[lit-ideas] You Don't Say!
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 22:24:23 -0400 (EDT)
In a message dated 6/28/2012 6:03:43 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"It may be thought implicit in Robert's response that his view is the
proper understanding [for if it is not assumed to be the proper understanding,
why curtail discussion on what is the proper understanding? why be
affronted?"
Well, part of the problem seems to be that the so-called (by D. McEvoy)
'key tenet' in Witters's philosophy is hardly the standard exegesis (of
Witters's philosophy). Not that there is anything wrong with a novel way of
approaching things -- but the _standard_ interpretation of Witters' philosophy
has regarded that the
"TLP" -- depicts a picture theory of meaning, focusing on one language
function: that of "assert" -- the 'show'/'say' distinction plays a minor role
there? (my bible here has been Urmson, "Philosophical Analysis: its devel
opment between the two world wars", Oxford). OTOH the
PI -- extends the scope and range of the language functions -- and if the
'show'/'say' distinction played a minor role already in the TLP the standard
view has it that the distinction wholly evaporates, if that's the word, in
the grander 'picture' of language games and forms of life that the PI
presents (the exegetical bibles here being the work by D. F. Pears, and G. P.
Baker with P. M. S. Hacker).
D. McEvoy is a Popperian at heart and wants refutations. So, he is looking
for a 'refutation' of his view (or an attempt of a refutation) that the
'key tenet' is otiose as regards an interpretation of Witters's philosophy.
Unless such refutation is presented or found, he rightly holds his exegesis
to be a valid one -- and presses the idioms into 'understanding' and
'properly understanding' Witters -- into the bargain.
I am fascinated by the fact that D. McEvoy keeps stressing what Witters
does not say, but show . THIS McEvoy manages to _say_, rather than show. It
would seem that the ideal exegesis for the primacy of 'show' over 'say' in
Witters (I and II) should best be _shown_. This has two sides:
On the one hand, McEvoy rightly ejects technical jargon when it comes to
applying original 'show'/'say' distinction by Witters in the TLP -- a narrow
view as to what a formula says with reference to its logical form -- and
sticks to a somewhat broader view that relies on some basic idea of the
'sense' (or "Sinn" but unformulated by Witters) as carried by an expression,
yet
ironically not being _said_ (by it) but shown (by some 'utterer').
On the other hand, McEvoy apparently regards this 'key' tenet as pertaining
to meta-philosophy, i.e. not as a description of a phenomenon of nature or
culture (for surely scientists don't care about the 'show' and the 'say')
but to a rather more narrow description of a specific field -- 'the fly in
the fly bottle' as it were -- i.e. what philosophers, according to Witters
(or himself, qua philosopher) should end up doing or at least end up
avoiding. It's not clear, incidentally, if there is a prescriptive side to the
description of the phenomenon behind the key tenet of "You don't say; you
_show_" --. If there is, the imperative force of this prescription is kept
somewhat secretive.
And so on.
Cheers
Speranza
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
