[lit-ideas] It only goes to show
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 00:58:40 -0400 (EDT)
Appearance and Reality, sozein ta phenomena
From wiki:
"Duhem also wrote on saving the phenomena. In addition to the Copernican
Revolution debate of "saving the phenomena" (Greek σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα
, sozein ta phainomena [3])
[4][5] versus offering explanations[6] that inspired Duhem was Thomas
Aquinas, who wrote, regarding eccentrics and epicycles, that
Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the
purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle [...]. Reason is
employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle,
but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the
congruity of its results, as in astronomy the theory of eccentrics and
epicycles
is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of
the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were
sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. [...][7]
The idea that a physical interpretation in physics is not an ultimate
condition has as descendant modern structural realism on science.[8]"
Show and Tell
There is an essay by Stampe on "Show and tell" which is Griceian in
nature: it provides an elucidation of the representational nature of 'meaning':
why do we say that black clouds mean rain? Do black clouds _show_ rain?
Surely black clouds don't _say_ rain.
Similarly, 'say it with flowers', the dictum goes. The idea is that it (in
say it) is "I love you". You cannot say _everything_ with flowers: but
just a few fixed phrases, like "I love you" (Try to say "I hate you" with
flowers).
Wittgenstein similarly remarked (on a lazy afternoon in Minnesota (he
loved westerners)): "Try to describe the aroma of coffee". He meant, alas, a
sort of wishy-washy coffee he was swallowing at the time, and he found that
_words_ "escaped him".
Grice and Wittgenstein on 'show'
We have seen various approaches to what is said and what is shown in Grice
and Wittgenstein (or "Witters" as Grice calls him).
This is a brief analysis of Grice on 'show':
"Compare the following two cases", Grice writes in "Meaning" (1948, for
the Oxford Philosophical Society):
(a) I show Mr. X a photograph of Mr. Y displaying undue familiarity to
Mrs. X.
(b) I draw a picture of Mr. Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr.
X.
Grice: "I find that I want to deny that in (a) the photography (or my
SHOWING it to Mr. X) meant-NN anything at all; while I want to assert that in
(b) the picture (or my drawing AND SHOWING it) meant-nn something (that Mr.
Y had been unduly familiar) , or at least that _I_ had meant-nn by it that
Mr. Y had been unduly familiar. What is the difference between these two
cases? Surely that in case (a) Mr. X's recognition of my intention to make
him believe that there is something between Mr. Y and Mrs. X is (more or
less) IRRELEVANT to the production of this effect by the photograph. Mr. X
would be led by the photograph at least to suspect Mrs. X even if, instead of
SHOWING it to him, I had _left_ it in his room *by accident; and I (the
photographer SHOWER) would not be unaware of this. But it will make a
difference to the effect of my picture of Mr X whether or not he takes me to
be
intending to inform him (make him believe something) about Mrs. X, and not to
be just doodling or trying to produce a work of art." (WoW: 218).
Of course, 'show' is not a Greco-Roman term of philosophical origin. The
Greek and Latin terms for 'showing' were complex in themselves, and Grice
knew it.
"It only goes to show..." -- etc. Is this factive?
In Greek, 'phainomenon' is a complex out of what can be deemed the
equivalent of English 'show'. Things that get shown are the 'phainomena'. In
Latin, we don't have 'phainomena'. The verbs of perception in Latin have been
inherited by Romance languages like Italian and French, and they, for Grice,
can be a bother. Even 'see', which is not Graeco-Roman shares some features
of complexity with verbs of perception.
I see a rainbow.
The rainbow shows itself to me.
Is "see" factive? Grice denies this:
"Macbeth saw Banquo".
Surely there is a disimplicature, as Grice calls it, here:
"If we all know that Macbeth hallucinated, we can quite safely say that
Macbeth saw Banquo, even though Banquo was not there to be seen" -- yet "we
should not conclude from this that an [implicature] of the existence of the
object said to be seen is NOT part of the 'conventional meaning' of the word
'see', nor even (as some have done) that there is one sense of the word
'see' which lacks this [implicature]!"
----
Of course Witters was unaware of the relevant Griceian complexities
involved, as testified, e.g., in the English language that Grice (but not
Witters) mastered. Rather, Witters wants to produce generalisations (he craved
for
generalisations) such as 'logical form', what-is-said, what is shown, and
so on.
Grice makes a remark about introjecting into other philosophers' shoes. He
says this is rewarding in the case of Kantotle or Plathegel, but not if
you are rather going to be concerned with "minor figures" like Witters,
Wollaston or Bosanquet. ("Prejudices and predilections; which become the life
and opinions of Paul Grice", by Paul Grice).
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
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