Absent any sign of a world wide Communist revolution, “. . . the Bolsheviks also struck conciliatory notes. Maxim Litvinov, Chicherin’s deputy, was smooth and agreeable. He had lived in London for several years, eking out a living as a clerk and marrying a novelist, Ivy Low, from the fringes of Bloomsbury. On Christmas Eve 1918, he sent Wilson a telegram from Stockholm. It spoke of peace on earth, of justice and humanity. The Russian people, Litvinov went on, shared Wilson’s great principles. They had been the first to cry out for self-determination and open diplomacy. All they wanted now was peace to build a better society. They were anxious to negotiate, but Allied intervention and the Allied blockade were causing terrible misery. The Bolsheviks found themselves obliged to use terror to keep the country afloat. Would not Wilson help them?
“Wilson was deeply impressed. So, when he saw the telegram, was Lloyd George. An American diplomat, William Buckler, was dispatched to talk to Litvinov. Buckler’s report, which Wilson brought to the Supreme Council on January 21, was encouraging. The Soviet government, as it was now calling itself, was ready to do much for the sake of peace, whether that meant paying at least part of the repudiated foreign debts or granting new concessions to foreign enterprises. It would drop its calls for worldwide revolution; it had only been forced to use such propaganda as a way of defending itself first against Germany and more recently the Allies.”
“Well, see,” I can hear Irene saying if she were to read this far. The Bolsheviks wanted to negotiate but those evil Allies just wouldn’t. But read on.
“Wilson and Lloyd George had some reason, then, to expect that the Bolsheviks would welcome the invitation to Prinkipo. The two statesmen chose their delegates: a liberal journalist and a defrocked clergyman for the United States, and for Britain a delighted Borden – ‘A great honour to Canada.’ (He did not know that Lloyd George was having trouble finding someone to go.) They all waited. The Soviet government’s reply arrived on February 4. Not for the last time the Bolsheviks misjudged the West. They craftily, but transparently, avoided agreeing to a cease fire, one of the preconditions laid down by the Supreme Council. They did not bother to comment on the appeal to high principles in the invitation. Clearly thinking that capitalists understood only one thing, they offered significant material concessions, such as raw materials or territory. After all, it had worked with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. Wilson was taken aback: ‘This answer was not only uncalled for, but might be thought insulting.’ Lloyd George agreed. ‘We are not after their money or their concessions or their territory.’”
This was but the beginning of long years of negotiating from different world views. Such Leftists as Irene blame the West for not being accommodating enough, but the facts say otherwise. Soviet Russia sought world domination. The West sought for all nations to be free. Even today one must choose between these two concepts. Anti-Americans never come out and oppose freedom. They put matters in other terms. We didn’t do something quite right, or we offended someone, or someone made a profit. But the bottom line is that one side stands for freedom (intrinsic in Liberal Democracy) and the other side stands for world domination (some totalitarian form of government). That was true when Wilson and Lloyd George sought to negotiate with the Soviets at Prinkipo in 1919 and it is true of any prospective negotiations with the Iranians today.
Lawrence
