[lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Objection
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 23:33:47 -0400 (EDT)
Obbles, rather.
In a message dated 6/18/2012 1:15:20 A.M. UTC-02, Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
quoted from Grice, literally:
"the objects revealed by perception should surely
be constituents of that world'.
For the record, this is from
Grice, H. P. "Notes for Grice/Warnock retrospective", The Grice Papers,
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- Grice was returning to the philosophy of perception, an area in which
he had worked with Sir Geoffrey J. Warnock and planning a "Grice/Warnock
retrospective".
The first topic that this 'retrospective' covers is:
"The place of perception as a faculty or capacity
in a sequence of living things.'
---
Thinking about the issue of the philosophy of perception in relation to
his interest in creature-construction, Grice wonders:
"at what point, if any, is further progress up
the psychological ladder impossible unless
some rung has previously been assigned
to creatures capable of perception?"
He goes on to dwell on the advantages of perception in terms of survival,
the crucial factor for adding any capacity during creature-construction,
and assesses the possible support this might offer for common sense against
philosophers of sense data.
(Cfr. Paul, "Is there a problem about sense data?", that Grice worshiped,
and treasured).
If perception is to be seen as an advantage, providing knowledge to aid
survival in a particular world,
"the object revealed by perception should be constituents
of that world".
It might be possible to say that sense data do not themselves nourish or
threaten, but constitute evidence of things that do.
If 'object' is perhaps too technical for Grice, he preferred to drop the
"j" and gemminate (if that's the word) the 'b'.
The object in Grice becomes an obble.
----
Grice writes, elsewhere, in "Lecture 1, 'Lectures on language and
reality', The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135, Bancroft Library, UC/Berkeley:
---
"a pirot can be said to potch of some obble x
as fang or fent; also to cotch of x, or some obble o,
as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and
another obble o' as being fid to one another."
Decoded:
Pirots are much like ourselves -- Locke's pirot, parot -- cfr. Carnap,
pirots karulise elatically -. Pirots inhabit a world of obbles very much like
our own world.
Here we could have a play on 'thing', rather than 'object'.
To potch is something like to perceive, and to cotch something like to
think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives. Fid
is a possible relation between obbles.
And so on.
Cheers
Speranza
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