Whether or not we shall be provided a definition of "The Modern Self" by Charles Taylor or as John McCreery recommends "plod along taking the gaps of incompleteness as well as the clashes of inconsistencies in stride," is yet to be determined. Others have written on similar if not identical subjects and if we happen to have read some of these others we shall be desirous of integrating or contrasting Taylor's "Modern Self" with them. Some of us may be willing to "plod along," but not before we are convinced that is what we must do. I mentioned Luc Ferry & Alain' Renault's Essay on Antihumanism. Alain Renaut continued their project with his The Era of the Individual, A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity. On page 17 he provides what we might say passes for definitions of two terms which may or may not be related to Taylor's "Modern Self": "Humanism is basically the valorization of humanity in its capacity for autonomy. What I mean by this - without, of course, claiming any originality in the matter - is that what constitutes modernity is the fact that man thinks of himself as the source of his acts and representations, as their foundation (read: subject) or author. (This is why, by the way, the antihumanistic passion common to various genealogical practices of the 1960s so often involved criticizing the idea of the author.) The humanistic man is one who does not receive his norms and laws either from the nature of things (as per Aristotle) or from God, but who establishes them himself, on the basis of his own reason and will. Thus modern natural right is a subjective right, posited and defined by human reason (as per juridical rationalism) or by the human will (as per juridical voluntarism). Thus modern societies conceive of themselves politically as self-established political systems based on a contractualist scheme, in contrast to societies where authority is established through tradition by means of the deeply antimodern notion of 'privilege.' "Individualism, on the other hand, carries a different emphasis. Tocqueville accurately predicted that at the level of sociopolitical phenomena it constituted a dangerous, but not irresistible, tendency in modernity. The best definition no doubt follows from Benjamin Constant's deceptively simple formula of the 'freedom of the moderns.' Constant placed less stress on the valorization of autonomy than on independence: among the ancients, he explained in a famous speech delivered at the Athenee royal in Paris in 1819, freedom was defined in terms of participation in public affairs and the direct exercise of sovereignty, by this 'collective freedom' was held to be 'compatible with . . . the complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the community,' to the point that '[n]o importance was given to the individual independence, neither in relation to opinions, nor to labor, nor, above all, to religion''; in contrast, among the moderns, for whom the sovereignty of the individual was profoundly restricted, being publicly exercised only 'at fixed and rare intervals,' the individual nonetheless thinks of himself as free because he is 'independent in his private independence,' Constant added; and in an age where, '[l]ost in the multitude, the individual can almost never perceive the influence he exercises, . . . we must be far more attached than the ancients to our individual independence.'" Lawrence