Or; The Taming of the True In a message dated 6/12/2012 11:45:59 P.M. UTC-02, rpaul@xxxxxxxx writes: Bibliography Other Internet Resources _http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#RedThe_ (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#RedThe) Any questions? -- Well, below, a quotation of the reference list from the above link. Cheers, Speranza Alston, William P., 1996, A Realistic Conception of Truth, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. --- Alston was a good philosopher. I like his "Philosophy of Language". He cares to list Grice as proposing an 'ideational' theory of meaning alla Grice. Armstrong, David M., 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- I like Armstrong. In his "Philosophical Review" essay on Meaning and Communication he cares to quote extensively from Grice. They disagree on the meaning of "intend" in Grice's phrase, 'utterer's intentions'. Armstrong think Humpty Dumpty can mean what he says he means. Austin, J. L., 1950, “Truth”, Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 24: 111-129. Reprinted in Austin (1961a). Austin, J. L., 1961a, Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Austin, J. L., 1961b, “Unfair to facts”, in Philosophical Papers, J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 102-122. ---- Of course, Grice's philosophy would never have attained the shape it did had it not been for his interactions with that master, J. L. Austin. Azzouni, Jody, 2001, “Truth via anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30: 329-354. Baldwin, Thomas, 1991, “The identity theory of truth”, Mind, 100: 35-52. Barwise, Jon and Perry, John, 1986, Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge: MIT Press. Beall, J. C., 2000, “On truthmakers for negative truths”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 264-268. Beall, J. C., forthcoming, “Transparent disquotationalism”, in Deflationism and Paradox, J. C. Beall and B. Armour-Garb, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blanshard, Brand, 1939, The Nature of Thought, London: George Allen and Unwin. Cartwright, Richard, 1987, “A neglected theory of truth”, in Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: MIT Press, 71-93. Davidson, Donald, 1967, “Truth and meaning”, Synthese, 17: 304-323. Reprinted in Davidson (1984). Davidson, Donald, 1969, “True to the facts”, Journal of Philosophy, 66: 748-764. Reprinted in Davidson (1984). Davidson, Donald, 1973, “Radical interpretation”, Dialectica, 27: 313-328. Davidson, Donald, 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Donald, 1986, “A coherence theory of truth and knowledge”, in Truth and Interpretation, E. Lepore, ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 307-319. --- Davidson contributed to the Grice festschrift ed. by Grandy/Warner, P.G.R.I.C.E., philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. "A nice derangement of epitaphs". Devitt, Michael, 1984, Realism and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. Dummett, Michael, 1959, “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 141-162. Reprinted in Dummett (1978). Dummett, Michael, 1976, “What is a theory of meaning? (II)”, in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in Dummett (1993). Dummett, Michael, 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dummett, Michael, 1983, “Language and truth”, in Approaches to Language, Roy Harris, ed., Oxford: Pergamon, 95-125. Reprinted in Dummett (1993). Dummett, Michael, 1991, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dummett, Michael, 1993, The Seas of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grice cares to quote from Dummett and Kripke in WoW (1967), but on the whole Grice held that Dummett was a bit of an outsider when it came to 'vintage Oxonian philosophy' of the "Play Group" type that Grice enjoyed. Etchemendy, John, 1988, “Tarski on truth and logical consequence”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43: 51-79. Field, Hartry, 1972, “Tarski's theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 69: 347-375. Field, Hartry, 1986, “The deflationary conception of truth”, in Fact, Science and Value, C. Wright and G. MacDonald, eds., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 55-117. Field, Hartry, 1994, “Deflationist views of meaning and content”, Mind, 103: 249-285. Fox, John, 1987, “Truthmaker”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 188-207. Frege, Gottlob, 1918-19, “Der gedanke”, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 1: 58-77. Translated by P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff as “ Thoughts” in Frege (1984). Frege, Gottlob, 1984, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Edited by B. McGuiness. --- Horn has recently elaborated on the Grice/Frege interface, e.g. the idea of conventional implicature as being Fregean in nature. Glanzberg, Michael, 2003a, “Against truth-value gaps”, in Liars and Heaps, J. C. Beall, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 151-194. --- Grice was ALSO very much against truth-value gaps. Horn wrote on this: "Showdown at Truth Value Gap" Glanzberg, Michael, 2003b, “Minimalism and paradoxes”, Synthese, 135: 13-36. Grover, Dorothy L., Kamp, Joseph L., and Belnap, Nuel D., 1975, “A prosentential theory of truth”, Philosophical Studies, 27: 73-125. Grice, H. P. "Section on "Truth"" in "Further Notes on Logic and Conversation" -- now repr. in WoW, Studies in the Way of Words. Grice, H. P. -- the 'alethic' -- in Aspects of Reason: "alethic reason" vs. practical reason. --- Grice quotes extensively from Strawson if only to criticise him. Grice quotes extensively from Tarski, too. Gupta, Anil, 1993, “A critique of deflationism”, Philosophical Topics, 21: 57-81. Haack, Susan, 1976, “The pragmatist theory of truth”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27: 231-249. --- Haack discusses Grice extensively in her "Philosophies of Logic". Halbach, Volker, 1999, “Disquotationalism and infinite conjunctions”, Mind, 108: 