[cryptome] Re: airgepped computer?--not for long maybe.
- From: Andrew Hornback <achornback@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 11:18:40 -0500
Coming a little late to the game here... but, wouldn't the products on this
page (note: I'm not associated with this site or endorsing their products -
it turned up as a result in a quick search via Google for TEMPEST)
eliminate a good deal of this attack vector?
http://www.advprograms.com/accessories.htm
Reduce or eliminate the emissions from the systems and you've negated a
good portion of the risk.
What's troubling from the Wired article is this - "Generally the most
common method for infecting air-gapped machines is a USB flash drive or
other removable media." Anyone who's ever done the least little thing with
regards to ITSEC would know that once you lose physical control over a
system, you're compromised. In an environment that requires an air-gap
level of security and scrutiny, to allow removable media (especially USB
drives) unfettered borderlines on the infinitely stupid.
--- A
On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Shaun O'Connor <capricorn8159@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> If people are using air-gapped computers in the mistaken belief that the
> system is secure. this article should send a shiver up their collective
> spines.
>
> http://www.wired.com/2014/11/airhopper-hack/
>
>
> --
> * PRIVACY IS A BASIC RIGHT - NOT A CONCESSION *
>
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