Is human nature fixed or is it variable and therefore barely deserving of the term? Fukuyama on page 63 of The End of History and the Last man, writes, "Thus the nature of human desire, according to Hegel, is not given for all time, but changes between historical periods and cultures. . . Our present desires are conditioned by our social milieu, which in turn is the product of the entirety of our historical past." To prove that there is a fixed human nature is much harder than it used to be. Not everyone engages in every one of the seven deadly sins; nevertheless, these sins do tempt a portion of humanity. There are people given to gluttony and greed for example, but at the same time the Church expected that most people would avoid these sins. If we think of humanity as a gene pool, some will be gluttons, some murderers, etc, but not all. And for Hegel, and Fukuyama's, purpose it is enough to say that insofar as politics are concerned, human nature isn't fixed. We can adapt to a variety of social situations and do. Now I'm going to abandon Fukuyama's thesis for the time being and consider a modern phenomenon that is presenting Westerners a problem: the fact that a lot of Muslims can't take criticism. David Selbourne on pages 130-132 of The Losing Battle with Islam writes, "Too serious for satire, as well as for the simplicities of counter-assault, are modern Islam's refusal of criticism. So, too, its harshness with 'apostates' and 'blasphemers'; so, also with its use of threat (and worse) against its own intellectuals when they are of independent cast of mind, and its widening abandonment of the principles of balance and compassion, proclaimed by other Muslims to be 'central features' of Islam. . . The writers who in the last decades have earned the disapproval of Islam have included, among man, Salman Rushdie in February 1989 (with his Japanese translator murdered, and his Norwegian publisher and Italian translator wounded in attempted assassinations); the Egyptian novelist Alaa Hamid sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in December 1991 for a satire on the lives of the prophets; ten Indians condemned to six years' jail in the United Arab Emirates in October 1992 for participating in a theatrical production deemed blasphemous; the Cairo scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, charged with apostasy in 1993 for his writings on early Islamic jurisprudence; and the Bangladeshi novelist Taslima Nasrin, ordered to be arrested in June 1994 for 'offending religious feelings' in a fictional work which described a Muslim's rape of a Hindu girl." Such occurrences are too well known to require much more than a few examples. The Diana West article I posted earlier, "Speak no evil: the New EU lexicon on terrorism," is indicative of the perplexity felt in both Europe and the U.S. Both regions are going to extremes to avoid offending Muslims. Is this good? Is there a principle we can invoke to determine how far we should go in this regard? We can borrow from Hegel and say that the desires of Muslims were conditioned by their social milieu in the course of their historical past. But then we can say the same thing about the West. Our desires were also conditioned by our social milieu in the course of our historical past. Since we humans are adaptable, some of us adapted to the Muslim approach and some to the Western approach. There is no principle agreeable to all that demands one approach over the other. Consequently there is no principle that demands that we in the West give up our approach and accept the Muslim approach, which in many cases would be necessary if we are to avoid criticizing or offending Muslims. Muslims as we know have gone on rampages when cartoons were considered offensive. They have also gone on rampages for other reasons less well known. Some "one hundred Muslim youths sacked a local butcher's shop after a dispute over the presence of pork in a pizza, and set cares alight. In 1992 . . . similar offence was found in the design of an imported Japanese car-tire, whose tread was said to 'resemble a verse in the Koran'; gunmen fired three shots into the Tokyo home of the tire-company chairman. . ." [Selbourne p 127-128] We could go on, but there is no point. We are all familiar with such examples. The principle that comes most readily to mind is that Muslims should function in accordance with European or American wishes when they live in Europe or America, and Europeans and Americans should function in accordance with Muslim wishes when they live in the Middle East. The alternative is for Europe and America to continue to give in until (as Oriana Fallaci fears) both regions are taken over by Muslims. I don't believe there is any serious fear of that, but what is a decided possibility is that legislators and leaders will wait too long to take remedial action and different sorts of riots will occur. Americans Red Necks and their European equivalent will attempt violently to remove the Muslims who offend them. Lawrence