[lit-ideas] Beliefs, reasons and decisions
- From: Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2008 13:25:20 +0000
As I belabored on an earlier thread, I have some beliefs about decisions which
affect how I go about making decisions. I think they are relevant to the
discussion about rationality and beliefs:(a) What orients us around a
particular decision is an outcome, defined or at least definable to some
extent; desire for that outcome creates the occasion for the decision.(b)
Because the outcome is in the future at the time of the decision, there is no
limit on the number of factors that could turn out to be relevant to the
attainment of that outcome.(c) Therefore, the best one can usually do
'rationally' is eliminate demonstrably unlikely paths to the desired outcome;
one can very rarely if ever demonstrate that a particular path is the optimal
one. The cases, like certain games, in which optimal paths *can* be defined
are notable precisely for the fact that the defining situation (the game) rules
out as irrelevant all but a highly constrained collection of future outcomes
(i.e. it eliminates as irrelevant *to the game* such things as the (real,
physical) roof falling in on the players before the game can be
completed).Because I think of decisions that way, I am unsure just what the
honorific 'rational' is supposed to achieve beyond eliminating irresponsible
actors from the process of deciding what to do. I say that because I believe
that the situations facing even a maximally rational and maximally responsible
human actor always force decisions to be made which can never be justified on a
fully rational basis except in highly artificial circumstances like games.He or
she, in other words, always has to act on what, by Walter's criteria, would be
irrational beliefs, i.e. beliefs which cannot be (fully) justified by
reasons.So I suppose one could say I believe that rational beliefs are always
inadequate in determining what to do. I think that belief is itself a rational
belief -- I have developed it over years of experience in settings in which my
decisions are subject to extensive "public" scrutiny (though the public has
been, for the most part, the limited one of the people inside a large
corporation).I think, in other words, that it is rational to believe that
rational belief is and always will be an inadequate basis for decision-making.
I do think rational belief plays an important role in decision making by
pruning irresponsible paths from consideration; its value, though, is always
exhausted before the decision is made, i.e. the pruning never leaves just one
path to follow.One last turn of the proverbial screw: because I think the
notion of 'beliefs' is closely entwined with the notion of 'decision' -- e.g.
one might argue that 'beliefs' are precisely those assertions one might cite in
justification of a decision and decisions are those actions for which one might
think justification is required -- a corollary to my belief about that rational
belief is an inadequate basis for decision-making is my belief that no belief
is in fully rational in the first place. The corollary follows to the extent
one accepts the idea that beliefs can be phrased as "in such & so circumstances
I would do x..." -- that carries the implication that the belief would
underwrite a decision, and because no decision can be fully rational, the
assertion that the belief would underwrite the decision is itself not entirely
rational.All of this might be thought of as an elaboration of Wittgenstein's
dictum that analysis has to stop somewhere.Regards to one and all,Eric
DeanWashington, DC
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