.. I think this is a difficult subject, Stuart. I haven't been following everything with Cayuse, but one must take great care here. Firstly, Wittgenstein surely did remove large segments out of his engine wholesale, to be specifically replaced by a new sort of motor -- but whether the vehicle is an upgrade or a repudiation is really a matter for the marketing. [Side note: must be auto simile week]. Let me say this another way. I would be careful relying upon quotes of what Ludwig said about his work to establish any substantive points. Case in point: although it is true that he did admit to "grave mistakes" in his earlier work, it is also true that he regularly had doubts about his later work, and he admitted that it would be difficult to follow because it had "egg shells" of the old view sticking to it. I personally do not view Wittgenstein II as a repudiation of Wittgenstein I. I see it as a substantial upgrade. Sort of like going from Dos computers to whatever they have now. Here's what I think should be focused upon. You ask yourself what are the outcomes (the stakes) of each of Wittgenstein's views? In each system of thought, what are you allowed to do with language? What can be said and not said? What must we be silent of? What is nonsense in each system? When you ask these questions, what you will find is that the new creature really does a hell of a lot of what the old one did, just with a different way of doing it. (And, of course, with different winners and losers -- different stakes). One way of summing this up might say that Wittgenstein I was concerned with demarking nonsense (and the unspeakable) whereas Wittgenstein II was concerned with demarking senselessness and confusion. Note the subtle difference: nonsense versus pointlessness. The former is the result of an algebra for policing these things -- it comes from a rule -- the other is the result of showing someone "why bother" on their own terms. Wittgenstein II doesn't need to invent an algebra to police language or to constitute meaning; he'll simply allow language and meaning to be whatever they can be in a person's behavior -- but then he will comment retrospectively upon how inadequate the offering was (under the laws of the person's own making). My point is really very simple. Whether any position, X, is repudiated by Wittgenstein is a function of how that X fits in the new way of thinking. Some of the old X's may still fit. And among those that do, some may also have been required to have shed some of their baggage or their containers, so to speak. Imagine someone telling you that you had to move to a new house. What a lovely time it would be to take with you only what you could and leave behind the stuff not worth moving. And when you are in your new home, do you treat it as a repudiation or a "moving along." All that has happened is that Ludwig has moved along. Regards. Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Redesigned Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860 Twitter: http://twitter.com/seanwilsonorg Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/seanwilsonorg New Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html ----- Original Message ---- From: swmaerske <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx> To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Monday, September 14, 2009 3:43:56 PM Subject: [Wittrs] Re: Young Ludwig by McGuinness This is especially relevant to my ongoing discussions with Cayuse who seems to be convinced that the Tractarian Wittgenstein is definitive in understanding certain of Wittgenstein's ideas even though, in his later work, he explicitly disavows the earlier thinking as reflecting "grave" mistakes. WEB VIEW: http://tinyurl.com/ku7ga4 TODAY: http://alturl.com/whcf 3 DAYS: http://alturl.com/d9vz 1 WEEK: http://alturl.com/yeza GOOGLE: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs YAHOO: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/ FREELIST: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009