[lit-ideas] on the alethic
- From: "Adriano Palma" <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 09:11:51 +0200
** Low Priority **
** Reply Requested by 6/12/2012 (Tuesday) **
It is, once again, most unfortunate that many (most? some?) people are
confused.
I shall try, for the nonce, to retain patience.
It is false that a truth predicate is 'redundant', viz. precisely
either the Tarskian or the Kripkean constructions
(the former dates 80 years of age, the latter, more than 30, and it
follows precisely fixed points in the hierarchy.)
There are two intuitive, semi formal reasons, for this.
1. if you allow that some F for an arbitrary F, is true, then whether S
believes that F or nor is utterly irrelevant. Nobody believes that there
are many universes, well, maybe there are.
2. consider a simple case, of an utterance, as some are wont to couch
their views in, x utters "I met Mickey Mouse". whether or not the quoted
utterance is true depends on x's meeting mickey or not. One, more often
than not, device (of humans, not of mice) is to reply: "Is it true or is
it a joke?" note that both are possible, x's utterance may be a joke
(hence you may have a theory of truth in-fiction, of truth in-humor, and
so forth), or the quoted utterance may be true, in which case one may
left wondering whether X met a ghost, an hallucination, Y dressed a
mickey mouse, is drinking too much, and so forth.
3. try to account for the status of the utterance by the weird notion
of "fact"
4. we're afraid junk doesn't "supersede" anything at all
regards
From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
>McEvoy is right that Aristotle held a correspondence-theory of truth,
and
that a theory of knowledge is not a theory of truth (although McEvoy
does
not use the Greek word for 'knowledge'). >
Afair I did not mention Aristotle, but yes he - and almost everyone -
holds to a correspondence theory of truth. So do courts of law - you
cannot defend against perjury by arguing that your lies were not lies
because they were coherent etc.
To say "a theory of knowledge is not a theory of truth" is not my
claim, for a theory of knowledge may include a theory of truth. But, as
with Tarski, we can have a theory of truth without any theory of
knowledge - without any account of how we know or decide whether a
proposition is true.
D
Similarly, Palma notes that a
theorem is not perhaps the right word.
Grice supersedes Tarski.
In WoW, "Logic and Conversation", II, section, "Truth", Grice
supersedes
Tarski via Strawson. Note that Tarski was insensitive to English (or
Polish,
for that matter) use, and speaks of 'sentences' (or Polish
equivalents).
Whereas, for Grice, Strawson, Speranza, etc., is it UTTERANCES which
are
true.
Grice notes that Ramsey is right in thinking 'true' as redundant:
"He believed that it was raining"
is certainly equivalent to
"He believed that it was true that it was raining". Therefore, we
don't
need a 'truth' predicate. Instead, Grice proposes to replace, 'true',
by
"factually satisfactory" ("The point of the manoeuvre is to apply
'satisfactoriness' to other utterances like "Close the door!").
Grice writes:
"There is a class of utterances, call it K -- utterances of
affirmative
subject-predicate sentences -- such that every member of K (1)
DESIGNATES
(*this verb to be explained within the theory) some item and INDICATES
(*
again, this verb to be explained within the theory) some class."
"Now, any member of K will be FACTUALLY SATISFACTORY iff the item
BELONGS
to the class."
In this respect, Grice goes on:
"To say that it is TRUE that Smith is happy is equivalent to saying
that
any UTTERANCE of class K which designates Smith and indicates the
class of
happy people is FACTUALLY SATISFACTORY (that is, any utterance which
assigns
Smith to the class of happy people is factually satisfactory).
Grice's scheme, which is superior to Tarski's, allows to deal with
Strawson's counterexample (unlike Tarski's).
"In my account," Grice goes on, "it is very easy to deal with the
linguistic facts noted by Strawson [but ignored by Tarski -- the
perfomative/concessive nature of 'it is true that' --]. To say that
Smith is happy is NOT to
make a concealed reference to utterances of a certain sort, whereas to
say
that it is TRUE that Smith is happy is to do just that (though of
course if
Smith is happy, it is true that Smith is happy)."
The reason is obvious and explained via disimplicature:
"If I choose the form which DOES make a concealed reference to
utterances,
and which is also the MORE COMPLEX form, in preference to the simpler
form
[_sans_ 'true'] it is NATURAL to suppose that I do so because an
utterance
to the effect that Smith is happy has been made (by myself or someone
else
-- it wouldn't matter), or _might_ be so made."
"Such speech acts as endorsing, agreeing, confirming, and conceding,
which
Strawson notes are conventionally signalled by the use of the
predicate
'true' are just those which, in saying in response to some remark,
"That's
true", one would be performing (without any special signal)."
"And supposing no one actually to have said that Smith is happy, if I
say, "It is true that Smith is happy" (e.g. concessively) I shall
IMPLICATE
[or disimplicate, as the occasion may be] that SOMEONE might say so;
and I do
NOT select this obtuse form of words as, for example, a response to an
inquiry whether Smith is happy when I do NOT wish this implicature to
be
present."
