[lit-ideas] Re: Wittengstein's Criterion

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 9 May 2014 20:54:06 +0100 (BST)

>For the record, while I _know_ (or _believe_) that 'criterion' (or perhaps  
better 'criteria') is a 'technicism' (as it were) in Witters's scheme of 
things,  it was this below I was having in mind when I brought criteria in:>

It is academic commentators who treat it as a 'technicism': afaik Wittgenstein 
nowhere makes such a claim. The explanation may be that it is not a 
'technicism' as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, given the purposes for which 
he deploys it, but it becomes one in the hands of some commentators. 


As I understand it, Wittgenstein is not using the notion of 'criterion' in the 
strict sense in which we might say the positivist 'verificationist theory of 
meaning' is offered as a strict criterion of "sense" - that is, a definitive 
(rather than partial and defeasible) yardstick. In Investigations 
Wittgenstein's sense of 'criterion' is looser: more elastic and flexible, as it 
is deployed to reflect the sometime elasticity and flexibility of many 
different uses of language.

Dnl
Ldn

On Friday, 9 May 2014, 17:32, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" 
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
 
My last post today!

: There's no criterion? There's not ONE criterion, but criteria?

---

Rather, Witters ON 'criterion' (or 'criteria' if you must).

In a message dated 5/9/2014 12:11:47 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes, among other interesting things:
"This post  may help explain why I do not find what W writes about criteria 
(mentioned in a  previous post by JLS) to be at all incompatible with the 
interpretation I am  suggesting."

For the record, while I _know_ (or _believe_) that 'criterion' (or perhaps  
better 'criteria') is a 'technicism' (as it were) in Witters's scheme of 
things,  it was this below I was having in mind when I brought criteria in:

McEvoy, under "lw" thread:

"To give examples where names 
name is NOT [emphasis Speranza's] to give 
an EXPLANATION [emphasis Speranza's] of the naming-relation 
but merely to illustrate it: what 
the challenge asks is to provide an 
explanation so that the relation is 
captured in language, PERHAPS [emphasis Speranza's] by way 
of some "theory" or "criterion" 
by which we can determine that a 
word is being used as a name and not otherwise."

McEvoy does write 'perhaps', which is good.

'Criterion' can be difficult.

"Theory" is perhaps a different animal, since a theory introduces what we  
may call a 'theoretical object' (as I think it's called) -- a theoretical 
posit.  And meaning (or what we mean) is said to be a matter of 'intuition' 
(as Grice  emphasised) -- perhaps even 'analysis' -- rather than 'theory'.

For the record it may do to revise the use of 'ostensive definition' as per 
the Stanford Encyclopedia link -- which concerned the 'meaning' of 
'metre'. 

Cheers,

Speranza

REFERENCES:
Albritton, "On Wittgenstein's use of the Term "Criterion"".
Wellman, C. "Wittgenstein's Conception of a Criterion"







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