The publishing story of Grice's "William James Lectures" is a bit of a funny piece. His WoW:vi -- which contains "The shaggy dog story" was published in a rather obscure journal, "Foundations of Language". I was able to find it and always studied it with affection. It was repr. in Searle, Philosophy of Language (Oxford UP) which made it a bit of a classic -- and it's now safely in chronological order as WoW:6. I was recently, elsewhere, discussing bits of this, and it may do here to re-transcribe the Grice quotes (selected) as it applies to The S is P 00 "the dog is shaggy", or That dog -- i.e. Smith's dog -- is shaggy -- where "The S" is a nominal phrase, and "P" is an adjectival phrase. THIS IS THE SIMPLE TYPE of syntax Grice wants to restrict the lecture to. "Smith's dog is shaggy", say. Grice wants to be able to say how such a conversational move may shed light on intentional aspects of the U's behaviour vis a vis basic postulates of the theory of action. In particular, "What d'you mean, 'shaggy'?". "Hairy-coated." So Grice proposes to restrict this -- his stage 6 of his project, or grand plan, to "definite descriptor" ("Smith's dog") and an "adjectival phrase" ("is shaggy"). Grice writes: "We need to be able to apply some such notion of a PREDICATION", or indicatation "of beta (adjectival) on alpha (nominal)". We have thus reached the stage where we have "two species" of co-relation: i. R-co-relation, where "R" for REFER, and ii. D-co-relation (for DENOTATE). "We want to be able to speak of some particular [thing] as an R-correlate of alpha, and of "each member of some class" as being a D-correlate of beta." (WoW:130). Grice then goes on to provide an 'intentional' (basic, rather than resultant) procedure: that will co-relate a belief, say, or a desire, with an assertion, or an imperative move ("Bring that shaggy dog over here!"). There is a P1, then which corresponds to the R-correlate. This he just formulates as an imperative, "To utter s if U means the S to be P." A second, P2, focuses on the D-correlate: "To utter a psi-cross-correlated (cfr. P1 and P1' predication of beta on alpha)", and here again he produces conditions which do not claim to be necessary and sufficient jointly, to the effect that U intends psi-cross a particular R-correlate of alpha to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of beta" (WoW: 131). At this point Grice wants to extend BEYOND a merely disquotational Truth scheme (vide M. K. Davies for an extended approach -- his book with RKP on Meaning). It's not just 'The dog is shaggy' is true iff the dog is shaggy. Rather he wants to say, "Smith's dog (his example, p. 131), called Fido, is shaggy iff the thing is hairy coated. So he needs to work on an equivalence, in an intentional context for 'the dog' to mean, first, 'THAT dog that Smith owns' and second that it is shaggy, with a sort of explication for the 'meaning' of 'shaggy'. Next, Grice applies basic procedures to create a 'resultant' one: "to utter "p", a PREDICATION of beta on alpha ... if U intends to express a particular R-correlate of alpha to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of beta". Referring to Smith's dog, unimaginatively, as "Fido", Grice proceeds with a more expansive resultant procedure: "to utter ... a predication of 'shaggy' on 'Fido'" if U intends to express the belief that Jones's dog is "ONE OF THE SET OF" hairy-coated things (i.e. is hairy-coated)". "U has the procedure of uttering a psi-cross-corelated predication of 'shaggy' on alpha if ... [he is expressing the belief re the psi-cross "a particular R-correlate of alpha to be one of the set of hairy-coated things." At this point, Grice displays an interest in something like intensional isomorphism when in footnote to p. 133 he notes the caveat that reads as a very fine distinction indeed, "To the definiens, then, we should add, within the scope of the initial quantifer, the following clause: '& U's purpose in effecting that (Ax) (......) is that (ER') (Az) (R' shaggy' x iff x [belongs] to y" --, where he uses the set-theoretical sign for 'belongs' (as per below). Grice goes on to refer to 'ostending' here (p. 134) which may relate to the idea of explicit or implicit definitions. An act of ostension makes explicit what is implicit. We are providing a definition of what a correlation is: under what circumstances we hold the 'shaggy' = df. 