A report from PINR - Power and Interest News Report - http://www.pinr.com
This message was sent to you by Omar (omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx).
****************************************************************************************
10 June 2006
What al-Zarqawi's Death Means for Iraq
In December 2005, according to press reports, U.S.
military intelligence identified Sheikh Abd
al-Rahman as al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi's spiritual mentor. By following
al-Rahman for months, and gathering further
information, the U.S. military was able to
confirm that al-Zarqawi was at a safe house near
Baquba, north of Baghdad, on the night of June 7.
An air strike was called in and al-Zarqawi died
shortly thereafter as a result of injuries
sustained from the bombing run. Hours after the
announcement of al-Zarqawi's death, Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki appointed his ministers
of interior, defense and national security. These
incidents marked two positive developments for
Iraq's transition. Nevertheless, when analyzed in
context, they are unlikely to reverse the trend
toward instability that has dogged Iraq since
shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein's
government.
Al-Zarqawi's
Legacy
As a result of the nature
of al-Qaeda in Iraq, it is difficult to asses the
impact that al-Zarqawi's death will have on the
insurgency and the sectarian violence. It seems
certain, however, that it will do little to stem
the bloodshed. The impact of his death depends
largely on how much control he had over al-Qaeda
in Iraq and the importance of this organization
to the insurgency. By looking at both aspects, it
appears that al-Qaeda in Iraq will most likely
survive its leader's death and that its impact on
the fighting in the country will be marginal, if
only because al-Qaeda comprises a small portion
of the insurgency.
The hierarchy of
al-Zarqawi's organization is rather opaque, and
it is not clear how much control he had over the
network of foreign fighters in Iraq. At least 20
of al-Zarqawi's "lieutenants" have been captured
or killed in Iraq since 2003, but it seems that
the organization has been able to quickly fill
any open posts. In fact, shortly after
al-Zarqawi's death, an Islamist network published
a statement naming Abu Abdul-Rahman al-Iraqi, who
was apparently al-Zarqawi's "deputy emir," as the
new leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Some confusion has
developed over this announcement because al-Iraqi
has the same name as al-Zarqawi's spiritual
adviser, who U.S. authorities claim was killed in
the bombing run. Analysts have speculated that
these may be two different individuals. At the
same time, U.S. authorities put forth another
name, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, as the likely successor
of al-Zarqawi. Abu Ayyub al-Masri was named by
Major General William Caldwell, the U.S.
spokesman in Iraq. Al-Masri is an Egyptian who
allegedly came to Iraq in 2002 from Afghanistan
where he shared "communications" with al-Qaeda
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. These two developments
indicate that al-Qaeda in Iraq's organizational
structure will continue, and it may even grow in
strength if the new leader proves to be more
effective.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's
reputation as a brutal, uncompromising militant,
without strong religious credentials, likely made
even Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri uncomfortable
in aligning with him. His violent attacks made him
unpopular with segments of the Sunni Arab
population in Iraq, who shared his goals of
forcing the United States out of the country and
reestablishing Sunni dominance. Al-Zarqawi also
weakened a Muslim front against the United States
by encouraging attacks on Shi'a. For instance, in
an audiotape that al-Zarqawi released shortly
before his death, he said, "The roots of Jews and
the Shi'a are the same" and even went so far as to
brand Shi'a leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
as an "atheist."
These statements
further split the Muslim community in Iraq, and
heightened tensions between Sunni and Shi'a
elsewhere creating the possibility that Islamist
militants could turn on each other, damaging bin
Laden's efforts at vitalizing all Muslims against
the "far enemy" -- the United States and its
allies. In July 2005, for example, al-Zawahiri
reportedly sent a letter to al-Zarqawi,
questioning his attacks against the Shi'a; the
letter warned that "questions will circulate
among mujahideen circles and their opinion makers
about the correctness of this conflict with the
Shi'a at this time."
Al-Zarqawi's
Successor
Indeed, although
al-Zarqawi was successful in inspiring foreigners
to join the insurgency in Iraq, as a popular
leader of Iraqis he was a failure. One danger
that his death leaves open for the United States
and the Iraqi government is the possibility that
al-Zarqawi's successor will be more competent. If
al-Qaeda in Iraq is successful in winning more
Sunni hearts and minds in Iraq, it could prove to
be a larger threat to the new Iraqi government
than under al-Zarqawi's helm. As a result of the
time spent between al-Masri and al-Zawahiri,
analysts think that if al-Masri takes control of
the organization, he may direct al-Qaeda in Iraq
on a course that more closely resembles bin
Laden's strategy. Additionally, al-Iraqi, the
other possible replacement for al-Zarqawi, is
thought to be of Iraqi origin (al-Zarqawi was
Jordanian), which means he would probably be
better able to rally the support of Iraqis.
It is worth noting that al-Zarqawi's
organization represents only a small portion of
the insurgency. Still, a higher proportion of the
casualties in Iraq are attributed to al-Zarqawi's
organization because of its willingness to use
controversial tactics that the domestic
insurgents are not. Nevertheless, as a result of
al-Zarqawi's small role in the insurgency, his
death will not diminish the sectarian tensions or
the current level of violence.
The
Iraqi constitution was drafted along sectarian
lines, the government was formed along sectarian
lines, and the security forces are largely
operating as sectarian forces. The trend toward
the fracturing of Iraq along sectarian lines will
not be reversed by al-Zarqawi's death, nor will
the violence associated with this trend. It
appears that most U.S. officials agree that there
will not be a fall in the level of violence in
Iraq as a result of al-Zarqawi's death.
The appointment of an interior minister shortly
after the assassination, however, has the
potential to slow this sectarian trend. Jawad
al-Bolani is not associated with any militias,
unlike his predecessor at the ministry, and will
make it his priority to route out the
SCIRI-aligned Shi'a "death squads" believed to be
targeting Sunnis. His ability to take on the
militias, however, will be determined by his
capacity to take on the divided factions within
the Shi'a United Iraqi Alliance, as each side is
unlikely to concede its militia without the other
doing so first. Al-Bolani faces a Herculean task
in achieving this goal, but the survival of his
government may well depend on his success.
Conclusion
While Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi's death is a major public
relations coup for the U.S. military and the
Iraqi government, it is unlikely to have a major
impact on the trend toward the sectarian
fracturing of Iraq. His forces composed only a
small part of the insurgency, and guerrilla
fighters associated with other violent
organizations and militias will continue their
operations against the Iraqi government and
U.S.-led forces. Additionally, it appears that
al-Zarqawi will be quickly replaced like his
"lieutenants" before him. While al-Zarqawi was
the face of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and for the most
part the organization's only visible figurehead,
his replacement may prove more effective at
garnering domestic support for the organization.
Finally, the appointment of a minister of the
interior has the potential for a greater impact
on reducing the sectarian violence, although
here, too, it seems al-Bolani's task is too
great, and he will likely have little impact in
reversing the trend toward Iraq's fragmentation.
Report Drafted By:
Adam Wolfe
****************************************************************************************
The Power and Interest
News Report (PINR) is an independent organization
that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
conflict analysis services in the context of
international relations. PINR approaches a
subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the
reader. This report may not be reproduced,
reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of inquiries@xxxxxxxx.
All comments should be directed to content@xxxxxxxx.
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
|