[lit-ideas] Re: Let's talk about our vehicles ...
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: robert.paul@xxxxxxxx, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2006 19:43:28 -0230
Here are some replies and questions in light of RP's most recent post on Kant's
moral theory. (Where is RP anyway?)
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> Walter writes of my having drawn a 'false dichotomy' between the
> Categorical Imperative and practical reasoning.
>
> > The C.I. identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions of
> > the moral rightness of practical reasoning. Erin could have told us that
> > herself but, of course, now that she's a recent scholarship winner -
> actually a
> > double scholarship winner - she may not deign to communicate any longer
> with us
> > low-life on this List any more.
>
> There is apparently no end to the lengths to which Kant is willing to go
> in order to have his cake and eat it too. I have been criticizing Kant,
> in our earlier exchanges, for failing to give a place to human knowledge
> and beliefs about the world in ordering his moral universe.
W: Please pardon my memory but I don't recall the precise objections to which
you refer here. Almost everything Kant has to say about our moral universe
attempts to identify the grounds on which epistemic assessment of our moral
claims and beliefs can validly proceed.
> Now I find
> that one starts out with a piece of practical reasoning ("I need a coat;
> Barnum and Bailey make the sort of coat I need; so, I'll buy one') and
> then tests it?the reasoning?in light of the Categorical Imperative. And
> how is this done? By examining in light of it the maxim 'Buy a coat'?
> 'Buy a coat from Barnum and Bailey'? 'Buy a coat if you need one'? 'Buy
> what you need'?
W: The maxim we would be assessing is tied to the reasoning it involves.
Because
you don't identify the former, the latter question regarding what the maxim in
question is cannot be properly addressed. Typically, the maxim is identified by
the agent herself. The CI is not itself a source of maxims; it won't provide
you with ends and pursuits if you don't have any.
>
> It is hopeless. Kant apparently cannot see either that (1) these pick
> out different possible actions or (2) that the same action can have many
> different descriptions (Anscombe, Intention). It is as if Kant thought
> there were an a priori correct description of any action, i.e., the
> description of it somehow contained in the relevant maxim even though
> the maxim is one proposed by some human agent, not by some metaphysical
> judge indifferent to human wants and needs.
W: A well-formulated maxim contains an end, a means projected for the attainment
of the end and an initial set of conditions or the circumstances of action.
> And Kant does deride appeals
> to human wants and needs when it comes to moral reasoning. Or so I would
> have thought.
W: We must be careful here. Our wants, needs and desires cannot provide the
grounds for a moral principle possessing universality and necessity. However,
K. is very clear that accordance with the CI for its own sake and the pursuit
of our happiness and well-being are not necessarily opposed. Indeed, the morally
worthy disposition does its duty from duty gladly. Another way of putting the
former point is to say that K recognizes our inclinations to be constitutive of
our identities as embodied, historically located beings. However, there is a
distinction between identity and personhood. Personhood is what constitutes our
status as moral agents - a status we all have an obligation to respect equally
in others and ourselves. Our identities, on the other hand, are shaped by the
contingent factors of our socialization into a community. These factors cannot
define our moral worth as persons. (As a constitutional democracy is grounded
in rational speech and action, each democracy identifies the Categorical
Imperative of equal respect in a constitutional document. In Canada, the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms identifies the rights and freedoms regarding
personhood that we all share regardless of our identities (ie., religious
affiliation if
any, gender, sexual orientations if any, make of car driven, etc.)
>
> By practical reasoning, I mean the ordinary reasoning one engages in
> when one has goals and aims and projects, out of which arise wants and
> needs. If the Categorical Imperative enlightens us here, I'm unaware of
> it?which is not to say of course that it doesn't.
W: I think K is with you there. All rational ordinary practical reasoning,
however, also involves moral reasoning. The rational agent considers not only
the effectiveness and efficiency of means for ends projected, not only the
suitability of ends themselves, but also whether her actions and maxims are
morally permissible.
Walter C. Okshevsky
Memorial U.
> Robert Paul
> The Reed Institute
>
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