"I will say that it is true that snow is white because snow _is_ white" Tarski. R. Paul writes in reply to D. McEvoy: "Just as Tarski's notion that 'P' is true, iff P, leaves it to the truth-seeker to use his or her own favorite way of determining whether P, so S leaves it open as to how 'p' is established." Although Polish (and Polish-writing) Alfred Tarski was the idol of the German-speaking _Wiener Kriese_. And it is in German that his 'Semantic Conception of Truth' is best known. One of his examples, and this to please Walter O. who speaks German, was: "Schnee ist Weiss" ---- Nobody even _tried_ to refute him. I had to re-read my Sextus Empiricus (Loeb) to find Tarski's T-predicate was _wrong_: Sextus writes: "Anaxagoras countered the [ultimately Tarskian] notion that snow is white with the argument, 'Snow is frozen water, and water is black; therefore snow also is black" [Anaxagoras to leuken eina ten khiona antetithei hoti he khion hudor esti pepegos, to de hudor esti melan, kai he khion ara melaina estin.] "Anaxagoras countered the notion" Anaxagoras atetithei "that snow is white" khiona eina leuken with the argument, hoti 'Snow is frozen water, khion esti pepegos hudor and water is black; de to hudor esti melan therefore snow also is black" ara he khion kai estin melaina" [Anaxagoras to leuken eina ten khiona antetithei hoti he khion hudor esti pepegos, to de hudor esti melan, kai he khion ara melaina estin.] **************************************Check out AOL's list of 2007's hottest products. (http://money.aol.com/special/hot-products-2007?NCID=aoltop00030000000001)