[lit-ideas] The Philosopher's Self-Deception
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 13:20:59 -0400 (EDT)
In a message dated 6/27/2012 6:33:41 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
rpaul@xxxxxxxx was mentioning, in passing,
the Taniyama-Shimura conjecture.
----
Oddly, Child (as per my previous post) is right about Witters's confusions
with "I".
Surely Wittgenstein can say,
"My nose is beautiful" (or big for that matter) when it's not. So, whereas
Witters held that "I" statements carried two features:
privileged access
and
incorrigibility
he was wrong on both counts.
For a time, HPG thought likewise, till he learned better from D. F. Pears,
the only philosopher who has studied self-deception intelligently, along
the lines of a theory of rationality.
----
The interesting thing is, then, to review (with a view to a refutation) why
Witters was so concerned about the incorrigibility and privileged access
of, er, "I".
Child writes, as per link in previous post:
"Questions about the use of ‘I’ arise throughout Wittgenstein’s
writings."
‘My arm is broken' is CORRIGIBLE. As "My nose is beautiful", or "My nose
is big".
‘I have grown six inches' is similarly corrigible.
‘I have a bump on my forehead’ is VERY CORRIGIBLE (Witters may be seeing a
reflection of his FRIEND's forehead, and it is Witters's friend's forehead
which as a bump).
‘The wind blows my hair about’ is similarly corrigible -- since Witters
may be wearing a wig.
On the other hand, Witters claims that some utterances are, like "2 + 2 =
4", INCORRIGIBLE:
‘I see so-and-so’, ‘I hear so-and-so’, ‘I try to lift my arm’, ‘I
think
it will rain’, ‘I have toothache’.
Child comments: "It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a
pain in my arm,
see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine, when it is really my
neighbour’s. And I could, looking into a mirror, mistake a bump on his
forehead for one on mine."
The view by Witters on incorrigibility is too simplistic and merits
refutation rather than correction. As Child notes, but Witters doesn't:
"someone who asserts ‘I have a bump on my forehead’ or ‘I have toothache’
is doing two things:
a) she is saying which person has a particular property (it is I rather
than you who has a bump or a toothache); and
b) she is saying what property that person has (I have a bump rather than
a scratch, or a toothache rather than a headache).
Child concludes: "A question about the possibility of error arises in each
case: can the
subject be wrong about which person it is who has a bump or a 2
toothache?; and
can she be wrong that what that person has is a bump or a toothache?".
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
Refs.
Pears, D. F. Motivated irrationality, Oxford.
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