[lit-ideas] veri similis
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 23:40:34 -0400 (EDT)
vērī sĭmĭlis
In a message dated 5/30/2012 7:10:42 P.M. UTC-02,
_donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxxx (mailto:donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx) writes: Walter
recently made a
remark that was very complimentary to A.J. Ayer, to which I suggested a
useful
antidote in Popper’s reply to Ayer’s paper for P’s Schilpp volumes. [We
might also mention as an antidote Ayer’s misrepresentation of P’s position
elsewhere, beginning with Language, Truth and Logic].
Oddly, Alice asks Humpty Dumpty, "Must a name mean something?". According
to Sutherland, in "Language and Lewis Carroll" (Mouton), Carroll is
reversing Mill's thesis (also Frege's): proper names have no sense (no
reference).
In Wonderland, proper names (like "Alice") HAVE sense. (Mill's example in
"System of Logic", that Carroll knew, was "London"). Similarly, "Ayer", in
Wonderland, has TWO senses: one is A. J. Ayer. The other is a village in
Switzerland. There is a photograph of a village in Switzerland in Ayer (the
philosopher)'s biography, "Part of my life". Ayer explains the meaning of
Ayer.
McEvoy: "Ayer’s paper and P’s reply might be taken as a useful example of
the kind of divide that opens up between those who think on ‘
justificationist’ lines and those who profess not to."
I'm not sure "justify" is the proper word (or "just" word, if you must or
"-fy"). To justify is to make just. Geary has objected to the idea of
'justification' ("If 'just'", he writes, "were a matter of _MAKING_ it, then
Memphis would be in Egypt").
McEvoy: "The justificationist cannot accept that all knowledge is fallible
– i.e. that any ‘knowledge-claim’ may be mistaken – even if this
fallibilism does not imply that all knowledge is mistaken.
Oddly, Geary also objects to the word, "fallibilism". ("Most things are
fallible, even those which ain't" -- he claims. This was in a polemic
regarding the use of subscripts. We were arguing with Geary that most words
need a
subscript: "That's nice" should be rewritten as "that's nice-geary" --
i.e., as uttered by Geary, 'nice' means "nice for Geary". Geary finds the use
of subscripts otiose -- "Unless otherwise indicated, or 'shown' but not
said, alla Witters, by 'nice' I mean 'nice for me'. Now, in his claim.
Consider, "Most things are fallible even those which ain't". It's only, I
claim,
the use of subscripts that resolves the paradox. The above becomes, "Most
things are fallible-geary even those which ain't-speranza" -- and so on.
Popper never used subscripts, but perhaps he should.
McEvoy: "Popper’s reply, to “Sir Alfred Ayer’s contribution”, extends
over pages 1100-1114 and is divided into five sections. The first section
[is] on Verisimilitude"
VERISIMILITUDE was a concept initiated by Cicero and Quintilian. Those
Roman philosophers didn't really know what they were doing. It is like parts
of America (before the invention of Harvard) when families would send their
offspring to OXFORD to get an education. In Rome, Cicero sent his son to
ATHENS (hot weather notwithstanding). Cicero's son was learning PHILOSOPHY in
the correct lingo, i.e. Hellenic. And things should have remained like
that (where I come from, and where Grice comes from, Philosophy belongs in
Lit. Hum., and Grice was more of a classics graduate than a philosophy
graduate: first in Lit. Hum, 1939, alma mater: classics centre: Corpus
Christi -- tutor Hardie). Instead, Cicero started to create words in some sort
of
contrived Roman, such as 'verisimilitude', to render some Greek basic
notions. Geary has suggested that the invention of philosophical vocabulary
can
be traced back to Aristotle (Geary thinks he is refuting me by doing this,
and he means 'refute' as in 'refute'). E.g. Aristotle's use of 'category'
cannot be traced back to the origins of philosophy (Thales) because
Aristotle invented it (not philosophy but 'category'). Now vero- or
veri-similitude is a silly Roman notion which is hard to explain
hellenistically.
Granted, the Greeks were confused as to truth. They saw it as a lady,
typically:
Aletheia. Where 'a-' is negation. So, the
truth is in the unveiling. Years later, Grice, fascinated by von Wright's
"alethic" will use THIS as paradigm for truth. Now, what is to RESEMBLE or
simulate (as in -simil-) truth, as in verisimilitude. If Popper were
SERIOUSLY responding Ayer he should have traced the logic of the concepts
involved rather than rush to some superficial criticism.
