[lit-ideas] Grice on the alethic
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 21:10:54 -0400 (EDT)
Grice writes:
"First and foremost ... is the demand for a theoretically adequate
specification of conditions which will authorise the assignment of truth
conditions to suitably selected expressions, thereby endowing those expressions
with
a conventional signification."
"I have never been deeply moved by the prospects of a comprehensive and
compendious systematisation of acceptable logical inferences, though the
tidiness of Modernist logic does have some appeal for me. But what exerts more
influence upon me is my inclination to regard propositions as constructed
entitites whose essential character lies in their truth-value, entities which
have an indispensable role to play in a rational and scientific
presentation of the domain of logical inference."
(WoW: 374)
A Theory of Truth
In a message dated 6/10/2012 8:06:45 P.M. UTC-02, mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx
quotes from Palma:
>>what a theory of truth does.
and comments:
>Isn't that a central conundrum of philosophy of science?
I'm not sure --.
Personally, I agree with Davidson, or Grice for that matter, that a theory
of truth should be disquotational:
"Grass is green" is true iff 'snow is white'" is NOT disquotational, and
thus it fails.
On the other hand, to quote from Tarski's deep theorem in his Polish paper:
"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.
----
That is what a theory of truth does.
Cheers,
Speranza
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