[lit-ideas] The Truth About Grice

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 22:08:05 -0400 (EDT)

Or; The Taming of the True

In a message dated 6/12/2012 11:45:59 P.M. UTC-02, rpaul@xxxxxxxx  writes:
Bibliography
Other Internet Resources
_http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#RedThe_ 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#RedThe) 
Any  questions? 
 
--
 
Well, below, a quotation of the reference list from the above link.
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
Alston, William P., 1996, A Realistic Conception of Truth, Ithaca: Cornell  
University Press.

--- Alston was a good philosopher. I like his "Philosophy of Language". He  
cares to list Grice as proposing an 'ideational' theory of meaning alla  
Grice.
 
Armstrong, David M., 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press.
 
--- I like Armstrong. In his "Philosophical Review" essay on Meaning and  
Communication he cares to quote extensively from Grice. They disagree on the  
meaning of "intend" in Grice's phrase, 'utterer's intentions'. Armstrong 
think  Humpty Dumpty can mean what he says he means.
 
Austin, J. L., 1950, “Truth”, Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 24: 
111-129.  Reprinted in Austin (1961a).
Austin, J. L., 1961a, Philosophical Papers,  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock.
Austin, J.  L., 1961b, “Unfair to facts”, in Philosophical Papers, J. O. 
Urmson and G. J.  Warnock, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 102-122.

---- Of course, Grice's philosophy would never have attained the shape it  
did had it not been for his interactions with that master, J. L. Austin. 
 
 
Azzouni, Jody, 2001, “Truth via anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers”,  
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30: 329-354.

Baldwin, Thomas, 1991, “The identity theory of truth”, Mind, 100:  35-52.

Barwise, Jon and Perry, John, 1986, Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge:  
MIT Press.

Beall, J. C., 2000, “On truthmakers for negative truths”, Australasian  
Journal of Philosophy, 78: 264-268.
Beall, J. C., forthcoming, “Transparent  disquotationalism”, in 
Deflationism and Paradox, J. C. Beall and B. Armour-Garb,  eds., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Blanshard, Brand, 1939, The Nature of  Thought, London: George Allen and 
Unwin.

Cartwright, Richard, 1987, “A neglected theory of truth”, in Philosophical 
 Essays, Cambridge: MIT Press, 71-93.

Davidson, Donald, 1967, “Truth and meaning”, Synthese, 17: 304-323.  
Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, Donald, 1969, “True to the facts”,  Journal of Philosophy, 66: 
748-764. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson,  Donald, 1973, “Radical interpretation”, Dialectica, 27: 313-328.
Davidson,  Donald, 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: 
Oxford University  Press.
Davidson, Donald, 1986, “A coherence theory of truth and knowledge”,  in 
Truth and Interpretation, E. Lepore, ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell,  307-319.

--- Davidson contributed to the Grice festschrift ed. by Grandy/Warner,  
P.G.R.I.C.E., philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories,  
ends. "A nice derangement of epitaphs".
 
Devitt, Michael, 1984, Realism and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell.

Dummett, Michael, 1959, “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  
59: 141-162. Reprinted in Dummett (1978).
Dummett, Michael, 1976, “What is a  theory of meaning? (II)”, in Truth and 
Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds.,  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Reprinted in Dummett (1993).
Dummett, Michael, 1978,  Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
Dummett,  Michael, 1983, “Language and truth”, in Approaches to Language, 
Roy Harris, ed.,  Oxford: Pergamon, 95-125. Reprinted in Dummett (1993).
Dummett, Michael,  1991, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge: 
Harvard University  Press.
Dummett, Michael, 1993, The Seas of Language, Oxford: Oxford  University 
Press.

Grice cares to quote from Dummett and Kripke in WoW (1967), but on the  
whole Grice held that Dummett was a bit of an outsider when it came to 'vintage 
 Oxonian philosophy' of the "Play Group" type that Grice enjoyed.
 