McEvoy: "we might argue out particular cases – to see, for example,
whether verisimilitude might plausibly be deployed in a rational and critical
way but without its being underpinned by any justificationist guarantees."
From Etymology Online:
"verisimilitude c.1600, from Fr. verisimilitude (1540s), from L.
verisimilitudo "likeness to truth," from veri, genitive of verum, neut. of
verus
"true" (see very) + similis "like, similar" (see similar)." How central can a
concept be if it was only introduced in English "c. 1600" ("unlike "sun"",
Geary writes). Note that the Anglo-Saxons lacked a Tarski theory of truth.
In truth, English 'truth' is an abstract noun (hence ending in -th, as in
depth) from 'true', where 'true' means 'trust'. "A trustful friend". The
Anglo-Saxon idea of 'truth' (Latin verum) is thus impregnated with
pscyhological notions. Ayer knew this; Popper didn't the German lingo
equivalent
for English 'truth' is itself confused, as has no Graeco-Roman equivalent).
Note that the online Stanford avoids the Ciceronian concept of
'verisimilitude' and prefers to use the otiose, and slightly wrong, idea
of 'truthlikeness'. But '-like' is all full of implicatures: "it's like
nice", a Valley girl says. She means it's NICE, not LIKE nice. So 'like' has
become vacuous. Similarly, "It's like a big nose". Surely a big nose is
like a big nose. The ultimate confirmation comes from Clint Eastwood's
libretto for "Million dollar baby". The so-called Million dollar baby is
arguing
with Clint Eastwood as to how to clean the gymn. He suggests a substance.
She smells it: "Pjjj. This smells like bleach". Eastwood, calmly: "It is
bleach. Bleach smells like bleach".
What Eastwood says (AND shows) is 'true' (not just truthlike) -- Hence
what is true is also truth-like, hence Popper's otiosities once more
revealed. Short and Lewis, the organon of Latin in Oxford, write:
"vērĭsĭmĭlis , vērĭsĭmĭlĭter , and vērĭsĭmĭlĭtūdo , more correctly
written separately, vērī sĭmĭlis , etc., v. under verus and similis, etc."
And they are right. Cicero never claimed to have coined just one word,
the odd 'verisimilis'. Rather the two things are separated as in "veri
similis". --- Popper didn't know this. And he should, since, among other
things, he spoke good German:
"Der Ausdruck veri simile wird von Cicero sowohl in seinen Reden wie auch
in seinen philosophischen Schriften zumeist als rhetorischer Begriff
verwendet (griechisch πιιανόν oder εiκός) im Sinn von
`wahrscheinlich, plausibel'.
McEvoy: "Some forty years ago, P’s own proposed definition of
verisimilitude was proved defective [by Tichy and, independently, Miller],
though this
did not mean the concept was proven irremediably flawed. Subsequent
search for a tenable definition has led to developments that logically refine
what is
at stake but no entirely satisfactory definition has been found as yet.
Nor perhaps is it settled what follows from this or what follows if one is
not found (despite the Wittgensteinian author of the Stanford Entry on
Popper wanting to suggest the defects of P's definition shipwreck P's
theory of knowledge). The search for a satisfactory account of
‘verisimilitude’
has become a highly technical area beyond the reach of most
non-specialists. The implications of this ongoing work is also beyond the
reach of most."
It's hardly surprising that Popper's idea of 'veri similitudo' (alla
Cicero) has proved defective. As the above source testifies, Cicero perhaps
should never have played with the idea -- the Greeks never had a
concept of 'veri similitude' (and surely Geary is right when claiming,
"What's good
for the Greeks should be good for us Memphians"). Note that the closest
idea
in the Greek lexicon is the pair:
πιιανόν -- εiκός
But Popper typically needs a grander, more pretentious word: not even ONE
word, since it's separated in correct Roman: veri simile. Imagine if the
word "God" were separated like that? Would you say it represents one big
important concept? (cfr. the contrivedness of 'truth-like-ness' that never
should have merited in a Greco-Roman dictionary of philosophy but makes its
way to Stanford online!).
McEvoy: "The second section discusses Tarski’s theory of truth."
