[lit-ideas] Re: easy
- From: "[+1] 9 1 9 5 9 9 7 0 6 5 {palma@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx}" <palma@xxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2007 10:38:32 -0400 (EDT)
The post (cf below) trades on a silly move. From the fact that we
identify x via Y (we identify, "name", "call", etc. the mental states
via sentence) it does not follow that x is y, that x is identical with
y.
Consider: many people (many of my colleagues, e.g.) are convinced that
mental states are "brain cells firing in patterns" and those are
represented by graphs on Fmri scans.
Anyone who think that a mental state is a graph on a computer plotted
chart is, imho, --as the students put it- "out of it".
have a great day you all
On Thu, 4 Oct 2007,
Eric Dean wrote:
> Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2007 14:31:09 +0000
> From: Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Reply-To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: easy
>
> A. Palma writes:
> **************
> an easy way to test whether one can identify mental states independently from
> their linguistic expressions: CONSIDER A CRUCIAL MARXIAN DICTUM; "last night
> I shot an elephant in my pajamas. What he was doing in my pajamas is
> anybody's guess"(wrongly) attributed to G. Marx well, Consider the first
> clause of the sentence. It works and produces its humour effect precisly
> because of its ambiguity (if you dop not see it, you are language blind)
> hence there are two mental states (menaings? expressions? propositions? brain
> states?) that get to be linguistically expressed by on and only sentence. a
> fortiori mental states are not identical with linguistic expressions, since 2
> is never equal to one.**************
>
> Well, OK, there's something more to what we do when we talk, write, etc.,
> than just production of the syntactic object one might call the 'linguistic
> expression'. I didn't mean to be disputing that; what I meant to be
> disputing was the notion that there is a clear enough definition of whatever
> that something more is to support forcing the alternatives Donal offered --
> that the something must either precede, coincide with or follow the
> linguistic expression.
>
> The ersatz-Marxian dictum trades on ambiguity, and the existence of ambiguity
> implies that there must be something plural connected to the single
> expression in some way. But when one tries to define the plural thing
> associated with the singular expression, I think one can only do so by either
> giving other expressions which express each of the multiple things or by
> giving expressions which tell how one might construct those expressions.
>
> The humor is eradicated, of course, but the two 'meanings' of the one
> sentence might be expressed as "last night I shot an elephant while I was
> wearing my pajamas" and "last night I shot an elephant which was wearing my
> pajamas". My question can be restated now about each of these expressions:
> exactly what's the distinction between these and the "mental states" or
> whatever the other somethings are that they express and what is it about the
> mental states that means they must precede rather than coincide with or
> follow the expressions?
>
> The fact that the same sentence can be used for more than one purpose
> (because it's ambiguous) does not mean that there are clearly defined or
> definable things called purposes which can be separated from the sentences
> that fulfill them. Neither, by the way, does that mean that the sentences
> make any sense in isolation from the purposes to which they can be put, nor
> that the sentences so fully embody their purposes that the notion of purpose
> is superfluous.
>
> Purposes do not obey the laws of logic and neither do their relationships to
> the sentences issued in fulfilling them.
>
> Attempts to rehabilitate purposes from this unfortunate condition by calling
> them mental states are no better than attempts to explain the fact that
> soporifics make one sleepy by attributing to them a virtu dormativa.
>
> Best regards to one and all,
> Eric Dean
> Phoenix --> DC
off address: #201 West Building, Philosophy, Duke University
box 90743, Durham, NC 27708
home ph#: [1] 9196881856
cellph#: [1[] 9195997065 (voicemail is available on said numbers)
email palma@xxxxxxxx
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