'hairy-coated'? And in doing thus he goes into a problem. Does 'shaggy' mean, simpliciter, as it does, 'hairy-coated'? But then this intentional programme seems to yield, rather, and we do not want that, that 'shaggy' means, "in U's view unmistakably hairy-coated", so we need a tweak there (p. 135). So he opts for "non-explicit" correlations. Grice concludes the lecture with a nod to what he will later have as the PERE, or principle of economy of rational effort (in "Reply to Richards"): The rule -- IMPLICIT (meaning postulate, say) -- is it subterranean?. Grice writes: "in some sense", "implicitly" we DO accept these rules" (p. 136). His P.E.R.E makes sense of that in terms of potential explicitation of what we are _deemed_ to follow or accept implicitly. No subterranean, thanks! (This was later the polemic of, say, Gricean M. K. Davies in the sequel to his book with RKP in the pages of Mind and elsewhere on 'tacit' knowledge of a language and what the thing is supposed NOT to mean!). OF COURSE GRICE IS RIGHT IN providing some charming illustration with Jones's dog being hairy-coated (colloquially 'shaggy'). For 'shaggy' is, after all, a predicate. And what we are dealing with here is what I think R. Dale in his essay on Grice calls 'a first-order language', i.e. a predicate calculus. Dale indeed plays with the idea of J-English. English, as it comprises only one sentence: "June loves to dance". Similarly one can imagine S-English. S-English only contains: "Fido is shaggy". Grice provides an ostensive definition of 'shaggy' -- too, in the remaining bits of WoW:VI. Dale touches on that fascinating point in the theory of Fodor that the meaning of "Mentalese" is 'circumscribed' as it were, by grasping the non-logical terms (i.e. the predicates) involved. Dale plays with 'cows' (property of being a cow -- cfr. Grice, "the property of being hairy-coated", _sic_ in WoW:VI for those who think he is only a committed extensionalist). Dale also plays with 'dog' and Schiffer's 'schmdog'. One point to consider here may have a historical side to it. I recall having to pass a seminar -- using Greek Loeb -- on ancient scepticism. So I read all the Sextus, and in looking for contemporary literature, came across a review by Dummett on "The language of appearance". The idea that there are noumenal- and phenomenal-predicates as it were. It would seem that 'shaggy' belongs to the sort of physicalist (or physical, or naturalistic) predicates. A asks B: "What kind of dog are you buying?" "A shaggy one" 'Shaggy' does not seem a _primitive_ predicate. Grice I think would hold that 'RED' is a primitive predicate (discussed extensively in his "Remarks about the senses", in WoW). Then there's 'sofa' that Dale also mentions! I tend to think that had it not been for Strawson's 'mistake' in "Introduction to Logical Theory" in finding formal logic otiose, Grice would have explored areas that perhaps interested him more intrinsically, like the philosophy of perception. Why is it that a PIROT may need to tell another, "That pillar-box isn't red", "It SEEMS red" ("Causal theory of perception" -- unfortunately the section II on 'implication' not repr. in WoW). Talking of 'red', it was good to find, online, a reply by Fodor to Schiffer indeed on 'simple compositionality', as it were. The concept of a 'red flag' I think it is -- with Fodor arguing how this cannot mean but a 'pirot' being equipped with the concept 'red' AND the concept 'flag'. Grice seems to have been charmingly obsessed with things like: "The pillar-box seems red"/"The pillar-box looks red". Why is it that '... looks ...' carries this (what Grice calls) 'doubt-or-denial' implicature? Surely cancellable. What else can a red pillar box do but LOOK red? (the philosopher of perception -- Grice, and, why not? I -- wonders). One little bit about the politics behind Grice may be in order before too long. A beautiful section in that ch. iv of Dale's PhD dissertation, online, "The theory of meaning" Recall Grice: "Fido is shaggy" --- R-correlate: By uttering "Fido" U meant Jones' dog. --- D-correlate. By uttering 'shaggy', U meant 'hairy-coated.' Dale: "[O]n the sort of theory that Fodor argues for, a predicate like "dog" (pretend that's Mentalese) will have as its meaning the property of being a dog." "But, for well known reasons that property will not suffice as the thing assigned to "dog" by a C[ompositional] M[eaning] T[heory]." "A story by Schiffer is helpful here." "Ralph came upon a race of creatures which he thought comprised a previously unencountered biological species, and he introduced the word 'shmog' to designate members of that species." ""A thing shall be called a 'shmog'," Ralph said, "just in case it belongs to the species of those creatures." "Unbeknown to him, however, shmoghood IS doghood." "Ralph had stumbled not upon a new