the
>>relation between measurable phenomena and experiencable phenomena?

>>alternately, one might theorize that experiencable phenomena can be
>>explained on the basis of measurable phenomena alone; and, either:

>>1. that experiencable phenomena is identical to measurable phenomena
>>or that it can be reduced to measurable phenomena; or,

>"Identity", as we have seen, has a number of flavors and must be
>carefully explicated if it is to be the basis for such a claim as this.
>As to "reducible", you sometimes seem to me to consider this term
>problematic as well. While it seems rather open and shut to me, I would
>want to see it explicated here so we can be sure we're talking the same
>thing!

>In either case, as we have seen, my position can be described as
>invoking "identity" and certainly involves a claim of reduction and yet
>I would not generally consider the distinction between merasurable and
>experienceable that you make relevant. From what I can see, this is
>just a distinction between the observable (in an objective or shared
>sense) and the non-observable (because it is subjective). And that
>distinction doesn't seem significant to me in this matter because
>subjectivity is the phenomenon we're discussing and we would not be
>discussing it if it didn't have the characteristics it has (being
>non-observable in an objective sense) otherwise. Measurability it seems
>to me comes in a variety of flavors, too.

>As I've said, I can live with an appellation of "identity" as long as
>it is not reduced to a notion of logical identity. As to measurability
>vs. experienceable, I think that's really a false dichotomy and that
>the distinction should be between objectively observable and
>subjectively observable (merely experienceable).

I define the identity relation as the relation that satisfies Leibniz's
Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, (L. Ind. Id.).
[http://academic.reed.edu/philosophy/courses/phil200/handouts/hd-fall05-mind-1.html]

this is probably what you call 'logical identity'; and, that term is
okay with me. however, if you want to call a relation that does not
satisfy L. Ind. Id. an 'identity' relation; then, I suggest you use a
qualifier (other than 'logical' or 'strict') with 'identity'.

this should help avoid at least one quagmire of ambiguity because L.
Ind. Id. makes it impossible for the brain to be logically identical to
the mind if the brain is also considered the cause of the mind.

to put this point in terms of the duality of measurable and
experiencable phenomena: a measurable phenomenon can not be identical to
an experiencable phenomenon that it causes.

getting clear on this point would likely resolve at least some
linguistic muddles, as you call them.

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>

>
> I define the identity relation as the relation that satisfies Leibniz's
> Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, (L. Ind. Id.).
> [http://academic.reed.edu/philosophy/courses/phil200/handouts/hd-fall05-mind-1.html]
>
> this is probably what you call 'logical identity'; and, that term is
> okay with me. however, if you want to call a relation that does not
> satisfy L. Ind. Id. an 'identity' relation; then, I suggest you use a
> qualifier (other than 'logical' or 'strict') with 'identity'.
>

Note that I don't call it "identity". You and Bruce sometimes seem to want to impute that terminology to my explanations. That's okay with me as long as you don't mean by this what I have called "logical identity" and which you correctly connect to the definition you have offered. But then it isn't for me to further qualify because I have already done so when I say you can call my proposal one of identity, as long as you do not think I mean by this the logical variety.

I have already noted that, as with most words we play the language game with, there are many different kinds of identity, from the logical to the identity of twins to that of like-specked artifacts to that of different aspects of the same thing. I am on record as saying my notion of brains causing consciousness comes down saying this is about different aspects of the same thing (as in two sides of the same coin or water molecules, which operate in a certain way, will manifest on one level of observation as wetness).

Note that my point is that it is the performance of certain functions by physical processes that are the coin on this analogy. The two sides of the coin are the observable evidences of the processes in operation and the occurrence of subjectiveness. On this view the brain is the platform on which the processes are run. But neither the brain nor the processes themselves are the consciousness (the subjectness). THAT is an aspect, on a certain level of observation, of the functions being performed. On such a view, any processes on any platform that can do the same things (perform the same functions) could generate subjectness. But it doesn't follow that any two instances of subjectness (of consciousness) would be interchangeable except insofar as they are capable of the same functionalities (of accomplishing the same tasks).

I have said all this many times and with many different examples. I don't have to offer a specialized name for it because I did not choose the name "identity" for what I have in mind, you and/or Bruce did. But I acknowledge one could do THAT and that I would be okay with it as long as we are clear on the meaning I have in mind. You can call it "Frank" for all I care. I will still describe it in the same way.

> this should help avoid at least one quagmire of ambiguity because L.
> Ind. Id. makes it impossible for the brain to be logically identical to
> the mind if the brain is also considered the cause of the mind.
>

The quagmire happens when people don't read or pay attention to what is being said! I have said what I mean countless times now, on this and prior lists. I deliberately avoid the term "identity" precisely because of this risk of ambiguity. That's why I prefer "cause" which can, as we have seen, also be problematic but which seems more intuitive to me, based on the simple fact that, when asked why water is wet we can say with reasonable clarity and limited ambiguity that it's because _______ (describing the atomic behavior that lies at the bottom of that particular physical feature).

> to put this point in terms of the duality of measurable and
> experiencable phenomena: a measurable phenomenon can not be identical to
> an experiencable phenomenon that it causes.
>

Here we have ambiguities with regard to "measurable". We certainly can measure responses in conscious organisms and, if Dehaene is right, we will even be able to measure the occurrence of mental images in brains -- even without the reporting of the organism that has the brain.

It seems to me you are collapsing "measureable" into observable but even on that basis what I have described is, indeed, observable. What is missing though is, of course, shared direct access to the subjective experience. Dehaene's observations and thesis suggest that even this may be achievable but assuming it never is, I still see no special problem here. That we have a subjective field that is forever inaccessible to an observer other than one that already is at one with that field doesn't strike me as especially problematic for the study of consciounsess and its physical causes.

> getting clear on this point would likely resolve at least some
> linguistic muddles, as you call them.
>
> Joe
>
> --
>

Well it's not been for want of trying on my part. I have said for a long time that 1) I am not hung up on any particular term and that it is the description that interests me and that 2) I find both "causal" and "identity" appropriate terms, with the caveats I have long provided for each. Is it my fault that some in reading my statements to this effect simply don't or won't process what I have said? Would coming up with an amended nomenclature make any real difference if people aren't paying attention to the descriptive content of the words I'm using?

The point of philosophy of the Wittgensteinian sort is precisely this, to explore our word usages and to use the information uncovered about the variant uses to get clear on various conceptual questions that seem to stymie communication on a philosophical level. Renaming relations, or other things, via stipulated terms is only an outcome of the linguistic discovery process. It's the process that counts, not the naming.

But if you want to call the idea I have been talking about "Identity sub 2" or "underlying identity" or "non law of indiscernibility identity" or some other invented term, that's fine. As long as you are naming what I am actually saying and there is no better terminology already available to us to designate this in a distinct way, I'm fine with that. I just don't think it does much for us philosophically. What is interesting from the perspective of philosophy is the analysis that gets us to the relevant insights, not what we call the things we have our insights about.

SWM

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