[lit-ideas] Re: Wittgenstein the positivist
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2004 21:01:36 +0100 (BST)
Starting at the end, here a very good place to start, where Robert expresses
not for the first time
A. His puzzlement as to the ?general point? being made
B. His view that the point about W being positivist is self-evidently wrong.
Using the expression ?One has but to open one?s eyes?, and not
for the first time.
It seems to me more than simple eye-opening is involved...
?I have no idea what general point Donal is trying to
make. Was Wittgenstein a
''Positivist'? One has but to open one's eyes to see
that he was not. Even the
Positivists realized eventually he wasn't. Then why
try to make him one? What
ever turns on it? Nothing apparently but to make sense
of some third-hand
remarks of Popper's.?
Robert refers to some ?third hand remarks of Popper?s? which I am apparently
concerned to ?make sense of?. Since I have quoted Popper directly I would
rather say these remarks are firsthand, even if they [appear to] rely on
other sources: just as PI is hardly some third-hand remarks of Wittgenstein
because it begins by referring to St.Augustine.
In a suitably wide sense of ?making sense of? almost any inquiry can be
regarded as an attempt ?to make sense of?: so should I perhaps see Robert?s
characterisation as trivially true in some suitably vacuous sense of the
words used? But it is also the case that I think I already see some sense in
what Popper is saying, and am actually offering it for discussion as to its
validity. That is, I am past the most preliminary sense in which one tries
?to make sense of? something.
Unfortunately, Robert does not seem to stay on track ? though I can see that
the quotation Popper uses may have thrown him. Despite the quotation
referring to W?s later philosophy, we came in on whether
W?s TLP is a positivistic tract _in certain key respects_ :- for P?s thesis
is that, at least in the TLP, W offers a combination of positivistic and
mystic thinking. Robert has said, without seeming qualification, that W was
?no positivist?. Here we have an apparent difference of opinion; and
discussion might show the extent to which this difference of opinion is real
or apparent, and the relative merits where there is genuine difference.
The quotation refers to a concept needing criteria for its application: the
question, at its widest, is whether this positivistic thesis is at work in
TLP or PI? The answer, I suggest, is yes on both counts. (see below). But it
is enough to show it is at work in TLP to show that [depending what we mean
by ?positivism?, of course] it is wrong to say W was "no positivist". The
most recent track we were on was exploring TLP rather than PI.
To counter-argue, as Robert does, that this thesis is not at work in PI is
off the track we were currently on: and it must be noted that P in using the
quotation is really nimbly avoiding entanglement in the rights and wrongs of
Wittgn. exegesis in favour of making a clear point against a clear idea.
Equally in conceding positivism ?has many meanings?, P is avoiding exegesis
of the term positivism in preference for talking about a clear thesis and its
refutation.
Yet, afair , some [as the quotation shows] have seen a variant of this thesis
in the PI, though one might readily admit it is a rather watered-down and
more diffuse view of ?criteria? than the more concentrated, rigid criterion
of sense offered in TLP. For example, W in PI does not assert only the
propositions of natural science have sense as he more rigidly suggested in
TLP. Nevertheless both ?criterion? and ?criteria? are lengthily indexed in
PI. And W uses the terms eg. $344 ?Our criterion for someone?s saying
something to himself is what he tells us?? $ 239 ?Is a further criterion
needed for that??
To show there is no remnant of the thesis in PI one would perhaps have to
show that W is accepting that a concept can have sense even though there are
absolutely no criteria for its application: it is not enough to show that his
view of criteria is somewhat more diffuse and complex and multi-faceted than
the view expressed in TLP. Or that his view of ?criteria? has moved beyond a
verificationist criterion of sense (more below).
It is worth mentioning that the positivistic thesis Popper attacks is not
confined to positivism as in ?Logical Positivism?: Hume, who Popper mentions,
was not himself a Logical Positivist [though LPism might be seen as an
abstract of certain Humean views]. So the thesis that that there are
positivistic elements in TLP, and perhaps PI, is not to be misconstrued as
the thesis that on all points and in all respects W is a Logical Positivist.
This last claim is, I admit, false; but, afaik, Popper never claimed its
truth. Nor did I.
What may still be the case is that there are distinct and vital positivistic
elements in W?s TLP, and that these have marked affinities with the doctrines
of Logical Positivism. For example: 1) The only propositions about the world
that strictly have a sense are the propositions of natural science; 2) Only
concepts with criteria for their application are not vacuous.
___________________
Donal wrote:
Popper in 'Objective Knowledge' p.321, "Comments on
Tarski's Theory of
Truth",
"In vol.2 of the same _Enclyclopedia*_ we are told
that it is implicit in the
later writings of Wittgenstein 'that a concept is
vacuous if there is no
criterion for its application'.