species but a new race of dogs, and thus the property that 'shmog' has been introduced as standing for is none other than doghood." "But 'shmog' and 'dog' will have to be synonymous for Fodor's theory since they will both stand in the relation that Fodor offers to the same property, the property of being a dog." It is sad that Grice focussed on the 'shaggy', in retrospect -- i.e. on the D-correlate, rather than the R-correlate [Jones's shmog?], in retrospect, that is. In his sixth (almost there!) William James Memorial Lecture, Grice educated his audience: "Suppose that for U (utterer), the following two correlations hold: i. Grice's dog is an R-correlate of "Plato" ii. Any hairy-coated thing is a D-correlate of "shaggy". "Given that U has the initial procedures that he has, we can infer that U has the following resultantprocedure, to wit: RP: To utter the indicative version of a predication of Beta on "Fido" if U wants A (Addressee) to think U to think Grice's dog to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of Beta. Given RP and (ii) we can infer that U has: RP2: to utter the indicative version of a predication of "shaggy" on "Fido" if U wants A to think U to think Grice's dog is one of the set of hairy-coated things (i.e. is hairy-coated). And given the information from the linguist that "Plato is shaggy" is the indicative version of a predication of "shaggy" on "Fido" (assumed), we can infer U to have: RP3: To utter "Fido is shaggy" if U wants A to think U to think that Grice's dog is hairy coated. And RP4 is an interpretant of "For U, "Fido is shaggy" means 'Grice's dog is hairy-coated'". I now provide a definiens which may be adequate for adjectival X (e.g."shaggy"): For U, X (adjectival) means '...' iff U has this procedure: to utter a psi-correlated predication of X on ALPHA if (for some Addressee) U wants A to believe a particular Referentially-correlate of Alpha to be ..." (where the two lacunae represented by dots are identically completed). Any specific procedure of the form mentioned in the defininens can be shown to be a resultant procedure: if U has (2) it is inferable that he has the procedure of uttering a psi-correlated predication of "shaggy" on Alpha if for some A U wants A to belief a particular referential-correlate of Alpha to be one of the set of hairy-coated things, that is, that for U, "shaggy" means "hairy-coated"". More formally: By uttering V, U has correlated "shaggy" with (and only with) each hairy-coated thing iff There is a Reference such that U effected by V that there is an x such that R(shaggy, x) iff x belongs to y (y is a hairy-coated thing) andU uttered V in order that U effect by V that there is an x..." And this is insufficient as it stands". (p.133). For certainly, why wouldn't "one want to know that my dog is shaggy unless she wants to beautify it?" INTERLUDE: A shaggy dog story is defined by the OED as "a lengthy tediously detailed story of an inconsequential series of events, more amusing to the teller than to his audience, or amusing only by its pointlessness; also shaggy dog yarn, etc -- 1945 D. Low in N.Y. Times Mag. 4 Feb. 40/1 -- The logical lunacy of `Shaggy Dog'. -- 1946 Coll. Shaggy Dog Stories facing p. 1 -- Stories of the Shaggy Dog variety are essentially tales to be told rather than read. -- 1947 Beat Apr. 6/3 -- Here's one of my favourite `shaggy dog' stories. -- 1952 A. R. K. Barnard in A. Red man Somewhat `Shaggy' 4 -- The comparatively recent type of story-the `Shaggy Dog' yarn. -- 1952 Koestler Arrow in Blue i. viii. 68 -- The people of Budapest have a peculiar shaggy-dog kind of humour. -- 1958 Listener 16 Oct. 623/1 -- It was a shaggy-dog story about a small-town worthy who shams madness to avoid paying bills. -- 1972 P. Ruell Red Christmas xi. 102 -- He seemed to be in the middle of an autobiographical shaggy-dog story. I have elsewhere, indeed in most fora I have been able to push Grice (as if he needed my pushing, but I enjoy doing it -- I push other things too, like wheelbarrows, if that´s the word, not when I´m selling cockles in Dublin (which I don´t, but when I garden at the Villa Speranza). Anyway, a recent query elsewhere was looking for experimental evidence of the ´procedural´thing about things. The interesting thing, if I may be redundant, is that the query appeared to be from someone who is well aware of the literature of what is called L2 -- not your mother tongue, but not your father tongue, either. Instead, the querier was looking for evidence _in_ the mother tongue. This is confusing. The mother tongue while etymologically IS my mother´s tongue, I guess she (my