Should Rumsfeld go? Depends on whether you're for or against Bush. After all, Rumsfeld is Bush's assistant when it comes to war. Bush is the commander-in-chief. Rumsfeld's supposed to have followed Bush's lead. Throw Rumsfeld out and it looks like Bush is admitting a lot of things were done poorly. That's one thing Bush won't do: admit to any mistakes. Throwing Rummy away weakens the commander -- at the worst of all times, just before the election. Bush is nothing if not sensitive to the political dynamics of every nuance. But retaining Rumsfeld IS good, I think, for the Democrats. Bush then retains liability for all those errors and omissions, false steps, poor planning and stupid judgments. I like that. Hooray for Rumsfeld! Stan Spiegel ----- Original Message ----- From: <JulieReneB@xxxxxxx> To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 2:52 PM Subject: [lit-ideas] Rumsfeld > Should Rummy go? I cannot begin to imagine why Bush continues to support > him. The below gives a very good case for Rumsfeld's departure, having very > little indeed to do with any photos. I can't help but thinking, though, that it > would be very good for Democrats for Bush to continue to hold on to Rummy. The > below is a very interesting analysis of the Iraq situation. > Julie Krueger > > <<Tactical Failures? > > It is at that point that things started to go wrong -- not with the grand > strategy of the United States, but with the Iraq strategy itself. A string of > intelligence failures, errors in judgment and command failures have conspired > to undermine the U.S. position in Iraq and reverse the strategic benefits. > These failures included: > > * A failure to detect that preparations were under way > for a guerrilla war in the event that Baghdad fell. > > * A failure to quickly recognize that a guerrilla war was under way in Iraq, > and a delay of months before the reality was recognized and a strategy > developed for dealing with it. > > * A failure to understand that the United States did not have the resources > to govern Iraq if all Baathist personnel were excluded. > > * A failure to understand the nature of the people the United States was > installing in the Iraqi Governing Council -- and in particular, the complex > loyalties of Ahmed Chalabi and his relationship to Iraq's Shia and the > Iranian government. The United States became highly dependent on individuals > about whom it lacked sufficient intelligence. > > * A failure to recognize that the Sunni guerrillas were regrouping in > February and March 2004, after their defeat in the Ramadan offensive. > > * Completely underestimating the number of forces needed for the occupation > of Iraq, and cavalierly dismissing accurate Army estimates in favor of lower > estimates that rapidly became unsupportable. > > * Failing to step up military recruiting in order to increase the total > number of U.S. ground forces available on a worldwide basis. Failing to > understand that the difference between defeating an army and occupying a > country had to be made up with ground forces. > > These are the particular failures. The general failures are a compendium of > every imaginable military failing: > > * Failing to focus on the objective. Rather than remembering why U.S. forces > were in Iraq and focusing on that, the Bush administration wandered off into > irrelevancies and impossibilities, such as building democracy and eliminating > Baath party members. The administration forgot its mission. > > * Underestimating the enemy and overestimating U.S. power. The enemy was > intelligent, dedicated and brave. He was defending his country and his home. > The United States was enormously powerful but not omnipotent. The casual > dismissal of the Iraqi guerrillas led directly to the failure to anticipate > and counter enemy action. > > * Failure to rapidly identify errors and rectify them through changes of > plans, strategies and personnel. Error is common in war. The measure of a > military force is how honestly errors are addressed and rectified. When a > command structure begins denying that self- evident problems are facing them, > all is lost. The administration's insistence over the past year that no > fundamental errors were committed in Iraq has been a cancer eating through > all layers of the command structure -- from the squad to the office of the > president. > > * Failing to understand the political dimension of the war and permitting > political support for the war in the United States to erode by failing to > express a clear, coherent war plan on the broadest level. Because of this > failure, other major failures -- ranging from the failure to find weapons of > mass destruction to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners -- have filled the space > that strategy should have occupied. The persistent failure of the president > to explain the linkage between Iraq and the broader war has been symptomatic > of this systemic