1-22. Hartshorne, C., Weiss, P., and Burks, A. W. (eds.), 1931-58, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1-8, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Heck, Richard, 1997, “Tarski, truth, and semantics”, Philosophical Review, 106: 533-554. Horwich, Paul, 1990, Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hylton, Peter, 1990, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. James, William, 1907, “Pragmatism's conception of truth”, in Pragmatism, New York: Longmans, 197-236. Joachim, H. H., 1906, The Nature of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon Press. --- Oxford professor. Kaplan, David, 1989, “Demonstratives”, in Themes From Kaplan, J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 481-563. First publication of a widely circulated manuscript dated 1977. Ketland, Jeffrey, 1999, “Deflationism and Tarski's paradise”, Mind, 108: 69-94. Lackey, Douglas (ed.), 1973, Essays in Analysis, New York: George Braziller. Leeds, Stephen, 1978, “Theories of reference and truth”, Erkenntnis, 13: 111-129. McDowell, John, 1976, “Truth-conditions, bivalence, and verificationism”, in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 42-66. Misak, Cheryl J., 1991, Truth and the End of Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moore, George Edward, 1899, “The nature of judgment”, Mind, 8: 176-193. Moore, George Edward, 1902, “Truth”, in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, J. M. Baldwin, ed., London: Macmillan, vol. 2, 716-718. Moore, George Edward, 1953, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: George Allen and Unwin. --- "Some like Witters but Moore's MY man" (Austin -- heard by Grice). Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter, and Smith, Barry, 1984, “Truth-makers”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 287-321. Parsons, Josh, 1999, “There is no ‘truthmaker’ argument against nominalism ”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 325-334. Putnam, Hilary, 1978, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Putnam, Hilary, 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, Hilary, 1985-86, “A comparison of something with something else”, New Literary History, 17: 61-79. Reprinted in Putnam (1994). Putnam, Hilary, 1994, Words and Life, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Quine, W. V. O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press. Quine, W. V. O., 1970, Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ramsey, Frank P., 1927, “Facts and propositions”, Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 7: 153-170. Reprinted in Ramsey (1931). Ramsey, Frank P., 1931, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ross, W. D. (ed.), 1928, The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, Oxford: Clarendon Press, second ed. Russell, Bertrand, 1903, Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, first ed. Russell, Bertrand, 1904, “Meinong's theory of complexes and assumptions I, II, III”, Mind, 13: 204-219, 336-354, 509-524. Reprinted in Lackey (1973). Russell, Bertrand, 1910a, “The monistic theory of truth”, in Philosophical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin, 131-146. Russell, Bertrand, 1910b, “On the nature of truth and falsehood”, in Philosophical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin, 147-159. Russell, Bertrand, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press. Russell, Bertrand, 1956, “The philosophy of logical atomism”, in Logic and Knowledge, R. C. Marsh, ed., London: George Allen and Unwin, 177-281. Originally published in The Monist in 1918. Soames, Scott, 1984, “What is a theory of truth?”, Journal of Philosophy, 81: 411-429. Strawson, Peter F., 1949, “Truth”, Analysis, 9: 83-97. Strawson, Peter F., 1950, “Truth”, Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 24. Reprinted in Strawson (1971). Strawson, Peter F., 1971, Logico-Linguistic Papers, London: Methuen. --- Grice's tutee at St. John's -- Strawson was John Locke lecturer at St. John's when Grice was Tutorial Fellow there. Under Grice's tutorials, however, Strawson only got a "second" -- in PPE -- never the "first" that Grice had attained in Lit. Hum -- "greats". Tarski, Alfred, 1931, “Sur les ensembles définissables de nombres réels. I. ”, Fundamenta Mathematicae, 17: 210-239. References are to the translation by J. H. Woodger as “On Definable Sets of Real Numbers” in Tarski (1983). Tarski, Alfred, 1935, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalizierten Sprachen” , Studia Philosophica, 1: 261-405. References are to the translation by J. H. Woodger as “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” in Tarski (1983). Tarski, Alfred, 1944, “The semantic conception of truth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4: 341-375. Tarski, Alfred, 1983, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Indianapolis: Hackett, second ed. Edited by J. Corcoran with translations by J. H. Woodger. His real name wasn't Tarski -- but then what IS 'real'? Taylor, Barry, 1976, “States of affairs”, in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 263-284. Walker, Ralph C. S., 1989, The Coherence Theory of Truth, London: Routledge. Walker defended Grice against Cohen in "Conversational Implicature" -- a brilliant essay. Williamson, Timothy, 1996, “Knowing and asserting”, Philosophical Review, 104: 489-523. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. Wright, Crispin, 1976, “Truth-conditions and criteria”, Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 50: 217-245. Reprinted in Wright (1993). Wright, Crispin, 1982, “Anti-realist semantics: The role of criteria”, in Idealism: Past and Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 225-248. Reprinted in Wright (1993). Wright, Crispin, 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wright, Crispin, 1993, Realism, Meaning and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, second ed. and so on. ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html