[lit-ideas] On the reassessment of Civil War generals, e.g. General Hood
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "Lit-Ideas " <Lit-Ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 08:55:01 -0700
Someone wrote me privately wanting to argue about Burnside. I?ll probably
get more into him in a couple of weeks. At present I?m more interested in
Hood whose reputation has traditionally been much worse than Burnside?s.
After years of passionate debate about these and other generals some
scholars are making ?better? assessments. By ?better? I mean that the
information about the various generals has improved cumulatively, but also
the task of the historian is better understood and practiced than in earlier
times. It is very difficult not to impose our present views upon earlier
times. Some historians have been able to put those times into a ?better?
more objective and accurate context.
An easy criticism is ?he should have known?; which is truly an absurd
criticism when we honestly attempt to put ourselves back into those times.
Imagine taking your family into the woods with an inadequate map and no
knowledge of the territory. Imagine getting lost. Then imagine all the
authorities saying ?you should have known.? Today that would mean you
should have taken better maps, a GPS, or perhaps have ?known better? than to
have gone into the woods in those circumstances, but back in the 1860s there
were huge tracts of land where virtually no one knew what was in them. The
enemy was ?out there? some place but you didn?t know exactly where.
Guessing was a big part of generalship. Sherman was a great guesser but on
one occasion he did ?a very dangerous thing. He had divided his army and
made it possible for Hood to attack it unit by unit; and that is precisely
what he did. He struck Thomas with the expectation of defeating him and
then turning on Schofield and McPherson, several miles to the east, before
they could effect a junction with Thomas.? Hood called his three corps
commanders together and explained his plan. They agreed it was a good one
and went off to get their troops ready for the attack. But because of the
uncertain terrain nothing went as planned. When the attack did occur it was
with an inadequate force and Thomas held out against it. Should Hood ?have
known?? I don?t see how he could have. The Corps commander who ?failed?
the worst was Hardee who many at the time rated better at managing an Army
than Hood. But Hood took the blame for this failure.
Sherman realized it had been a near thing. If Hood?s plans had worked
successfully as well it might, Sherman would have suffered a defeat. He
called his own corps commanders together for a ?lessons learned? session:
?We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times
for sallies and hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a
scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined,
and rash man. . . .?
As we read the correspondence of Jefferson Davis and Braxton Bragg we learn
that Hood?s approach was just what they were looking for. Previous generals
were too defensively minded. Davis & Bragg wanted more aggression and Hood
gave it to them. Unfortunately for Hood?s reputation Davis and Bragg didn?t
give Hood enough men to pull off that ?brave, determined and rash? sort of
combat. So Hood ran out of troops, and his reputation suffered accordingly.
He was no longer the most highly praised of generals and his fiancé broke
off their engagement ? no one says that was why she broke it off but with
the ?shine? off of Hood, sitting there, wrinkled and worn with only one leg
and one arm she realized she wasn?t really in love with him. Few people
were. One woman however did love him. They married after the war and had
eleven children ? ending speculation that Hood?s injury may have damaged
more than his leg.
Lawrence
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