failure. > > Remember the objective; respect the enemy; be your own worst critic; exercise > leadership at all levels -- these are fundamental principles of warfare. They > have all been violated during the Iraq campaign. > > The strategic situation, as of March 2004, was rapidly improving for the > United States. There was serious, reasonable discussion of a final push into > Pakistan to liquidate al Qaeda's leadership. Al Qaeda began a global > counterattack -- as in Spain -- that was neither unexpected nor as effective > as it might have been. However, the counterattack in Iraq was both unexpected > and destabilizing -- causing military and political processes in Iraq to > separate out, and forcing the United States into negotiations with the Sunni > guerrillas while simultaneously trying to manage a crisis in the Shiite > areas. At the same time that the United States was struggling to stabilize > its position in Iraq, the prison abuse issue emerged. It was devastating not > only in its own right, but also because of the timing. It generated a sense > that U.S. operations in Iraq were out of control. From Al Fallujah to An > Najaf to Abu Ghraib, the question was whether anyone had the slightest idea > what they were trying to achieve in Iraq. > > Which brings us back to the razor's edge. If the United States rapidly > adjusts its Iraq operations to take realities in that country into account, > rather than engaging on ongoing wishful thinking, the situation in Iraq can > be saved and with it the gains made in the war on al Qaeda. On the other > hand, if the United States continues its unbalanced and ineffective > prosecution of the war against the guerrillas and continues to allow its > relations with the Shia to deteriorate, the United States will find itself in > an untenable position. If it is forced to withdraw from Iraq, or to so limit > its operations there as to be effectively withdrawn, the entire dynamic that > the United States has worked to create since the Sept. 11 attacks will > reverse itself, and the U.S. position in the Muslim world -- which was fairly > strong in January 2004 -- will deteriorate, and al Qaeda's influence will > increase dramatically. > > The Political Crisis > > It is not clear that the Bush administration understands the crisis it is > facing. The prison abuse pictures are symptomatic -- not only of persistent > command failure, but also of the administration's loss of credibility with > the public. Since no one really knows what the administration is doing, it is > not unreasonable to fill in the blanks with the least generous assumptions. > The issue is this: Iraq has not gone as planned by any stretch of the > imagination. If the failures of Iraq are not rectified quickly, the entire > U.S. strategic position could unravel. Speed is of the essence. There is no > longer time left. > > The issue is one of responsibility. Who is responsible for the failures in > Iraq? The president appears to have assumed that if anyone were fired, it > would be admitting that something went wrong. At this point, there is no one > who doesn't know that many things have gone wrong. If the president insists > on retaining all of his senior staff, Cabinet members and field commanders, > no one is going to draw the conclusion that everything is under control; > rather they will conclude that it is the president himself who is responsible > for the failures, and they will act accordingly. > > The issue facing Bush is not merely the prison pictures. It is the series of > failures in the Iraq campaign that have revealed serious errors of judgment > and temperament among senior Cabinet-level officials. We suspect that Defense > Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is finished, and with him Deputy Secretary Paul > Wolfowitz. Vice President Dick Cheney said over the weekend that everyone > should get off of Rumsfeld's case. What Cheney doesn't seem to grasp is that > there is a war on and that at this moment, it isn't going very well. If the > secretary of defense doesn't bear the burden of failures and misjudgments, > who does? Or does the vice president suggest a no-fault policy when it comes > to war? Or does he think that things are going well? > > This is not asked polemically. It is our job to identify emerging trends, and > we have, frequently, been accused of everything from being owned by the > Republicans to being Iraq campaign apologists. In fact, we are making a non- > partisan point: The administration is painting itself into a corner that will > cost Bush the presidency if it does not deal with the fact that there is no > one who doesn't know that Iraq has been mismanaged. The administration's only > option for survival is to start managing it effectively, if that can be done > at this point. > > (c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved. > > http://www.stratfor.com>> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html