[lit-ideas] "Petulant" Burnside at Antietam?

  • From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "Lit-Ideas " <Lit-Ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 16:18:02 -0700

The person who opined that all had been said about everything having to do
with the Civil War was only partially correct.  For example, McClellan
criticized Burnside for not crossing the "Burnside Bridge" in an expeditious
fashion.  That truly has been said time and time again. The crossing was to
take place at 08:00 and he said he sent the order in plenty of time but
Burnside didn't attempt a crossing until after 10:00.  Burnside, on the
other hand, said he didn't receive the order until about 10:00.    

 

William Marvel in Burnside refutes Martin Schenck's article "Burnside's
Bridge" (from the Dec 1956 ed of Civil War History) in writing "It bears
noting that Schenck's conclusions are drawn from rather superficial
research: he employed only five sources of which only one Confederate memoir
and the OR were not secondary works.  ["OR" stands for War of Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128
vols. GPO, 1880-1901]

 

"From the latter documents he used none of the correspondence, relying
almost exclusively upon McClellan's second report; therefore some of his
most essential facts were distorted.  For all of that Schenck's article
marked the beginning of the myth that Burnside lost the day at Antietam
through his own petulance."

 

Marvel writes "Thanks to McClellan's corruption of the facts, the truth did
not emerge until the last volumes of the OR went to press, years after both
Burnside and McClellan were dead; therein appears a copy of McClellan's
order, bearing a heading of 9:10 A.M.

 

"If the message was copied down at 9:10, it was probably finished and in the
courier's hand by 9:20.  Given the urgency of a pitched battle, and assuming
the horseman was familiar with the haphazard road network (which was not
necessarily so), he would have covered the distance to Burnside's position
at a  moderate gallop, breaking gait for at least six turns of ninety
degrees or more.  That would have brought him to the vicinity of Benjamin's
battery no earlier than 9:30.  If he had to ask directions or double back
from a wrong turn, he could easily have been delayed until 10:00."

 

Also, it is pertinent that McClellan didn't allow his Corps commanders to
position their own men.  He sent staff officers out to do that.  He sent
"Captain James Duane "to post Burnside's divisions."  Marvel writes
"Possibly McClellan meant no particular offense by this, for General Cox
observed the habit of delegating field commanders' duties to members of the
general staff was all too common in McClellan's army: Cox disliked it
because it tended to rob the various generals of self-confidence and
independence of spirit."  

 

Stackpole doesn't focus on Burnside to any extent.  He is more concerned
with McClellan's inadequacies.  McClellan sat a significant distance away
viewing the battle through binoculars.  He accepted information about
Burnside and the bridge from his staff officers.  

 

The Bridge would only permit four across passage.  Furthermore the
Confederates had a good field of fire on it.  He was led to believe (as was
verified by General Cox who had the same understanding) that the bridge
crossing was to be nothing more than a diversion.  But if Burnside needed to
get people across elsewhere in order to chase the Confederate bridge
defenders away, he was to use a river crossing found by Captain Duane.  When
Burnside's men tried to use it they found it much too deep so they had to
keep trying other likely places further south.  Another group went north to
attempt to find a crossing using the same trial and error approach.  

 

Better evidence than that available to Schenck suggests that it was another
of McClellan's failures rather than Burnsides that prevented Burnside from
getting across the bridge at 08:00

 

Why would McClellan have it in for his old West Point buddy Burnside?
McClellan had a very strong motive.  Lincoln as is well known didn't like
McClellan.  He thought he was a good organizer and good at building an army
but no fighter.  He kept trying to get Burnside to accept McClellan's job.
Burnside turned the job down largely through loyalty to his friend, but if
McClellan could thoroughly discredit Burnside then perhaps Lincoln would
leave him in command.  That can't be proved but it seems a more creditable
theory than Burnside's petulance.

 

 

Other related posts:

  • » [lit-ideas] "Petulant" Burnside at Antietam? - Lawrence Helm