[lit-ideas] Re: Was William of Ockham parsimonious enough?
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2015 10:57:13 +0000 (UTC)
The implicature of the question is that he WAS parsimonious; but we are
dealing with a 'gradual' conceptual analysis here.>
Should we paying attention to anyone either PEI or PGE [Pre-Era of Implicature
or Pre-Grice Era]?
Elsewhere I have explained why "conceptual analysis", gradual or not, is a huge
intellectual hoax. But as to the conclusion - that it depends what we mean by
necessity - I would add this depends not on any conceptual analysis but on the
substance of our views on "necessity and its role in explanation". The
additional words - "its role in explanation" - are most important.
We should distinguish between different kinds of case and how the Razor applies
in terms of what is to be explained. If we have an explanation in the sciences
that does not need ghosts, and which would not be made more satisfactory by the
introduction of ghosts, then we can use the Razor to say we need not introduce
ghosts even though, conceivably, we could. But in other areas, like
metaphysics, the problem is that our explanations are not scientifically
testable, and we do not have scientific standards of what is satisfactory from
which to judge what entities are necessary to explanation. In metaphysics, the
Razor's application is therefore much more debateable. This is particularly so
if we reject a cosmology of "There's nothing new under the sun" for a cosmology
where the universe has a creative character where new entities emerge; and
where not only is their existence irremovable by a Razor but the explanation of
their emergence is not reducible to what pre-existed, and thus the Razor also
does not help in explanatory terms.
The dangers in this last kind of case is that the Razor may be applied in ways
that give us a false sense that we have explained what is there when we have
really opted to explain it away (this, for example, is the marked tendency of
physicalism in relation to 'mental events'). In this last kind of case, the
Razor becomes the enemy of proper explanation whereas in the right kind of case
it is the friend of proper explanation.
It should be emphasised that "explanation" is not to be identified with
"conceptual analysis" and is not dependent on it - the opposite views are just
philosophers' make-believe.
DSgt. Popper's Lonely Brains Club
On Saturday, 10 October 2015, 19:42, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Geary prefers the spelling "William off Ockham", since "we are not sure how
long he stayed there," (implicating, "or even if he was ever WANTED there"
-- Geary means 'welcomed').
The implicature of the question is that he WAS parsimonious; but we are
dealing with a 'gradual' conceptual analysis here. And using the historical
past, on top ("was").
In a message dated 10/9/2015 5:43:22 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
Should we multiply the applications of Occam's Razor beyond necessity?
Well, we should ask William of Ockham.
It is not known when he started to use the razor -- "and for what purpose,"
Geary adds.
What _is_ known is that William (his surname has not come to us; thus Geary
calls him "William Smith": "I use 'Smith' as the default surname of any
Englishman worth his name -- it etymologically means 'smith'") was born (by
his mother -- whose maiden known has neither come to us -- "but I won't
assume "Smith"", Geary recommends) in Ockham, Surrey in 1285.
William joined the totally unparsimonious Franciscan order at an early age
-- "His mother possibly wanted to get rid of him 'at an early age'", Geary
comments.
It is believed that he studied theology at Oxford from 1309 to 1321, but
while he completed all the requirements for a master's degree in theology
(more or less the 14th century equivalent of a doctorate in Tagalog) he was
never made regent master.
This may be due to his NOT being 'parsimonious' in his manners and stuff.
Oxford was at the time the most parsimonious university in England ("They
didn't have much to compete with; and Cambridge _was_ always unparsimonious
by comparison," Geary comments).
Because of this -- i.e. that he was never made 'regent master', William
(""of Ockham," at this time, was his 'sobriquet'" -- Geary notes) acquired
the honorific title Venerabilis Inceptor, or "Venerable Beginner". As Geary
explains, an "inceptor" ("NOT in the way we use the word today," Geary adds)
was "a student formally admitted to the ranks of teachers by the
university authorities" -- the custom was kept in Christ Church, Oxford, where
teachers are called 'students' (Lewis Carroll was one).