"The term 'positivism' has many meanings, but this
(Wittgensteinian) thesis
that 'a concept is vacuous if there is no criterion
for its application'
seems to me to express the very heart of positivistic
tendencies. (The idea
is very close to Hume). If this interpretation of
positivism is accepted,
then positivism is refuted by the modern development
of logic, and especially
by Tarski's theory of truth, which contains the
_theorem_:for sufficiently
rich languages, there can be no general criterion of
truth."
* before some wag inquires whether this was the
Encyclopedia Brittannica For
Children, it was the The Encyclopedia Of Philosophy
Not only are these comments of some interest given
Robert Paul's claim that W
was no positivist, they may be seen against a
background where it is unclear
W ever understood Tarski's and Godel's work properly
(see eg. Monk, p.295).
If W did not, these figures might be added to figures
like Darwin whose work
was of great importance for Popper's thought but whose
work Wittgenstein
seems to have had understood little of. Consider W's
thesis at TLP 4.1122
whose truth perhaps [merits?] discussion in a separate
thread, and other adverse
remarks re Darwin's theory.
Donal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------
?Donal (I think this is how it goes) quoting Popper
citing the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, writes that '[i]n vol. 2 of the same
_[Encyclopedia]*_ we are told
that it is implicit in the later writings of
Wittgenstein 'that a concept is
vacuous if there is no criterion for its application'.
[Although Donal assures
us that the work cited isn't the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy for Little Folk** he
does not tell us which of the several works by that
name Popper had in mind. I
suspect that it might be the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards,
which did indeed appear in two volumes, in 1967.]?
This last suspicion is indeed correct.
?The entries in _this_ Encyclopedia are by various
authors, and it would help to
know _which_ of them wrote what Popper cites
(paraphrases?) here. ?
It might help, but then again the idea can be evaluated without knowing the
source, as Robert shows?
?One can perhaps see how a hasty reading of the Investigations
(which could go proxy for most of Wittgenstein's later thought) might lead
one to say something as muddled as this.?
What muddle?
?However, in the Investigations, criteria for
the 'application of
concepts' is not discussed. What is discussed is the
need for 'outward criteria'
for inner processes; criteria for saying that a pupil
knows how to go on in continuing a mathematical series, criteria for the
'mastery of a technique, and so on. ?
But surely at least some of these cases may be regarded as
discussing the application of concepts:- for example the criteria for
applying the concept of a sequence or series in maths? Or for applying the
concept of ?having a pain??
Isn?t this reply purely a semantic dodge? I mean: if we know the criteria for
saying that a pupil knows how to continue a mathematical series don?t we know
the criteria for applying the concept of ?continuing a series??
That is: aren?t you here trying to insinuate a distinction where there is no
difference?
?I say, 'and so on,' because the word
'kriterium' is used in a number of
different, although perhaps related, contexts. In
fact, there is no talk of
'vacuous concepts' in the whole of Wittgenstein's
post-1931 philosophy. (I'll
bet.)?
That?s a big claim. And of course it needs some interpreting: do we mean he
never explicitly spoke of vacuous concepts or never implicitly said anything
to suggest there were even such things as vacuous concepts?
Take this passage from the post-1931 philosophy [Monk, p411]:
?Suppose someone said: ?What do you believe, Wittgenstein? Are you a sceptic?
Do you know whether you will survive death?? I would..say ?I can?t say. I
don?t know?, because I haven?t any clear idea what I?m saying when I?m saying
?I don?t cease to exist?, etc.?
Here is a question that could be answered ?I believe so? or ?I don?t believe
so? [with reasons given in support]: but W cannot answer in that way because
he has no ?clear idea? what such an answer means. Is this not a variant of
the approach of saying that because it is unclear what the concepts used come
to in their application, the concepts are ?vacuous? [in this case the concept
of ?existence? in particular]. And his answer is offered not simply as a
personal comment but as representing a correct philosophical stance.
Of course W?s attitude to such ?vacuous? questions is not perhaps one of
brusque dismissal but of sympathetic engagement. I concede that neither the
early nor later W had the same dismissive attitude to such questions as say
Carnap ? in attitude and spirit he is thus quite far away from certain
prominent LPists.
Another example [Monk, p.546]:
? ?But surely ?I believed? must tell of just the same thing in the past as ?I
believe? in the present!? ? Surely the square root of ?1 must mean just the
same in relation to ?1, as the square root of 1 means in relation to 1! This
means nothing at all.?
Nothing at all? Here again is surely a quite pronounced assertion that a
certain application of certain concepts is empty ? vacuous. And surely
because the criteria for the correct application of the relevant concepts
have been misapplied or because there are no such criteria?
?I'm not sure what to make of the claim that
Wittgenstein was a closet Logical
Positivist in the later writings. ?
It was not claimed that the later W was a closet LPist ? and the difference
in his attitude has been acknowledged even in relation to TLP; so I am not
sure what to make of your claim that you are unsure what to make of this
claim, since it was never made.
