________________________________ From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx >"[T]he Wittgensteinians call the philosophy they are interested in 'linguistic'." "Actually they are naively fatuous about language: no exceptions to my offensive generalization, 'philosophers are always weak on language.'"> This is a case where we should distinguish Wittgenstein from some 'Wittgensteinians'. Was W ever naively fatuous? Well, perhaps in some of his political and moral views (including a naivete about Communist Russia) and perhaps in his understanding of Goedel's work. But "about language"? Here I have argued the root of his views "about language" is that there are "limits to language" such that we cannot express those limits in language but nor can we say in language the sense of language. Now this may be mistaken or it may be overstating the "limits of language" but it is hardly a fatuous or naive view. If it is true, then for W it will be true of all language - even the most fatuous or fatuous-looking. It will be true where we use a word to name an object - i.e. that this 'naming' sense is not said by the words used but can only be shown. It will be true where the sense of a word depends on some kind of rule-following - i.e. that the 'rule' here can only be shown not said, for no 'rule' says its own sense. We should not mistake the fact the W tries to show his POV in relation to such naive and fatuous cases as meaning that his view is naive and fatuous. Yet there is a school of Wittgensteinians who would take W as offering something naive and fatuous. For example, they would extract a Private Language Argument from his work and say that this PLA comes to something like this - there are necessarily 'public' 'rules' as to what makes sense "about language" such that there cannot be a 'private' language in the sense of a language that has sense without recourse to any 'public' 'rules'. Some, including Kripkensteinians, then seek to examine what are the grounds for such 'public' rules. Already they are seeking to say more than can be said given the "limits of language" and, from W's POV, it is not surprising that what they produce in his name is often nonsense - and naive and fatuous nonsense to boot. Donal (Letter to Eugenio Montale quoted in G. Singh, F.R. Leavis: A Literary Biography [London, 1995], 212.) Actually, Eugenio Montale was a genius -- if only for attempting to bring Walton's "Troilus and Cressida" to Milan's La Scala: Troilo e Cressida opera in tre atti. by William Walton · Troilo e Cressida opera in tre atti. by William Walton; Christopher Hassall; Eugenio Montale. "Rhythmic translation," too. What Leavis means by "Wittgensteinians" should NOT apply to Grice, who found himself anti-Wittgensteinian. And while he (Grice) _might_ have been 'academic' he was so NOT in what Leavis calls "a pejorative sense'. For one, he would combine philosophy with cricket, et al. to the extent that his obituary in "The Times" came out as "Professional philosopher and amateur cricketer" (or "Amateur cricketer and professional philosopher", I forget). He also played bridge, and sang to his own piano accompaniment. A Renaissance Man, Oxonian style! O. T. O. H., Witters was Witters. Re: Leavis on what a 'word' is, I would refer to J. L. Austin, "The meaning of a word" in his Philosophical Papers, with special emphasis on the word 'rat'. The online source referred to above makes a citation of P. M. S. Hacker, who, as things happened, succeeded Gordon P. Baker, who succeeded H. P. Grice as "Tutorial Fellow" at St. John's, Oxford. It is an irony of history that rather than a Griceian, Hacker would turn up a Wittgensteinian. The root for this in Baker's contribution to PGRICE (the Grice festschrift, ed. Grandy/Warner "Alternative mind styles" -- Frege vs. Witters, from a Griceian perspective). Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html