E. T. Gendlin, from http://www.focusing.org/gendlin5.html "There is nothing ineffable or unspeakable about what Wittgenstein showed." "And, of course he said what he showed." "One can say more in many further ways (for example with the words in my parentheses), but only by "naked saying", i.e. without covering it with a theoretical version which _then_ claims to be what we _really_ said." "Such a substitutional explanation [may be] the only saying that is made impossible by what Wittgenstein showed", even if I disagree (*). Cheers, Speranza ----- Interesting ref. to scalar implicature by Richard H. -- * Cfr. from: http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/wittgenstein/section1.rhtml "Wittgenstein draws an important distinction between saying and showing." -- this distinction does not seem to have a base in Graeco-Roman philosophy. The Latin concept of 'dictiveness', for the 'sayable', may apply. But it is more controversial to find a Graeco-Roman equivalent to 'show': De-MONSTRATIO perhaps a good candidate, if not perfect. "While a proposition *says* that such-and-such fact is the case, it *shows* the logical form by virtue of which this fact is the case." --- "The upshot of this distinction is that we can only say things about facts in the world; logical form cannot be spoken about, only shown." "Because logical form shows itself and cannot be spoken about, there is no need for the so-called logical objects, the connecting glue between different propositions that plays a central role in the logic of Frege and Russell." "Wittgenstein asserts that most philosophical confusion arises from trying to speak about things that can only be shown." ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html