 
Etchemendy, John, 1988, “Tarski on truth and logical consequence”, Journal 
 of Philosophical Logic, 43: 51-79.
Field, Hartry, 1972, “Tarski's theory of  truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 
69: 347-375.
Field, Hartry, 1986, “The  deflationary conception of truth”, in Fact, 
Science and Value, C. Wright and G.  MacDonald, eds., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
55-117.
Field, Hartry, 1994,  “Deflationist views of meaning and content”, Mind, 
103: 249-285.

Fox, John, 1987, “Truthmaker”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65:  
188-207.

Frege, Gottlob, 1918-19, “Der gedanke”, Beiträge zur Philosophie des  
deutschen Idealismus, 1: 58-77. Translated by P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff as  “
Thoughts” in Frege (1984).
Frege, Gottlob, 1984, Collected Papers on  Mathematics, Logic, and 
Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Edited by B.  McGuiness.

--- Horn has recently elaborated on the Grice/Frege interface, e.g. the  
idea of conventional implicature as being Fregean in nature.
 
Glanzberg, Michael, 2003a, “Against truth-value gaps”, in Liars and Heaps, 
 J. C. Beall, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 151-194.

--- Grice was ALSO very much against truth-value gaps. Horn wrote on this:  
"Showdown at Truth Value Gap"
 
Glanzberg, Michael, 2003b, “Minimalism and paradoxes”, Synthese, 135:  
13-36.
Grover, Dorothy L., Kamp, Joseph L., and Belnap, Nuel D., 1975, “A  
prosentential theory of truth”, Philosophical Studies, 27: 73-125.
 
Grice, H. P. "Section on "Truth"" in "Further Notes on Logic and  
Conversation" -- now repr. in WoW, Studies in the Way of Words. 
 
Grice, H. P. -- the 'alethic' -- in Aspects of Reason: "alethic reason" vs. 
 practical reason. 
 
--- Grice quotes extensively from Strawson if only to criticise him. Grice  
quotes extensively from Tarski, too.

Gupta, Anil, 1993, “A critique of deflationism”, Philosophical Topics,  
21: 57-81.

Haack, Susan, 1976, “The pragmatist theory of truth”, British Journal for  
the Philosophy of Science, 27: 231-249.

--- Haack discusses Grice extensively in her "Philosophies of Logic". 
 
Halbach, Volker, 1999, “Disquotationalism and infinite conjunctions”, 
Mind,  108: 1-22.
Hartshorne, C., Weiss, P., and Burks, A. W. (eds.), 1931-58, The  Collected 
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1-8, Cambridge: Harvard  University 
Press.
Heck, Richard, 1997, “Tarski, truth, and semantics”,  Philosophical 
Review, 106: 533-554.

Horwich, Paul, 1990, Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hylton, Peter,  1990, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic 
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford  University Press.
James, William, 1907, “Pragmatism's conception of truth”,  in Pragmatism, 
New York: Longmans, 197-236.

Joachim, H. H., 1906, The Nature of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon  Press.

--- Oxford professor.
 
 
Kaplan, David, 1989, “Demonstratives”, in Themes From Kaplan, J. Almog, J. 
 Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 481-563. 
First  publication of a widely circulated manuscript dated 1977.
Ketland, Jeffrey,  1999, “Deflationism and Tarski's paradise”, Mind, 108: 
69-94.
Lackey, Douglas  (ed.), 1973, Essays in Analysis, New York: George 
Braziller.
Leeds, Stephen,  1978, “Theories of reference and truth”, Erkenntnis, 13: 
111-129.

McDowell, John, 1976, “Truth-conditions, bivalence, and verificationism”,  
in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Oxford: Clarendon 
Press,  42-66.

Misak, Cheryl J., 1991, Truth and the End of Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford  
University Press.

Moore, George Edward, 1899, “The nature of judgment”, Mind, 8:  176-193.
Moore, George Edward, 1902, “Truth”, in Dictionary of Philosophy and  
Psychology, J. M. Baldwin, ed., London: Macmillan, vol. 2, 716-718.
Moore,  George Edward, 1953, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: 
George Allen and  Unwin.

--- "Some like Witters but Moore's MY man" (Austin -- heard by  Grice).
 
 
Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter, and Smith, Barry, 1984, “Truth-makers”,  
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 287-321.

