[lit-ideas] Say That, Say How
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 13:06:02 -0400 (EDT)
Say That, Say How
Grice, like any intelligent person, knows that there are _categories_ or
realms.
What you say, How you say it. When echoing Kant, he calls the Relation,
Quantity and Quality categories of 'conversation' as pertaining to the WHAT is
said. It's the category of Mode that pertains to HOW what is said is said.
Witters is never so careful.
In a message dated 6/25/2012 11:38:46 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
_phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxx (mailto:phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx) , in a nice post meant to
illustrate some of the queries raised by J. Wager, quotes directly from
Witters
(recall Grice, "Some like Witters, but Moore's MY man").
"In the Tractatus," P. Enns writes, "at 3.221, Wittgenstein writes,
'A proposition can only SAY HOW a thing is, *not* WHAT it is'.
-
--" (emphasis mine -- Speranza)
Cfr. the above by Grice:
what is said.
How what is said is said.
One sees that in the informal use of 'how' above, Witters is led to some
further confusions.
Witness Ryle who similarly thought that, because 'know' can sometimes be
followed by 'that' (He knows that he is right) and sometimes by 'how' (He
knows how to cook), there are two types of 'know' involved. There aren't.
P. E. goes on:
"This is part of a larger discussion of the relationship between objects,
their names, and propositions that use those names. The argument seems to
be that a proposition, by virtue of having logical form, functions like a
picture of a state of affairs that involves objects. However, while a
proposition can say this state of affairs, it cannot at the same time, give the
sense of itself. Or, as Wittgenstein puts it at 3.332, 'No proposition can SAY
anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained
in itself'."
Still, since a proposition belongs in a Language, and a language allows
for levels:
-- object-language L1
-- meta-language L2
and so on.
Grice calls this the "Bootstrap". It is a poor lingo one speaks that does
not allow for this hierachy. The only way to pull yourself up by your own
bootraps, Grice knows.
For it is VERY CLEAR that, from the perspective of L2 one can SAY that L1
may not say, it seems Witters is being too tragical in his consequence.
(Grice's "Bootstrap" concerns the choice of L1 and L2 --. Being a reductionist
at heart, Grice knows that it's best NOT to allow for L2 to enrich L1 too
much: all that can be expressed in L2 should ultimately be expressed in L1
-- minus 'use'/'mention' otiose distinctions).
P. E. continues:
"The sense of the proposition is therefore variable, depending on how this
proposition and others like it, are used. The proposition gives a fixed
picture, it [DOES SAY] SOMETHING, but its sense or meaning cannot be
similarly fixed, and therefore is shown."
I like P. Enns's idea of talking Anglo-Saxon "mean" rather than Latinate
"sense" here.--- Not that that would solve the mistake in Witters's
thinking, alas (see below)
P. E. goes on:
"At 3.144, Wittgenstein writes, 'States of affairs can be described but
not named. (Names resemble points; propositions resemble arrows, they have
sense.)' I find this imagery helpful, that a proposition says something
pointedly, but can only direct its meaning in a particular direction. It is
maintaining this distinction, between what a proposition says about a
particular state of affairs and what it means, that I think is important, not
just
in philosophy but in our daily lives."
What Witters fails to note, or manage to ignore, is that 'say' can have
various uses. We, qua philosophers, seem to be interested in
"saying-that"
(cfr. Witters above -- say 'what' -- versus say 'how' --).
For, surely if we do not restrict the use of 'say' to 'say that' surely we
are giving room for nonsense, with which Witters unsuccessfully fought his
while life. "He said, "If Caesar number prime if not prime prime"". But
how do we get, from that, a report in terms of oratio obliqua? "He said that
p".
Now, 'saying that' (Utterer said that p) IS conceptually related to
"Utterer MEANT that p". This important conceptual connection is negated
(wrongy)
by Witters and it is not wonder he becomes sceptical about the power of
'saying' and hence his need to worship 'show' instead.
Grice notes that 'say' as in 'say-that' depends on our ability to identiy
a lingo -- qua system of symbols. It is not the task of the philosopher to
do so. He relies on what the linguist deploys for him. But given a
language, extensionally understood as an infinite sequence of symbols in
well-formed formulae, -- we can provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for any
sentence S and any utterer U -- as to what we mean when we say that "U said
that p". While "p" belongs in L1, "U said that p" belongs in L2, even if
the oratio recta is not evident. And "U said that p", when prompted, SHOWS --
and 'says' -- what "p" itself, or U, rather, said by uttering it.
See how abstract and confusing Witters's jargon in the TLP passage on the
show/say distinction becomes once we compare it to a more realistic
communicative picture as per Grice's "Logic and Conversation".
After providing two real-life scenarios, P. Enns concludes: "It seems to me
that Wittgenstein's say/show distinction [or lack thereof?] can be helpful
in many different situations in our lives as we consider the significance
of facts in our lives" -- as we, if I may, try to redefine, into the
bargain, the Wittgensteinian solution in theoretically alternative ways which
do
not rest on this or that artificiality, a blurring of important fine
distinctions ('say' simpliciter versus 'say-that') or ann inability to account
for the hierarchy of levels within one's fee and creative use of one's
language.
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
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