[nasional_list] [ppiindia] The dilemma of democracy
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- Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2006 03:13:19 +0100
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**http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/777/op8.htm
10 - 18 January 2006
Issue No. 777
The dilemma of democracy
That true democracy in the Middle East would threaten US strategic and
economic interests explains why it won't be happening soon, according to Ayman
El-Amir*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The US presented Arab regimes with a poisoned chalice they could not
refuse: transform yourselves into working democracies. As a starting point, the
brash Greater Middle East Initiative, formulated by the US two years ago, was
further refined and articulated by the G8 in June 2004 as a Partnership for
Progress and a Common Future. With the "no reform imposed from outside" proviso
voiced by Arab governments accepted by the G8 and included in their final
declaration, the regional stage was set for dramatic democratic change. Or so
it seemed. There was no roadmap to follow, however: US foreign policy for the
last 50 years rewarded loyal autocracies rather than independent democracies,
leaving most Arab regimes with no democratic tradition to build on and little
incentive to develop one, the cost of forging a democratic model in Iraq less
than appealing for other candidate regimes. As might have been expected,
pseudo-democratic alterations that followed were half-hearted
attempts to placate the US on the one hand, and to contain rising local
demands on the other.
Efforts made in 2005 to undertake democratic change without rocking the
boat resulted in political chaos and social discontent. One referendum and two
elections in Egypt were marred by thuggery, bloodshed and charges of outright
fraud. Media coverage was fervently biased and the fundamental standards of
free and fair elections left unattained. In Iraq, there was a US-sponsored
constitutional referendum and contested parliamentary elections. To the extent
they were freed from daily suicide massacres, Iraqis were allowed to vote
freely, at least along sectarian lines. Allegations of fraud, mass protests and
a resurgence of violence left Iraq more divided and more violent than it had
ever been before. Like sectarian-sown Lebanon, Iraqis looked out of the same
national window but saw a different political landscape.
In Washington, the Iraqi elections were celebrated as a victory of the
US strategy of creating a free, democratic and stable Iraq -- a condition that
would warrant the beginning of US troops' withdrawal. Many in Washington took
President George W Bush's statements with a pinch of salt while Arab peoples
and candidate regimes for democratic change everywhere cringed. Then Syria and
Lebanon heated up, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict roared on and a battle over
Iran's nuclear ambitions erupted. Except for the periods of the Arab-Israeli
wars, the region has never been more unstable.
In the last half-century, US-Arab relations coalesced around defined
common interests, not shared values. These were best exemplified by the
historic meeting, on 20 February 1945, between US President Franklin D
Roosevelt and King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud aboard the cruiser USS Quincy at the
Great Bitter Lake in Egypt's Suez Canal. The upshot of the congenial meeting
was very simple: an exchange of guarantees ensuring free flow of oil to US and
Western markets in return for securing the continuation of the Saudi ruling
family. With the exception of few, short-lived revolutionary-brand regimes in
the Arab world, this served as the model for US-Arab relations from then on.
Hence, these relations were unperturbed by the Arab-Israeli conflict or
threatened by the brief and measured Arab oil embargo during the 1973 October
War. Vital strategic interests dictated that no party would question or strike
a comparison with the system of government or the code of values of the other.
As long as oil flowed freely at reasonable prices, the US never had any qualms
about the human rights record or the quality of the political practices of its
loyal allies. Common interests ruled supreme; democratic ideals and human
rights standards were relegated to the background.
The drama of 11 September changed the paradigm. The neo-conservative
think tanks of the Bush administration drew the lesson that without shared
common ideals of participatory democracy those oil-pumping monarchies -- what
the late intellectual Tahseen Bashir used to call "tribes with flags" -- were
unsustainable. In the estimates of US national security agencies Iraq, in
particular, was unviable as a state and a threat to its oil-rich neighbours.
This was demonstrated by the war with Iran (1980) and the invasion of Kuwait
(1990). Autocratic governance, political oppression and economic exclusion were
also breeding terrorism. That was a challenge to the vital strategic interests
of the US and Western allies 9,000 miles away.
For the US, the challenge was how to maintain and further strengthen
its oil interests based on an unsustainable paradigm. For US allies in the
region, it was how to undertake measured reform to remain essentially the same.
A compromise would have been possible had the local nationalist forces passed
the opportunity to propel democratic change. They did not. Awakened by
long-suppressed aspirations and a wind of change, these forces asserted their
right to participate in shaping their political life and in freely choosing
their representative government. A genie has popped out of the bottle and it
will be next to impossible to put it back. Another challenge has thus emerged
in that the democratic forces' demands far exceed what governments are willing
to concede, and survive. These new forces are suspicious of US designs, are
strongly opposed to the Iraqi model, hostile to US policies of unconditional
support of Israel and are eager to clean up the domestic scene of th
e decades-old malaise of one-party rule, corruption and incompetence.
The US's dilemma in Iraq has, for the time being, overshadowed all
other priorities. When it started off, the neo-con strategy saw the compelling
case for democratic change as the best guarantor of US interests.
Unfortunately, Iraq proved to be a distasteful recipe for democratic change;
Arab local forces were not bowing to the US line, fundamentalists lurked in the
background and ruling oligarchies were apprehensive. It would seem that the US
is now beginning to perceive the dichotomy of popular democracy posited against
guaranteed strategic interests the old-fashioned way. So, which way will it go?
From the pragmatic point of view, the US has little interest to
undercut its traditional allies for the sake of democratic ideals. Its
sustained political, military and economic interests are becoming increasingly
assured. Gulf Arab countries are as much aghast as the US over the rising power
of Iran. They support its action in Iraq, distance themselves from the politics
of the Israeli-Palestinian problem and are offering good examples of free
market economic development. Each one of them shares a common dread of
fundamentalist Islam or renewed Shia- Sunni rivalry. A new paradigm, therefore,
will have to develop. Its elements will probably consist of a regional alliance
against terrorism as a security threat, heavy US military presence in the
region to deter Iran and guarantee the uninterrupted flow of oil, and
soft-pedalling on the ambitious agenda of democratic reform. This may not be
much to the liking of grassroots forces clamouring for democratic change, the
rule
of law and full respect for human rights. If they should rebel, armies of
security forces will be at hand to control them, with an iron fist in a silk
glove. What will be the US reaction? It will not be the first time the US will
have abandoned the nationalist forces it once encouraged. In the meantime,
autocratic regimes throughout the Arab world will bide their time and wait for
Bush to pass too.
* The writer is former Al-Ahram correspondent in Washington, DC. He
also served as director of the United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
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