[lit-ideas] Who is the Enemy?
- From: Eric <eyost1132@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 21:00:39 -0500
You can access this report through the RAND
Corporation main page.
Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat
BRUCE HOFFMAN
February 2006
Testimony presented to the House Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
on February 16, 2006
...there are many al Qaedas rather than the single
al Qaeda of the past. It
is now a more loosely organized and connected
movement that mixes and matches
organizational and operational styles whether
dictated by particular missions or imposed by
circumstances. Nonetheless, it would be mistaken
to believe that al Qaeda does not still retain
some important characteristics or aspects of a
more organized entity with a central command and
control structure, however weakened and reduced.
Al Qaeda today, accordingly, can perhaps be
usefully conceptualized as comprising four
distinct, but not mutually exclusive, dimensions.
In descending order of sophistication, they are:
*1* Al Qaeda Central. This category comprises the
remnants of the pre-9/11 al Qaeda
organization. Although its core leadership
includes some of the familiar, established
commanders of the past, there are a number of new
players who have advanced through
the ranks as a result of the death or capture of
key al Qaeda senior-level managers such
as KSM, Abu Atef, Abu Zubayda, and Hambali, and
most recently, Abu Faraj al-Libi and
Abu Hamza al-Masri. It is believed that this
hardcore remains centered in or around
Pakistan and continues to exert some coordination,
if not actual command capability, in
terms of commissioning attacks, directing
surveillance and collating reconnaissance,
planning operations, and approving their execution.
This category comes closest to the al Qaeda
operational template or model evident in the
1998 East Africa embassy bombings and 9/11
attacks. Such high value, “spectacular”
attacks are entrusted only to al Qaeda’s
professional cadre: the most dedicated,
committed and absolutely reliable element of the
movement. Previous patterns suggest
that these “professional” terrorists are deployed
in pre-determined and carefully selected
teams. They will also have been provided with very
specific targeting instructions. In
some cases, such as the East Africa bombings, they
may establish contact with, and
enlist the assistance of, local sympathizers and
supporters. This will be solely for
logistical and other attack-support purposes or to
enlist these locals to actually execute
the attack(s). The operation, however, will be
planned and directed by the “professional”
element with the locals clearly subordinate and
playing strictly a supporting role (albeit a
critical one, though).
*2* Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates. This
category embraces formally established
insurgent or terrorist groups who over the years
have benefited from bin Laden’s largesse
and/or spiritual guidance and/or have received
training, arms, money and other
assistance from al Qaeda. Among the recipients of
this assistance have been terrorist
groups and insurgent forces in Uzbekistan and
Indonesia, Chechnya and the Philippines,
Bosnia and Kashmir, among other places. By
supporting these groups, bin Laden’s
intentions were three-fold. First, he sought to
co-opt these movements’ mostly local
agendas and channel their efforts towards the
cause of global jihad. Second, he hoped to
create a jihadi “critical mass” from these
geographically scattered, disparate movements
that would one day coalesce into a single,
unstoppable force. And, third, he wanted to
foster a dependency relationship whereby as a quid
pro quo for prior al Qaeda support,
these movements would either undertake attacks at
al Qaeda’s behest or provide
essential local, logistical and other support to
facilitate strikes by the al Qaeda
“professional” cadre noted above.
This category includes groups such as: al-Ittihad
al-Islami (AIAI), Abu Musab Zarqawi’s al
Qaeda in Mesopotamia (formerly Jamaat al Tawhid
wa’l Jihad), Asbat al-Ansar, Ansar al
Islam, Islamic Army of Aden, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), Jemaah Islamiya
(JI), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Salafist
Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), and the various
Kashmiri Islamic groups based in
Pakistan——e.g., Harakat ul Mujahidin (HuM),
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Laskar-e-
Tayyiba (LeT), and Laskar I Jhangvi (LiJ).
*3* Al Qaeda Locals. These are amorphous groups
of al Qaeda adherents who are likely to
have had some prior terrorism experience, will
have been bloodied in battle as part of
some previous jihadi campaign in Algeria, the
Balkans, Chechnya, and perhaps more
recently in Iraq, and may have trained in some al
Qaeda facility before 9/11. They will
therefore have had some direct connection with al
Qaeda——however tenuous or
evanescent. Their current relationship, and even
communication, with a central al Qaeda
command and control apparatus may be equally
tenuous, if not actually dormant. The
distinguishing characteristic of this category,
however, is that there is some previous
connection of some kind with al Qaeda.
Specific examples of this adversary include Ahmed
Ressam, who was arrested in
December 1999 at Port Angeles, Washington State,
shortly after he had entered the U.S.
from Canada. Ressam, for instance, had a prior
background in terrorism having
belonged to Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
After being recruited to al Qaeda, he
was provided with a modicum of basic terrorist
training in Afghanistan. In contrast to the
professional cadre detailed above, however, Ressam
was given very non-specific,
virtually open-ended targeting instructions before
being dispatched to North America.
Also, unlike the well-funded professional cadre,
Ressam was given only $12,000 in ‘seed
money’ and instructed to raise the rest of his
operational funds from petty thievery. He
was also told to recruit members for his terrorist
cell from among the expatriate Muslim
communities in Canada and the U.S.3
*4* Al Qaeda Network. These are home-grown
Islamic radicals——from North Africa, the
Middle East, and South and South East Asia——as
well as local converts to Islam mostly
living in Europe, Africa and perhaps Latin America
and North America as well, who have
no direct connection with al Qaeda (or any other
identifiable terrorist group), but
nonetheless are prepared to carry out attacks in
solidarity with or support of al Qaeda’s
radical jihadi agenda. They are motivated by a
shared sense of enmity and grievance felt
towards the United States and West in general and
their host-nations in particular. In this
case, the relationship with al Qaeda is more
inspirational than actual; abetted by
profound rage over the U.S. invasion and
occupation of Iraq and the oppression of
Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and
elsewhere. Critically, these periods are
neither part of a known, organized group nor even
a very cohesive entity unto
themselves.
Examples of this category, which comprises small
cells of like-minded locals who
gravitate towards one to plan and mount terrorist
attacks completely independent of any
direction provided by al Qaeda, include the group
of mostly Moroccan Islamic radicals
based in Spain who carried out the March 2004
Madrid bombings and their counterparts
in the Netherlands responsible for the November
2004 murder of Theo Van Gogh, among
others.
The most salient threat posed by the above
categories, however, continues to come from al
Qaeda Central and then from its affiliates and
associates. However, an additional and equally
challenging threat is now posed by less
discernible and more unpredictable entities drawn from
the vast Muslim Diaspora in Europe. As far back as
2001, the Netherlands’ intelligence and
security service had detected increased terrorist
recruitment efforts among Muslim youth living in
the Netherlands whom it was previously assumed had
been completely assimilated into Dutch society and
culture. Thus, representatives of Muslim extremist
organizations had already succeeded in embedding
themselves in, and drawing new sources of support
from, receptive elements within established
Diaspora communities. In this way, new recruits
could be drawn into the movement who likely had
not previously come under the scrutiny of local or
national law enforcement agencies.
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