?(I'll try to say
more about 'Positivism' and
the Tractatus in another post.)?
Good. Perhaps you will further explain why ?Blue here? is an elem.propn.?
?One would like to be
charitable--but still...?
Try. It might do you good. It bein? Easter an? all too.
?Two things: in the Investigations, Wittgenstein talks
of the variously many,
variously diverse uses of language (from forming and
testing a hypothesis to
telling jokes to 'asking, thanking, greeting, cursing,
praying'--Investigations
23 ). Moreover, in that work he repeatedly talks of
his former delusion that
logic had a kind of 'crystalline purity' (which it had
in the Tractatus, where
what supported language was something like the logic
of Principia Mathematica),
and tries to show what was _wrong_ with that
conception of language.?
Ok.
?These concerns are central to the Investigations;
neither of them can be found
in any version of (Logical) Positivism the world has
yet seen. In LP, there is
the notion that to be meaningful, a proposition must
be, or at least in
principle be, empirically verifiable.?
Oops; this last claim seems to be denied in a next breath below..
?In the
Investigations, to be meaningful, a
word or an expression must have a use within a
particular language game, or in a
set of language games.?
The abandonment of a verificationist criterion of meaning is not necessarily
abandonment of the idea that where there are no proper criteria for applying
concepts their ?use? is vacuous [a spinning cog unconnected to any
mechanism]. So this seems by-the-by to the validity of the quotation Popper
used.
?In LP, there is no room for the
notion that 'Ow!' 'Water!' 'Away!' and 'Help!' e.g. have 'a meaning.' ?
Well, they can be seen as verbal expressions of emotion. Strictly noise
rather than sense, but noise we can understand. F___ me, yes.
?In LP, which keeps pining for a logically perfect
language, there is no place
for a concept with vague boundaries. Here, LP follows
Frege's pronouncement, in
Section 56 of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, that a
concept without
determinate boundaries is not only useless, but is a
concept in name only, of no
use to logic or to mathematics. In the Investigations
(sections 71 and 77,
especially) he attacks this Fregean requirement, and
tries to give examples of
the usefulness of concepts with 'blurred edges' and
indefinite boundaries. Here
he rejects not only Frege, but the Tractatus view that
the sense of a
proposition must be determinite. Once again, there is
a clear conflict between
his later views and anything that can be found in the
thought and writing the
Logical Positivists.?
Who insisted the later W was a LPist?
?As early as 1930, when Wittgenstein's thoughts were in
transition and extremely
confused, he was beginning to question the assurance
with which he dealt with
certain problems in the Tractatus, and by 1932, his
thoughts had almost entirely
shifted away from anything _resembling_ a principle of
verification--not that
any such principle was actually present in the
Tractatus in any event.?
Oops: that next breath thingie I mentioned above. Now no verificationist
principle is in TLP. Now you see it, now you don't.
But on the main track: does this show complete abandonment of, or rather
radical revamping of, the idea that non-vacuous concepts have ?criteria? for
their application? I mean: without such criteria how are we to tell whether
we are applying concepts rightly or wrongly? [see the so-called ?private
language argument?]
?How his alleged defective understanding of the work of
Godel and Tarski is at all relevant to any of this needs to be pointed out.?
Ehh?Popper stated it above: Tarski showed that for sufficiently rich
languages there can be no general criterion of truth.
?The Tractatus was published
in 1922, although it was written several years
earlier. Godel's 'uber formal
unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und
verwandter Systeme,' was
published in 1931. If there are other works of Godel
which he might have ignored
(where--in the Tractatus?) the ought to be mentioned
and their relevance
explained. To say that Wittgenstein may not have
understood his work 'properly'
tells us nothing whatsoever.?
This is just the kind of over-absolute judgment W seemed overly fond of.
_Nothing whatsoever_? Surely not.
Is this kind of talk infectious? It seems to be with some [the Wittgn.
?meme??]. But saying something tells us nothing whatsoever tells us nothing
whatsoever, no? Of course this is wrong: it tells us _something_.
And it is a neat trick switching between TLP and PI as it suits certain
rhetorical purposes: for Godel?s work is pre-PI but post-TLP and I did not
suggest W should have mentioned it in TLP [Darwin?s work is pre-TLP, but of
course he is mentioned in TLP]. So again why these misleading rhetorical
statements as if I did suggest Godel and Tarski?s work was pre-TLP but as if
we can pass over in silence its possible relevance to PI, where perhaps it
should have had more influence? But then Robert has asked what here is the
relevance of G and T?s work, thus inviting me to draw his attention again to
Popper?s point as relayed in my earlier post, which perhaps he missed?
But, hey, there?s enough on the plate already without getting side-tracked on
side-orders. Like _why is _ ?Blue here? an elem.propn.?
Donal
London
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