"Should we multiply the applications of Occam's razor beyond necessity?"
Well, there are razors and there are razors.
The term "Ockam's razor" first appeared in 1852 in the works of Sir William
Hamilton, 9th Baronet (1788–1856), centuries after William of Ockham's
death in 1347.
"And it's rare to think that Hamilton SAW the razor anyway, after all them
years," Geary expresses himself, for comical effect, in the vernacular.
Ockham did not invent this "razor" — its association with him may be due to
the frequency and effectiveness with which he used it. ("He was hirsute,"
is Geary's implicature).
Ockham stated the principle in various ways, but the most popular version,
Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate
was formulated by the Irish Franciscan philosopher John known as "Punch" in
his 1639 commentary on the works of Duns Scotus, a Scot, as his name
implies -- commenting on Duns Scotus' book Ordinatio, where he (Duns -- also
Duns's birthplace, in Scotland) writes: "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine
necessitate".
The oldest and very clear equivalanet of Occam's razor is the one of
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans two millennia before Occam, as Proclo very
clearly describes.
The Pythagoreans have the principle that we have to make the simplest
suppositions as Pythagoras ordered them to do when they describe what is
necessary to describe.
As one reads from Geary's notes:
"τῶν μὲν Πυθαγορείων ... παρακέλευσμα ἦν ...... δι'
ἐλαχίστων καὶ ἁπλουστάτων ὑποθέσεων ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τοῖς
κλεινοῖς Πυθαγορείοις" και "δεῖν γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων καὶ
αὐτὸν παρακελεύεσθαι τὸν Πυθαγόραν ζητεῖν ἐξ ἐλαχίστων
καὶ ἁπλουστάτων ὑποθέσεων δεικνύναι τὰ ζητούμενα·"
The origins of what has come to be known as Occam's razor are thus
traceable to the works of earlier philosophers such as Pythagoras, Proclo, John
Duns Scotus (1265–1308), Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), Maimonides (Moses
ben-Maimon, 1138–1204), not to mention Aristotle (384–322 BC).
"Then why do YOU mention him?" an irritated Geary asks.
Aristotle writes in his Posterior Analytics:
"We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus [other things being equal]
of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses."
Tolemeo (c. AD 90 – c. AD 168) writes:
"We consider it a good principle to explain the phenomena by the simplest
hypothesis possible."
Phrases such as "It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer"
and "A plurality is not to be posited without necessity" were commonplace in
13th-century scholastic writing.
Robert Grosseteste ("so nicknamed because of his great head or
intelligence", Geary comments), in Commentary on [Aristotle's] the Posterior
Analytics
Books (Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros) (c. 1217–1220),
declares:
"That is better and more valuable which requires fewer, other circumstances
being equal... For if one thing were demonstrated from many and another
thing from fewer equally known premises, clearly that is better which is from
fewer because it makes us know quickly, just as a universal demonstration
is better than particular because it produces knowledge from fewer
premises. Similarly in natural science, in moral science, and in metaphysics
the
best is that which needs no premises and the better that which needs the
fewer, other circumstances being equal."
The Summa Theologica of the well-known Italian philosopher Tommaso d'Aquino
(1225–1274) states:
"it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few
principles has been produced by many".
Tommaso (from Aquino) uses this principle to construct an objection to
God's existence, an objection that he in turn answers and refutes generally
(cf. quinque viae), and specifically, through an argument based on causality.
Hence, Tommaso (of Aquino) acknowledges the principle that today is known
as Occam's razor, but prefers causal explanations to other simple
explanations (cf. also Correlation does not imply causation).
In other words: and to answer McEvoy's question: "It depends on what you
mean 'necessity'."
Cheers,
Speranza
References:
Brundage, James. "Canon Law in the Law schools", in The history of
medieval canon law in the classical period. Catholic University of America
Press
(Wilfried Hartmann & Kenneth Pennington, eds.)
Geary, Notes on the razor. Memphis Metaphysical Ministry, Memorandum 45.
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