It's not surprising that Popper finds a way to fill a few pages in his
volume ("Living philosophers" -- oddly this was reissued once Popper never
was -- but a dead one) to his honour. "The idea of a living philosopher
came to me," wrote Schlipp, "oddly, when reading Thales, a notably dead
one". Grice notes that Tarski's theory of truth is not just wrong but
_dead-wrong_ (where 'dead' is implicatural, Grice adds): "A theory of truth
has
(as Tarski noted)", Grice writes in "WoW" ("Further notes on logic and
conversation") to provide not only for occurrences of 'true' [never mind
'veri
similis'] in sentences in which what is being
spoken of as 'true' is SPECIFIED [As in Geary, "It is true that it's hot
today."] but also for occurrences in sentences in which no specification is
given." "What Geary said was true". Grice notes that Tarski fails to
provide a proper pragmatic analysis of non-specified approaches to true. If
'true' is related to 'commitment' (as in trust -- in God we trust. Note the
cognateness, true-trust), then "I do not think", Grice observes, "I should be
PROPERLY regarded as having _committed_ myself to the content of [Geary's]
statement, merely in virtue of having said that it was 'true'. When to my
surprise, I learn that [Geary] actually said ["2 + 2 = 5" -- a blatant
falsehood, or "Memphis is not the capital of Egypt"], I say, perhaps, "Well,
I
was wrong -- [what Geary said was not true], but NOT, "I withdraw that, or
"I withdraw my commitment to that". I never was committed to it."
McEvoy: "The third concerns The Verification of Theories."
If "veri simile" was an otiose concept, so was Popper's claim to infame:
veri-fy. If for each adjective (think 'smooth') we would need a
corresponding -fy verb to give prestige to it, we would have more words than
we
need. Hence Popper's joke about 'falsi-fy'.
McEvoy: ""there is a sense in which we shall after all have a general
criterion for recognizing empirical
truth.’""
ENTER EMPIRICAL TRUTH. Popper just sticks to the phrase, complex,
typically, rather than analyse bit by bit. What do we mean 'empirical'?
"Empiricism revisited", indeed. If Popper had proceeded analytically he would
not
have delivered such simplicities as he did.
McEvoy: "“By ‘empirical truth’ Ayer means, especially, the truth of
scientific
theories"
If Popper had an idea of how rooted Empiricism was in Oxford -- if he had
an idea of the progress of the early philosophies of Ayer -- and Grice --
he would have known that Ayer's "Problems of knowledge" was considered an
important attempt, by an English Oxford philosopher -- originally -- to
revisit the truth about Hume, that the members of Vienna Circle without
Anglo-Saxon blood in their veins, could not have cared less about. Hume was
the truly empiricist philosopher and he was following Locke, who was
refuting
Descartes. Empereia, is the Greek notion. To think, as Popper
simplistically does, that Ayer means 'scientific' by 'empirical' only goes to
show how
obsessed Popper is with 'winning' (or trying to win) an argument rather
than engage with his interlocutor. In this case, it is lack of manners, too,
seeing that it was a contribution to a sort of festchrift, "library of
living philosophers" ("The idea came to me that while Thales, a dead
philosopher, could not reply to critics, a living philosopher, if paid, would.
Hence the substantial sum we gave Popper for his rather rude replies -- in
some sort
of non-colloquial English").
McEvoy: "; and the statement just quoted implies that, given an empirical
method to decide on the truth or falsity of what I in Logik der Forschung
called ‘ basic statements’ ... ‘Finding a counterexample proves the
statement false, but failing to find one does not prove it true….’"
"Fail to be false" is one of the most otiose otiosities. Grice noted
this: "I fail to be a girl", Grice once argued.
The alleged counterexample was: "But you never tried". That is: in common
parlance, "fail" is overused. Typicaly, failures are failures with regard
to this or that dimension. Hence, Popper is sticking
with a colloquialism in Ayer (and the English language -- "fail to find a
falsity") and missing the idiomatic point.
McEvoy: "If it sounds so, it is because Ayer is a trifle indistinct about
what set of basic statements is ‘some set of basic statements’."
Ayer, unlike Popper, knew what Ayer was writing about. In the early days
of Oxford analytic philosophy, they were concerned with Paul, "Is there a
problem about sense data?". They were arguing, seriously, as per Berlin,
in "Concepts and Categories" about the ultimate idea of a 'basic' (so
mis-called) concept like a sense datum like "red". The idea was NEVER
scientific.
While Cambridge philosophers THINK They Do, Oxonian philosophers DEFINE
theirselves by their disrespect for science. What does science tell us
about 'red'? Nothing that someone who knows his Locke needs or cares to
learn!
McEvoy: " empirical omniscience involves basic omniscience.""
