In "Taking Issue with The God Issue" (PN 101), Raymond Tallis argues against William Lane Craig's claim that "God is the best explanation why there’s Something rather than Nothing?" Tallis writes: "This presupposes that there are, or could be, other explanations. But there are not; nor would one expect there to be. Explanations – for example ‘there was thunder because there was lightning’ – work inside Something, and cannot operate in the putative vacuum of the Nothing that precedes (or is the alternative to) Something. Explanations link a bit of Something with another bit of Something. Outside of Something, there is no explanation, least of all an explanation that there is Something. The point is, any explanation of the totality of things would have to appeal to something outside that totality, which is surely a contradiction."" I'm not sure. Let's say that some philosopher claims that to value means to value /something/ -- would some other philosopher possibly counter such an assertion by noting that valuing /in itself/ is a kind of activity whatsoever object the verb -- cinsidered transitive -- envelops. If the subject is not the center of some universe, value could be considered intransitive and sufficintly orderly to warrant its being a point of departure for some wholeness. In a word, if you feel a bit empty, that's still something. Mvh / Yours, Torgeir Fjeld Gdansk, Poland Blogs: http://phatic.blogspot.com // http://norsketegn.blogspot.com Web: http://independent.academia.edu/TorgeirFjeld