mother) will have NO idea. So I take ¨mother tongue¨to mean, by metonymy, my tongue. And what does "procedure" mean in my tongue? It was fun to have the most active of my sexual years -- the ten of years -- involved in the Gricean analysis of propositional attitudes and communicative reasoning alla whatever. Not only was great at bars, A: Do you come here often? B: Only in the mating season. -- and cfr. my The content of content -- but I was able to _think_. For ten years I was looking -- true I was writing my PhD thesis too, and needed a LOT of field work, for the right word for various things, and discovered it all, one dark night, in Grice´s A Shaggy Dog Story Grice tells, then, in WoW:vi. It involves a dog which is shaggy. For Grice, the shaggy dog story is a way of illuminating us against the evil (he then thought, and vice versa) influence of Chomsky. For Grice, there are two types of procedures: basic and resultant. It is _both_ basic procedures, as he calls them, which are involved in the Meaning of ¨Words¨. This is not to say that this is "procedural words". For the basic procedures, for Grice, involve the incorporation of content. Notably, what is the content of "dog"? What is the content of "shaggy", when we say "The dog is shaggy." We need a basic procedure for ¨dog¨, and we need a basic procedure for "shaggy". Both fall within the same nominal category, while Grice takes provisions to deal with "shaggy" as not "the shaggy one", but "shaggy" qua adjective. However, the procedures are similar. Here Grice applies work by Strawson and himself on reference, in "Individuals" by Strawson and elsewhere. ¨The dog¨involves the referential bit of the utterance; "is shaggy" involves the predicational bit. It´s these functional categories that tell us then what a noun versus an adjective is. I won´t inverse the terms here, since "The sh*g is doggy" makes so much sense, and according to my friend, J. M. Geary, much MORE sense than the original sentence used by Grice. WoW indeed. So this leaves us what another "use" of "procedural" which I find easy to digest, or understand. Grice seemed to have problems with some "procedural" procedures. I would think that what is elsewhere, or in some elsewheres, called "procedural" is merely esultant procedure in Grice. For consider, "¨The dog is shaggy and the sh*g is doggy". Here the resultant procedure involves "and". And, for some reason, "and" was the first resultant procedure, as analysed by Grice that struck Chomsky. Anyone familiar with his 1966 Theory of Syntax will find a reference in the name index which is bound to amuse him: Grice, A. P. That _is_ our Grice. The "A" possibly meaning, "Aristotle" -- and "P", Plato? Anyway, for Grice, "and" involves various procedures, all resultant. The first is the "&" thing. "The dog is shaggy & the sh*g is doggy", where "&" is defined in terms of the truth-value table. The second resultant procedure is more complicated, for it involves a FLOUT of the maxim, Be orderly. So, the following dialogue may ensue: A: The dog was shaggy and the sh*g was doggy. B: Are you saying you found it out in that order? A: No. Matter of fact, I did feel the sh*g was being doggy well before I percieved that it _was_ a shaggy dog. B: Still, I don´t see what kind of sh*g you were expecting from a dog other than the one that struck you so deeply. A: Dunno. Is this the Griceian in me? Now, experiments, made on oneself are -- painful. I am going to experiment with myself, whose mother tongue involves "shaggy" and "dog" and proceed to see if I see a distinction between "shaggy", "dog", and "and". And I don´t! I mean, "and" can become a noun. ¨His ands bore me, especially as follwing "try", "try and"¨". Here "and" is "mentioned", not used, but in metalogic, "p & q" may become the metadiscourse at some higher level, where "and" is the focus of our attention, and hence it achieves "content". After all, Grice WILL talk of something like a Fregean SENSE [this should interest McEvoy, since he (McEvoy) senses sense senses] iin Reply to Richards, for things like "not", "and", and in WoW:ii, he refers to the "meaning" of things like "to" and "of" as being just as tricky as "or". But then I am not an innocent informant. Chapman has a good one on this when she mentions, in her bio of Grice (Macmillan, 2006) that Grice would use Tim´s and Karen´s (his children) playmates as naive informants, for things like "Nothing can be green and red all over". What kind of procedures, basic and resultant does this "judgement" of synthesis a priori involve? Years, later, and in Lancaster, too, Nigel Morley-Bunker