Sean Wilson wrote on Wed, 13 January 2010 17:45
> So, possible statements are still propositions. It's only the form of the proposition that matters. 

Absolutely.

For example, someone claimed that the Bible is full of references to a Santa Claus figure. I asked him where this was to be found in the Bible, for even though I have yet to finish it, I have yet to see any such claim. He cited a few random lines of scripture: I responded that I saw no mention of what he was speaking of, but I did see an if/then claim. And that would, of course, be the form of the proposition.

There are, however, numerous statements that I have some difficulty differentiating. Take the statement that many of the prophets made, namely, "I am here!"

Is "I am here" tautological or possible? There is not even any pointing going on, but it is quite clear. Is "I am there" a contradiction? It appears some context is requisite, because it would be quite sensible for someone to utter the second phrase if he were speaking to someone on the phone who was guessing cities on a map. But that is not the context of the prophets.

I used to think that in the motto of the TLP, that W. might have been thinking something like "I am I", but I was never sure. I guess I am still not sure...
--
He lived a wonderful life.
==========================================

Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Having trouble with Yahoo -- don't know if others share in that, but I have=
been trying to keep off Yahoo for that reason, hence my slowness to respon=
d. Maybe that will continue, who knows?

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:

> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:

> > Dualism is not a pejorative, Neil.
>
>
> The issue should be whether it contributes anything useful to the
> discussion. I don't think it does.

I read you. I disagree, of course, since I think it shows where the bottom lines of the different positions get drawn and what the implications for drawing them where we each do are.

>
>
> > It merely denotes the idea that consciousness is ontologically basic,
> > that it cannot be derived from anything else.


> If that even means anything. I'll admit to being a skeptic of
> ontological claims.
>

We can't avoid ontologoical thinking (meaning having ideas about what there is and what underlies what) even if we can avoid talking about such things. I don't think much is gained by suppressing that information in a discussion though merely because one has an aversion to the notion.

Note that by pointing out where something is ontological (about what there is or what underlies what there is), I am not arguing for metaphysical claims about what we can determine to be most basic, etc. There's an important distinction to be made.

>
>
> > It seems to me the possibilities here are:

> > 1) Consciousness is seen as a unique something that co-exists, at
> > some level, with all that we call physical in the universe (atoms,
> > energy, forces, etc.) but is of a fundamentally different type or
> > nature from all the rest.

> > 2) Consciousness is produced by some combination of the rest but,
> > once produced is fundamentally different and stand-alone. A new
> > something has been brought into the world.

> > 3) Consciousness is a parallel realm of being that peers into the
> > physical world through some physical window (the brain as lense to
> > another dimension, you might say).
>
>
> That kind of thinking is why I am an ontological skeptic.
>
>

To note these is to point out the various dualist positions that are possible but not to argue for the truth or primacy of any of them.

>
> > My view, again, is that dualism could be true.
>
>
> And what does it mean to say that dualism is true? Or, to ask
> differently, what kind of criteria would be used to settle the question
> of whether dualism is true?
>
>

At least two ways:

1) If we could not explain the occurrence of consciousness in a physicalist=
way, then some other thesis would be required, probably a dualist (but may=
be a multiplist) one.

2) If we had evidence of ghosts and spirits and other realms of existence (=
of minds existing without bodies, of life after death, etc.) that went beyo=
nd subjective feelings and claims based on them, then I would say we needed=
to consider a dualist explanation of the phenomena of existence.

>
> > Dualism could be true but why do we need to rely on such fairy tales
> > when the story can be told much more simply and in keeping with the
> > way we currently understand the world? But it isn't pejorative,
> > per se, to describe certain positions as being either explicitly
> > or implicitly dualist.
>
>
> In one breath, you say it is a fairy tale. Then in the next breath you
> say it isn't pejorative. That seems inconsistent to me.
>
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
>
>

I don't think fairy tales are necessarily false either though I do happen t=
o think they are. That some fairy tale(s) might actually be true is at leas=
t as much a possibility as disembodied spirits, life after death, etc. But =
"fairy tale" in a pejorative sense only means a story in which we have no r=
easonable basis to believe. But even fairy tales could turn out to be reaso=
nable, given the right evidence.

SWM

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> To note these is to point out the various dualist positions that are
> possible but not to argue for the truth or primacy of any of them.

Suppose you use similar reasoning, but instead of applying it to
consciousness you apply it to mathematics or art or poetry. How would
that work out?

>> And what does it mean to say that dualism is true? Or, to ask
>> differently, what kind of criteria would be used to settle the
>> question of whether dualism is true?

> 1) If we could not explain the occurrence of consciousness in a
> physicalist way, then some other thesis would be required, probably
> a dualist (but maybe a multiplist) one.

Wouldn't that only show that we were using an inadequate explanatory
framework?

