[lit-ideas] Re: Empiricism Revisited
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 10:50:43 +0100 (BST)
From:"Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
Elsewhere Robert points out that W became suspicious of the
craving for generality that perhaps underpins the Tractatus, where JLS writes
as if W was in the unrelenting throes
of such cravings. This may show something that connects with this thread, but
we may leave unsaid what it may show in case we are accused of simply craving
too much generality in rebutting JLS.
In this thread JLS offers this, as a seeming conclusion from
his foregoing:
>So, whatever Popper found simplistic on Ayer's idea of
'empirical truth' is
perhaps itself simplistic.>
This seems to be said as a criticism – simplistic as in
over-simplistic, not merely simplistic the way ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is more simplistic
than ‘2 + 2 = 7 x 9.2’ but is nevertheless correct [the truth may be the more
simple of two options].
Is this criticism, that P is over-simplistic in his
treatment of Ayer’s idea of ‘empirical truth’, at all substantiated by what JLS
writes?
No. And for several reasons.
First, P’s treatment of Ayer in Schilpp focuses [not unreasonably one might
think] on Ayer’s
contribution to Schilpp;and here it is Ayer’s argument that is
overly simplistic, indeed invalid; in particular, because Ayer makes an invalid
move in the inductive direction so that Ayer suggests knowing how to recognise
empirically the whiteness of swans [in terms of ‘basic statements’] would give
us a criterion for knowing empirically whether all swans are white [as
empirical truth includes scientific
theories of this sort]. Nothing JLS writes focuses on P’s reply to that
contribution. Nothing JLS writes rescues Ayer from P’s criticism by showing it
may be deflected by some less simplistic view of ‘empirical truth’. Nothing JLS
writes actually illuminates what is ‘empirical truth’, whether in Ayer’s idea
or otherwise, in a way that bears on what P writes in Schilpp.
Instead JLS makes a series of points about Ayer and Grice
and papers they published elsewhere than Schilpp,
without showing how these papers have any relevance to P’s criticisms of Ayer
in Schilpp or showing how they show P’s
criticisms there are over-simplistic.
JLS’ supposed criticism seems to come to this: P’s treatment
of Ayer in Schilpp is over-simplistic
because it only concerns itself with Ayer’s contribution to Schilpp and does
not enter into a
wide-ranging survey of all of Ayer’s work, including papers whose relevance [to
the issue of ‘empirical truth’ as disputed in Schilpp] is entirely unclear –
and, worse than that, P is at fault
for not considering what Grice had to say on the same or similar topic of these
possibly irrelevant papers by Ayer.
To paraphrase what P says on Ayer’s thesis ‘empirical
omniscience involves basic ominiscience’, even if this supposed criticism were
validly argued it would not reveal any weakness in P’s views.
Does not JLS realise that the Schilpp volumes on ‘The Philosophy of Karl
Popper’ [the clue’s in
the title] were not a place for raking over somewhat obscure papers by Grice
and Ayer whose relevance to the issue of ‘empirical truth’, as disputed in
Schilpp, JLS anyway fails to
make clear? And it is hardly to the point to supposedly criticise P for not
using these volumes to take up these obscure, and probably from the sounds of
it misconceived and invalid, papers.
But then writing ‘hardly to the point’ is, and I apologise
if this seems to have an inductive flavour or show an untoward ‘craving for
generality’, something of a JLS speciality. Unless the point is to crowbar in
Grice.
Donal
On a day of jubileeation
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