reported a same experiment -- cited by G. R. Sampson in his book in Experimental Linguistics. People don´t _know_ what they are talking, is mainly Sampson´s conservative point. T. Wharton who teaches at Sussex should approach Sampson and get the real answer about this! I first learned of Morley Bunker via Sampson´s more philosophical "Making Sense" (Clarendon), which amused me, since deals with the complete protocol for the experiment. Something like that I assume is the way to go with the original query. And in any case, going through it, has allowed the Grice Club to expand on distintions made by this mastermind the club is dedicated to. Grice on shaggy (five-step semi-inferential sequence) après WoW:364 ---- Since Grice (WoW: 364) is careful to use 'feature' (which he distinguishes in WoW:vi from 'item') it's best to state his semi-inferential sequence thus (his shaggy-dog story): STEP 1: It is, speaking extensionally, general practice (merely) -- which can be with myself --, to treat 'shaggy' as signifying hairy-coated. Or 'runt' to mean 'undersized person'. STEP 2: It is, now speaking, with Carnap, INTENSIONALLY too, general boring practice to treat 'shaggy' to signify (or mean) 'hairy coated' (or 'hairy-coated' to mean shaggy). STEP 3: It is generally, as a matter of fact, rather 'de iure', acceptED that it is LEGITIMATE (sc.) acceptABLE) to treat 'shaggy' as signfiing or to signify 'hairy-coated'. STEP 4: It is legitimate (ceteris paribus acceptable) to deem and treat 'shaggy' to signify or as signifying 'hairy-coated'. STEP 5: "'shaggy' signifies 'hairy-coated'". Then there's Grice on " α ∈ β" (WoW:VI:133n1) -- repr. in Searle and scaring Chomsky One may wonder: how are the concepts to which the uppercase words refer actually represented? I pointed out that Grice will NOT engage in this silly practice, and use rather, if he must ('must' understood in the preterite, here -- no such trick in English), by variables, using the more distinguished phi and khi, or alpha, alpha', beta, and beta', as in the footnote referred to in title which scared Chomsky when he read it in Searle, "The philosophy of language" (Oxford, 1971) and which him fodder for his boring 3rd lecture against Grice at Oxford (The Locke Lectures). α ∈ β So Grice wants to just stick with any 'feature' that belongs to an 'item'. We have four features in his long shaggy-dog story: the dog that Jones calls 'Fido' -- alpha the dog that Jones owns ----------- alpha' shaggy ---------------------------- beta hairy-coated ---------------------- beta' When we think of co-extensionality of features, we mean that all items which have feature beta, also have feature beta' (All shaggy things are hairy-coated things). We are concerned with Grice on 'beta', here because for the sub-mechanism of referring the logic is slightly different from the more basic sub-mechanism of 'predicating'. So what that 'infamous' footnote that does display Grice as the extensionalist he once was reads: "The definiens suggested for explicit correlations is, I think, insufficient as it stands." To see that Grice managed Harvard University Press to have this as a footnote is miraculous. He goes on in same self footnote: "I would not wish to say that if A deliberately detaches B from a party, he has thereby correlated himself with B, nor that a lecturer who ensures that just ONE blackboard is visible to EACH member of his audience (and to no one else) has thereby explicitly correlated the blackboard with EACH member of the audience, even though in each case the analogue of the suggested definiens is satisfied." His ability to bring in the most disparate illustrations is just genial. It brings the whole abstract field he is plowing into something that even the dullest student or reader should understand. It's like he is saying: 'No way you can defend yourself by saying that I did use convoluted examples.' He goes on: "To have explicitly correlated X with EACH MEMBER [i.e. each ITEM that is a member. JLS] of a set K, not only must I have intentionally effected that a particular relation R holds between X and all those (and only those) items which belong to K [feature. JLS], but also my purpose or end in setting up this relationship must have been to perform an act." Imagine if you wanted to say this -- of such an importance -- in just a footnote! Grice goes on: "to perform an act as a result of which there will be some relation or other which holds between X and all those (and only those) things [or items. JLS] which belong to K." And here is the important bit, where he plays Zermelo-Fraenkel: "To the definiens, then, we