Seeing that Ayer does not use 'science' seriously, to stick to yet another
pretentious label, as is Popper's wont, 'omni-science' is irrisory (or
laughable-geary if you must). Note that in Ciceronian Roman, scio, as in
science, means 'know' a concept that the Greeks avoided, "Know thyself" (and
fail). Now, "scio" is a factive in Roman: "I know it". But science, as
Popper misunderstood it, is all about not really being sure. Instead of
providing his own falsificatory approach to science, Popper should have
started by concentrating on the fact that what he is dealing with is NOT
'scientia' as the Romans knew it. Scientia is never wrong never mind
falsifiable. So: "I know but I am wrong" -- is one of the catastrophes of
Graeco-Roman philosophy. If Popper
had been more knowledgeable of the history of the discipline he was
playing in, he would never have written a book on "Objective knowledge"!
McEvoy:"‘All swans are white’" "Einstein’s denial is just as
metaphysical, or almost as metaphysical,
because nothing observable follows from it."
Popper's addition of 'metaphysical' can only confuse. As Grice notes in
an interesting essay, "Actions and Events": Philosophy is all about
hypostasis; science is about mere hypothesis". Grice is arguing that
the distinction, often made by German-speaking philosophers -- and by the
confused Ayer at one point -- between metaphysic (nonsense) and scientific
(sense) is itself nonsense. Hypostasis and hypothesis are ways to approach
reality, and hypostasis is actually a better, deeper grasp. Nothing
'metaphysical'
about it.
McEvoy: "'All swans are white’ only “may” be a case where the absence of
any
counterexample is a sufficient condition of truth.
There are of course black swans: Black Swan. Conservation status. Least
Concern (IUCN 3.1)[1]. Scientific classification. Kingdom: Animalia. Phylum:
Chordata. Class: Aves. Order: Anseriformes. Family: Anatidae
Subfamily: Anserinae. Tribe: Cygnini. Genus: Cygnus. Species: Cygnus
atratus
Binomial name: Cygnus atratus (Latham, 1790). Subspecies: Cygnus atratus
atratus. Black Swan
†C. a. sumnerensis. New Zealand Swan (extinct). Synonyms: Anas atrata
Latham, 1790, Chenopis atratus."
It's different with 'ravens' (Reichenbach, cited by Grice -- and his
famous counterexample): All ravens are black. An albino white raven does not
COU
NT -- genetically. J. L. Austin, a distant 'friend' with Grice,
argues in "How to do things with words" that "all" in "All swans are
white" is hyperbolic and parents know that. "France is hexagonal" is his other
example of hyperbole that parents can use. "Surely, the presence of this or
that non-white swan in areas unknown to the Roman empire is no refutation
of
the early bird systematics". (I draw material here from Grice's example of
hyperbole in "Logic and Conversation: "Every nice girl loves a sailor" --
cfr. "All swans are white").
McEvoy: " Taken as a UL, the absence of a counterexample is not a
sufficient but only a necessary
condition of the truth of ‘All swans are white’. But none of this rescues
Ayer’s views from P’s logical demolition."
It was in 1790 that Latham first saw what he called "a black swan". In
those days, Latin was the lingo, so he said he saw an "anas atrata
Lathamiensis". The point was brought back to London, where there was
discussion as to Cicero's use of 'cygnus'. In no passage was 'albus'
related to 'cygnus' tautologically, so it was concluded that indeed what
Latham
saw was a black 'swan', rather than another bird. The confirmation was
"philological". ("Had Cicero made a point about 'cygnus' HAVING to be white
we would have been
in deep trouble", professor Middleton wrote -- "Proceedings of the London
Zoological Society", Zoological Gardens, Kew).
McEvoy: "the acceptance or rejection of [basic statements] is a matter
for something like the scientific jury – the scientific community (which may
or may not come to an agreement).”"
Since Popper is being oversimplistic in his exegesis of the complexities
Ayer (and the early Grice) saw in 'basic' as per sense-datum EMPIRICAL
content of subjectivity (totally unrelated to 'science' as Popper
never knew it) it's no wonder he yet agains is only finding an excuse to
fill a few more
pages for his own festschrift.
McEvoy: "There is a final section on Subjective Experience and Linguistic
Formulation, where P addresses “What is the fundamental difference between
Ayer and
myself?”; but we may be spared this story. (For now.)"
The fundamental difference between Ayer and Popper is that while both are
German in origin (note the village in Switzerland, called "Ayer") there
is no Swiss village called "Popper". Popper knew this and was envious.
Speranza
---
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•Zwart, S. D., and M. Franssen, 2007, "An impossibility theorem for
verisimilitude", Synthese, forthcoming in print.
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