Re-reading Tarski's Polish essay (provided you read Polish) in the
light
of Grice's clarifications helps, because Tarski never makes a point
about
the convoluted form:
"It is true that snow is white".
---
--- But then perhaps Polish is not what Grice calls an "alethic"
language
-- i.e. truth may be less otiose in Polish than in, say, English -- or
Latin.
Cheers,
Speranza
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די סומ ע ן ע י ו ,ל
א ר
מא י ו-ה י צ מ א ,א ל-י כ נא אי ב נ ,ן
ב א ל ו-אי ב נ
י כ נא: י כ-י כ נא ר קוב ,םי מ ק ש ס לובו .
נצח ישראל לא ישקר
palma
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Howard College Campus, philosophy
Durban 4041 South Africa
Tel off: [+27] 03 12 60 15 91 Fax [+27] 03 12 60 30 31
(sec: Mrs. Yolanda Hordyk : [+27] 03 12 60 22 92)
mobile 07 62 36 23 91 from abroad +[27] 76 23 62 391
EMAIL: palma@xxxxxxxxxx
palma's office 280 (3rd flr of Mtb)
to meet email palma@xxxxxxxxxx
palma's timetable term 1\2012 Su 11:00 hrs, seminar of the phildept,
logic
the logic will be on until the 1st week of July of 2012
object being the 2 thrms of Goedel
*only when in Europe*:
inst. J. Nicod
29 rue d'Ulm
f-75005 paris france
An die Nachgeborenen
I
Wirklich, ich lebe in finsteren Zeiten!
Das arglose Wort ist töricht. Eine glatte Stirn
Deutet auf Unempfindlichkeit hin. Der Lachende
Hat die furchtbare Nachricht
Nur noch nicht empfangen.
Was sind das für Zeiten, wo
Ein Gespräch über Bäume fast ein Verbrechen ist
Weil es ein Schweigen über so viele Untaten einschließt!
Der dort ruhig über die Straße geht
Ist wohl nicht mehr erreichbar für seine Freunde
Die in Not sind?
Es ist wahr: ich verdiene noch meinen Unterhalt
Aber glaubt mir: das ist nur ein Zufall. Nichts
Von dem, was ich tue, berechtigt mich dazu, mich sattzuessen.
Zufällig bin ich verschont. (Wenn mein Glück aussetzt, bin ich
verloren.)
Man sagt mir: Iß und trink du! Sei froh, daß du hast!
Aber wie kann ich essen und trinken, wenn
Ich dem Hungernden entreiße, was ich esse, und
Mein Glas Wasser einem Verdurstenden fehlt?
Und doch esse und trinke ich.
Ich wäre gerne auch weise.
In den alten Büchern steht, was weise ist:
Sich aus dem Streit der Welt halten und die kurze Zeit
Ohne Furcht verbringen
Auch ohne Gewalt auskommen
Böses mit Gutem vergelten
Seine Wünsche nicht erfüllen, sondern vergessen
Gilt für weise.
Alles das kann ich nicht:
Wirklich, ich lebe in finsteren Zeiten!
II
In die Städte kam ich zur Zeit der Unordnung
Als da Hunger herrschte.
Unter die Menschen kam ich zu der Zeit des Aufruhrs
Und ich empörte mich mit ihnen.
So verging meine Zeit
Die auf Erden mir gegeben war.
Mein Essen aß ich zwischen den Schlachten
Schlafen legte ich mich unter die Mörder
Der Liebe pflegte ich achtlos
Und die Natur sah ich ohne Geduld.
So verging meine Zeit
Die auf Erden mich gegeben war.
Die Straßen führten in den Sumpf zu meiner Zeit.
Die Sprache verriet mich dem Schlächter.
Ich vermochte nur wenig. Aber die Herrschenden
Saßen ohne mich sicherer, das hoffte ich.
So verging meine Zeit
Die auf Erden mir gegeben war.
Die Kräfte waren gering. Das Ziel
Lag in großer Ferne
Es war deutlich sichtbar, wenn auch für mich
Kaum zu erreichen.
So verging meine Zeit
Die auf Erden mir gegeben war.
III
Ihr, die ihr auftauchen werdet aus der Flut
In der wir untergegangen sind
Gedenkt
Wenn ihr von unseren Schwächen sprecht
Auch der finsteren Zeit
Der ihr entronnen seid.
Gingen wir doch, öfter als die Schuhe die Länder wechselnd
Durch die Kriege der Klassen, verzweifelt
Wenn da nur Unrecht war und keine Empörung.
Dabei wissen wir doch:
Auch der Haß gegen die Niedrigkeit
Verzerrt die Züge.
Auch der Zorn über das Unrecht
Macht die Stimme heiser. Ach, wir
Die wir den Boden bereiten wollten für Freundlichkeit
Konnten selber nicht freundlich sein.
Ihr aber, wenn es so weit sein wird
Daß der Mensch dem Menschen ein Helfer ist
Gedenkt unsrer
Mit Nachsicht.
Bertolt Brecht Werke: Gedichte 2. Vol. 12. Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1988;
pp. 85-7.
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