> 2) If we had evidence of ghosts and spirits and other realms of
> existence (of minds existing without bodies, of life after death,
> etc.) that went beyond subjective feelings and claims based on them,
> then I would say we needed to consider a dualist explanation of
> the phenomena of existence.

Wouldn't we just change what we mean by "physical" so that it
incorporated ghosts and spirits as physical?

Regards,
Neil

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

(Michael)

... these are good questions. A couple of comments. 

1. The point that is being objected to is when a person confuses an example of a word with its meaning. And also when they compound the problem by believing that, if it's the framer's example, the issue goes away. (It actually gets worse).

 So let's take several examples: "chair," "liberty," "lunch," "game," "speech,", and "food," If you found that the framing generation selected an example of each, it would be a fallacy to take this example as being "the original meaning of" chair, liberty, lunch, game, speech or food. The meaning of these words is never a single  example of them, because the words are family resemblance terms. 

Imagine that most in the framing generation said the following of something our generation generally called a chair (e.g., a living-room beanbag): "that's not a chair!" Under such circumstances, it would NOT be the case that either of us disagreed with the meaning of "chair" or that we had "separate meanings." Rather, it would only be that we differed over which examples we liked or decided to include. But in such cases of disagreement, both of us understand what "chair" stands for in the language game perfectly well (a seating-utility device of some sort). Please note that, in law, it is only "chair"  that is passed along to the next generation, not the examples (protocol) of it. Imagine Patrick Henry and Dr. King disagreeing over whether X counted as "liberty." This disagreement would not be over what "liberty" means in language; rather, it would be over whether this case or example should count. If generations want to regiment progeny with
regard to the TYPE of chairs or the EXAMPLES of liberty, they need to pass along language different than "chair" or "liberty" -- they need, in short, language that speaks to the level of protocol (of examples).

Otherwise, such words operate in language the same then as they do now. They say, in essence, "pick a member of the family" or "select your example of it."

2.  Nothing I have ever said would suggest that anthropology or historicism should never be used for understanding language. The use here would be the same, I suppose, as dictionaries. Indeed, if the language culture changes significantly -- of or a use is idiosyncratic -- you need to consult such things. Example: Plato's use of "the forms." The issue here would be to avoid polysemy or to catch a colloquialism or a local parlance, of some sort. But once both of us know what family resemblance we are dealing with -- "chair," "game," "lunch," etc. -- historicism has come to an end in terms of stating language meaning.

3. Please note that we might use all sorts of historicism as suggestive guidance to tell us WHICH chair, liberty, etc., to pick. My point is only that the pick is OURS. And we are not violating either language or law when we pick an example different or even objected to by those who preceded us. So my view isn't "don't use history." It is: quit telling us that the original meaning of the constitution is the examples picked by the framing generation. If any parent of any generation has ANYTHING relevant to add to our lives, let it come through whatever inherent wisdom it offers rather than through both a language fallacy and an ideological program.  Any originalism (or tradition) that ever comes to us must do so on its own making. 

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

----- Original Message ----
From: "Curtis, Michael K." <curtismk@wfu.edu>
To: Patrick Wiseman <pwiseman@gsu.edu>; "CONLAWPROF@lists.ucla.edu" <conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu>
Sent: Fri, March 5, 2010 11:21:07 AM
Subject: RE: Originalism, "Arms," and Family Resemblance

I do not claim to be an originalist, because I am not sure what it means. 

History including historical context and  original meaning strike me as factors, not the only factors.  & I agree that the ultimate question is what do these words mean to us--but what does that mean?  It does seem to be legitimate to look for multiple sources of understanding the meaning to us of words in the text of the Constitution and that history and historical context is one source of understanding; precedent is another; and there are more. Courts appeal to history and have at least since John Marshall.  What sorts of problems influenced the writing of the provision?  Is this not a relevant question? 

If someone (Bork) says the words of the privileges or immunities clause of the 14th Amendment are an inkblot, is it legitimate to show that the words were commonly used to describe particular liberties in the Bill of Rights--running from early American history through the Civil War, in Court opinions (e.g. Palko and others), and e.g., in FDR's proclamation of Bill of Rights Day.  If this is to be ruled out, it is hard for me to see why.  Where exactly does Wittgenstein say that looking at usage is not a way to see how the language game is played?  (This is not a rhetorical question, I have only very slight knowledge of Wittgenstein).  If what the words meant in 1866-68 is a factor, then would not usage then be relevant? 

Whether 18th or 19th century common usage or any single factor should be controlling is another matter.  Even those who say it is, won't follow this approach consistently--see Scalia-- (a good thing at least sometimes) so they do their own picking and choosing. 

Judges invoke of principles in one context and then different values produce different decisions-- as in invocation of federalism to strike down the Gender Violence Act and ignoring it in striking down state tort laws as preempted by language that does not seem to do that.  Complaining about less textually explicit rights for gays (Lawrence) and finding them for states (Alden v. Maine).

Michael Curtis

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/