[lit-ideas] Re: Nicholas Wade on the development of language

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 27 May 2014 07:21:45 -0400 (EDT)

In a message dated 5/26/2014 4:27:00 P.M.  Eastern Daylight Time, 
lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
Even more  remarkable was language, a wholly novel system for conveying 
precise thoughts  from one individual’s mind to that of another.”  [Kindle 
Locations  662-672]
Comment:  I am ready to accept or at least be open to the early  part of 
what Wade writes, but fell into a coughing fit during his last sentence,  “
conveying precise thoughts”????   Has he never been married?   Has he never 
been in a discussion forum on any subject?  Has he never ready  Gadamer or any 
of the other philosophers who describe the difficulty of  communicating, or, 
if I recover sufficiently from my coughing fit and read on,  will he define 
“precise” in some new way I’ve never thought of? 

--- Yes,  we should proceed slightly ad hominem and find the credentials of 
 Wade!

Of course I read this all Griceianly!

The miracle of  language was not so much the 'transmission of "more or 
less" definite" thoughts,  but rather the open-endedness, if I may follow Grice 
following Chomsky. The  fact, or argument, as deployed by Davidson, that 
language allows for a finite  system of 'rules' to generate 'infinite' 
messages.  

I did some little research on Wade. He was born in England, and educated at 
 Eton, and has worked it seems mainly for the New York Times. I don't think 
he  ever followed a course (whatever that means) in philosophy. At least he 
must  have studied the classics at Eton and then he went to King's Cantab. 
but I'm not  sure what degree he acquired there (if 'acquire' is the word). 
It seems it's the  book AFTER the one referred to by Helm that is causing 
all the controversy: a  'troublesome inheritance' he calls it, and the 
references to language in  "Troublesome inheritance" seem minimal: although who 
refers to an African tribe  who lost the original language, and there is one 
mention of an idiolect, or  rather, dialect.
 
In the "Faith" book, after the passage that puzzled Helm, Wade goes on to  
explore this idea of language. His query is:
 
is religion dependent on language?
 
Having defined religion (or 'faith') as a 'belief' in the supranatural, he  
wonders. He decides, and I follow Wade there, that the fact that only men 
can  dance in 'unison' (unlike monkeys) proves that there is a communal 
religiosity  in men. He goes on to show that grunts and groans are enough for 
an 
alpha male  chimp to prove his power, and I suppose the 'enthymeme' here is 
that the same  should apply to homo sapiens sapiens sapiens. 
 
I write 'homo sapiens sapiens sapiens' because most critics to Wade's  
second book question the idea that evolution is 'regional': a 'race' while not  
wholly 'cultural' as the PC-views (as Wade calls them) of the Sociological  
Association and the Anthropological Association, is best understood as a  
subspecies. Homo sapiens sapiens, and so on.
 
Wade indeed stresses at at least two points the idea of language as  
connected with the transmission of precise thoughts. He goes on to refer to 
what  
he thinks psychologists call a 'theory of mind', but which I prefer to call 
a  mind-reading theory -- Wittgensteinian at that: the fact that pirots, as 
Grice  calls them, are able to _infer_ the psychological attitudes of their 
companions  (in conversation but also in pre-linguistic or non-linguistic 
analogues). I  think Wade means 'precise' as oppose to a groan or grunt by a 
chimpanzee (which  the argument should go) is less precise (but it isn't) as 
to the 'politics of  power' the alpha male chimp is displaying. 
 
The issue is of course very complicated philosophically and Grice was aware 
 of this. If we grant a 'precise thought' -- in terms of logical form, say 
 
(x)Fx.Gx
 
(all Fs are G)
 
which is then expressed verbally,
 
"Every F is G"
 
We have variants:
 
We can say,
 
"Every thing has some property"
 
or
 
"Most swans are white"
 
--- These are more or less precise thoughts and we find more or less  
precise ways of expressing (Grice's famous 'way of words' that correspond to  
'way of ideas' which correspond to 'way of things'). But what then about  
ambiguity which was Helm's original puzzle:
 
"I am ready to accept or at least be open to the early part of what Wade  
writes, but fell into a coughing fit during his last sentence, “conveying  
precise thoughts”????   Has he never been married?  Has he never  been in a 
discussion forum on any subject?  Has he never read Gadamer or  any of the 
other philosophers who describe the difficulty of communicating, or,  if I 
recover sufficiently from my coughing fit and read on, will he define  “precise”
 in some new way I’ve never thought of?"
 
I don't think he does, but he does wonder if the supernatural or  
supranatural (which is the focus in his book) does depend on language. I think  
his 
focus is on the 'communicating' and "SHARING" of those 'more or less'  
precise thoughts: presto, religion. Religion presupposes some common ground  
although the idea of a private religion is not as absurd as that of a private  
language ('absurd' for Witters, anyway, since he laughed at the simplistic  
dialogues between Robinson Crusoe and Friday conceived by Daniel Defoe).
 
But again, if Wade then goes to refer to the chimp's grunts and groans, he  
is being Griceian. We have some 'evolution' if not 'development' of things 
here.  Take a grunt more closely.
 
Grice would say that there's a factive level and a non-factive level. If a  
chimp GRUNTS he means he is annoyed, say. Rather, the grunt is a NATURAL 
SIGN  (not a word Grice would use) of the chimp's anger. In the case of 
humans,  there's prevarication. Of course, there's prevarication in some animal 
systems  of communication. Not bees, which apparently cannot 'lie' -- but a 
few water  birds can. They can scream to let the potential predator THINK that 
they are  approaching their nest when they are NOT. 
 
So, we have some 'precise thought' that is possible to get represented  
without language (vide Peacocke, "Language and Thought" in his Thought -- this  
was the old polemic of psychologists at the turn of the 
nineteenth-century). For  a philosopher, the question is whether we can analyse 
a 'precise 
thought'  without the aid of language.
 
The level of logic helps, but is not the last answer. If a 'precise  
thought' is prior and more primitive and predates language, then it makes sense 
 
to say that language serves to communicate and share 'precise' thoughts. It 
may  be that both abilities (thought and talk) originated simultaneously 
(Wade should  revise the pooh-pooh and all the other delightfully named 
theories 
on the origin  of language. My favourite the 'ouch' theory). The 
philosopher Davidson (who  taught with Grice at UC/Berkeley) thought that the 
abilities are SYMMETRICALLY  from an epistemological (way of knowing) and a 
metaphysical (or ontological)  point of view: not one without the other. The 
topic 
was hot enough back in the  1970s to have Anita Avramides write her DPhil for 
Oxford on this.
 
Eton and King's College are different animals, and since Wade then was  
concerned with "Nature" and "The New York Times", he is not going to quote your 
 favourite Griceian philosopher -- but then, as Judas Maccabaeus said, 'you 
can't  have everything'. 
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
 
 
 
 


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