would ADD, within the scope of the initial quantifier, the following clause." And what does the clause look like? It looks LIKE this. In fact it IS this: & U's purpose in effecting that (x) (......) [six dots. JLS] is that (ER') (z)(R' 'shaggy'z <-> z ∈ y (sc. y is hairy-coated)). Crystal clear, right? To understand him fully we need to expand on the NEED of this footnote, but I bring it to the forum because it's the ONLY place (surely for abbreviatiory purposes) that Grice cares to use that rather infamous concept, ∈, that he will later criticise when he sees "Extensionalism" as a bête noire. Of course he KNEW he wasn't an extensionalist (enemy of intenSions) even then, because he IS using at least intenTional terms (like 'end' or 'purpose'), and he is well aware of the problems of quantifying in: "I [did say] at one point that intenSionality seems to be embedded in the very foundations of the theory of language". Grice allows, though, that "it may be possible to derive ... the intenSional concepts which I have been using from more primitive EXTENSIONAL concepts." (WoW:137). So, the "R-correlates" (rather than "D-correlates") he has in mind is for the 'subject' line of the canonical: Fido is shaggy, rather than Whiskers is shaggy -- where "Fido" has as a R-correlate, what Grice has as "Jones's dog", rather than "Smith's cat" (Grice uses "Smith's cat" elsewhere in this essay, WoW:VI). He does not spend much time at all on alpha-correlates, since he is more notoriously going with Frege in D-correlates then, or beta-type correlates. I.e. extension of the predicate 'shaggy' itself. Here he is treading the ground of compositional semantics. If Tarski was into disquotational: "Snow is white" iff snow is white. Grice wants to go inside the 'propositional complex' and want to say that "shaggy" means 'hairy-coated'. It is via D-correlates that the thing is achieved. He allows for an extensionalist reading in set-theoretical terms, and an intensionalist reading in terms of the 'property of hairy-coatedness', and so on. Now, it is interesting that for Grice those D-correlates feature WITHIN a 'phrastic' as it were. "Tactful" is another predicate he considers (along with "shaggy" -- if not applied to 'dog'). Suppose that we define 'tactful' as considerate. So, he wants to say that: "Smith is tactful", "Smith, be factful!", "that Smith be tactful!", etc. These utterancesintroduce the same D-correlate. But obviously there is a variancy there. In the 'assertion' (for which he uses Frege's symbol, judgement-cum-content, /-), 'tactful' is predicated of Smith. Also in "Smith, be tactful" but not within the scope of an 'assertion' operator, but what Grice would symbolise, naively, as "!", and where, notably, the psychological attitude involved will be a 'desire' rather than a 'belief'. In the analysis of D-correlata themselves, Grice uses variables for psychological attidudes (psi), variables for moods (*) and the basic notion of a neutral 'intention', rather. Interestingly, Grice was concerned with Positivism as it was then known in Oxford back in the 1930s. Recall that Ayer was more or less of Grice's generation (Ayer born 1911, Grice, born 1913). So, while Grice will be of course identified, post-war, 1945, with Austin), back in the 1930s, when Grice was a student at Corpus Christi, he knew what was going on. There was a lot of activity (positivist and other) with Ayer, Hart, Austin, McNabb, and others, meeting at Hampshire's rooms in All Souls, as I recall -- or perpahs Hart's rooms. In any case, Grice always reminded that he never was invited to those 'seminal' advances of Oxford philosophy (vide Berlin, "Austin and the early origins of Oxford philosophy") because he had been born on the wrong side of the tracks. Corpus Christi catered for "Midlands" types like Grice. Whereas All Souls, and Hart in particular gathered around him a more 'pretentious' group. Ah, in any case, as I think M. Arnold once said, and he knew: "Only the poor learn in Oxford". Or something. It is good to review Grice's earliest publications for traces of 'positivism', or 'empiricism' of a radical type. His analysis of "I"-sentences ("I was hit by a cricket ball") look empiricist enough (in terms of mnemic states, _Mind_, 1941), and he has unpublished contemporary stuff on "Negation and privation" (negation in terms of 'ignorance') and "Intention and disposition". But soon enough Grice took all his introspections for valid, and never questioned again their validity. Positivism as a creed ceased to be a dogma, as it were. And so on. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html