Parsons, Josh, 1999, “There is no ‘truthmaker’ argument against  nominalism
”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 325-334.
Putnam, Hilary,  1978, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge 
and Kegan  Paul.
Putnam, Hilary, 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press.
Putnam, Hilary, 1985-86, “A comparison of something with  something else”, 
New Literary History, 17: 61-79. Reprinted in Putnam  (1994).
Putnam, Hilary, 1994, Words and Life, Cambridge: Harvard University  Press.
Quine, W. V. O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT  Press.
Quine, W. V. O., 1970, Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge: Harvard  University 
Press.
Ramsey, Frank P., 1927, “Facts and propositions”,  Aristotelian Society 
Supp. Vol., 7: 153-170. Reprinted in Ramsey  (1931).
Ramsey, Frank P., 1931, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other  Logical 
Essays, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Ross, W. D. (ed.), 1928,  The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, second  ed.
Russell, Bertrand, 1903, Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, first ed.
Russell, Bertrand, 1904, “Meinong's theory of  complexes and assumptions I, 
II, III”, Mind, 13: 204-219, 336-354, 509-524.  Reprinted in Lackey (1973).
Russell, Bertrand, 1910a, “The monistic theory of  truth”, in 
Philosophical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin,  131-146.
Russell, Bertrand, 1910b, “On the nature of truth and falsehood”, in  
Philosophical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin, 147-159.
Russell,  Bertrand, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Oxford 
University  Press.
Russell, Bertrand, 1956, “The philosophy of logical atomism”, in Logic  
and Knowledge, R. C. Marsh, ed., London: George Allen and Unwin, 177-281.  
Originally published in The Monist in 1918.
Soames, Scott, 1984, “What is a  theory of truth?”, Journal of Philosophy, 
81: 411-429.

Strawson, Peter F., 1949, “Truth”, Analysis, 9: 83-97.
Strawson, Peter  F., 1950, “Truth”, Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 24. 
Reprinted in Strawson  (1971).
Strawson, Peter F., 1971, Logico-Linguistic Papers, London:  Methuen.

--- Grice's tutee at St. John's -- Strawson was John Locke lecturer at St.  
John's when Grice was Tutorial Fellow there. Under Grice's tutorials, 
however,  Strawson only got a "second" -- in PPE -- never the "first" that 
Grice 
had  attained in Lit. Hum -- "greats". 
 
 
Tarski, Alfred, 1931, “Sur les ensembles définissables de nombres réels.  I.
”, Fundamenta Mathematicae, 17: 210-239. References are to the translation 
by  J. H. Woodger as “On Definable Sets of Real Numbers” in Tarski  (1983).
Tarski, Alfred, 1935, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalizierten  Sprachen”
, Studia Philosophica, 1: 261-405. References are to the translation by  J. 
H. Woodger as “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” in Tarski  
(1983).
Tarski, Alfred, 1944, “The semantic conception of truth”, Philosophy  and 
Phenomenological Research, 4: 341-375.
Tarski, Alfred, 1983, Logic,  Semantics, Metamathematics, Indianapolis: 
Hackett, second ed. Edited by J.  Corcoran with translations by J. H. Woodger.

His real name wasn't Tarski -- but then what IS 'real'?
 
 
Taylor, Barry, 1976, “States of affairs”, in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans  
and J. McDowell, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 263-284.

Walker, Ralph C. S., 1989, The Coherence Theory of Truth, London:  
Routledge.

Walker defended Grice against Cohen in "Conversational Implicature" -- a  
brilliant essay.
 
Williamson, Timothy, 1996, “Knowing and asserting”, Philosophical Review,  
104: 489-523.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, New  York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co.
Wright, Crispin, 1976, “Truth-conditions and  criteria”, Aristotelian 
Society Supp. Vol., 50: 217-245. Reprinted in Wright  (1993).
Wright, Crispin, 1982, “Anti-realist semantics: The role of  criteria”, in 
Idealism: Past and Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
225-248. Reprinted in Wright (1993).
Wright, Crispin, 1992, Truth and  Objectivity, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
Wright, Crispin, 1993,  Realism, Meaning and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, 
second ed.

and so on. 
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