DEQ removed plan for corrosion control of Flint water, leading to crisis
Ron Fonger | rfonger1@xxxxxxxxx
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Ron Fonger | rfonger1@xxxxxxxxx
on May 03, 2016 at 5:00 AM, updated May 03, 2016 at 5:45 AM
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The city of Flint's blueprint for treating Flint River water in 2014 included
corrosion controls that could have prevented the
Flint water crisis
from ever happening.
But harried and short-handed water plant employees abandoned plans to add
phosphates to the water after at least two state Department of Environmental
Quality
officials advised them it wasn't necessary.
In an interview with MLive before he was charged with tampering with evidence
and willful neglect of duty in April, Flint Utilities Administrator Mike Glasgow
said he was surprised by the explicit direction he was given by Adam Rosenthal
and Mike Prysby of the DEQ.
But Glasgow said he pushed forward with other preparations without resisting
the direction from the state because he had so much else to do and so little
time to put the plant into operation by the target date his superiors set.
"It was like a fire drill every day" with a to-do list that seemed impossible
to achieve, said Glasgow, who believed the activity at the plant was a ruse
â?? nothing more than a negotiating tool to force the city of Detroit to lower
the price of treated water it had been selling to Flint for decades.
It wasn't until a few days before the plant began treating and distributing
river water — over objections raised in writing by Glasgow — that the plant
operator realized "we were really going to switch over."
"I'm thinking, holy sh--. We're really doing it," he said.
As Flint was slowly poisoned, Snyder's inner circle failed to act
The lack of corrosion control in Flint's water treatment process was a critical
error in creating a nationally recognized lead contamination emergency in
Flint.
Left untreated, the corrosive river water damaged aging transmission pipes and
indoor plumbing, and the percentage of young children with elevated blood
lead levels in Flint nearly doubled.
DEQ spokeswoman Mel Brown declined a request from MLive to interview Prysby or
Rosenthal and declined to comment about Glasgow's remarks "because of the
ongoing investigations and litigation."
Prysby, a district engineer for the state, and Stephen Busch, a district
manager within the DEQ's drinking water division, also were charged with crimes
for their roles in the crisis on April 20.
Glasgow's emails to Rosenthal in 2014 included a warning the city was not
prepared to put the water plant into full-time service â?? concerns that Glasgow
described to the state Legislature's Joint Committee on the Flint Water Public
Health Emergency late last month.
The utilities director told MLive in advance of his testimony that
representatives of Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, the city's contract engineer at
the plant,
were active in discussions with the DEQ in the time leading up to treating the
river water.
LAN, an engineering firm based in Houston, was hired on a $171,000 contract by
Flint's state-appointed emergency manager Ed Kurtz in summer 2013.
Five months before the water plant was put into operation, Kurtz's successor,
Darnell Earley, signed a massive change order, increasing the contract to
$1.1 million.
LAN agreed to provide additional services to the city, including final design
work, construction engineering and "necessary regulatory submittals to operate
the water plant off the river until the KWA water source is completed."
A spokesman for LAN issued a statement in response to questions from MLive,
saying the company "was asked to provide a limited scope of engineering services
to address specific components of the existing water treatment plant, not the
overall water quality."
"The actual tasks are set forth in the public contract between the parties. The
systems we provided services on are operating without issue, and it is clear
that LAN provided these specific services in a responsible and appropriate
manner in accordance with industry standards," the LAN statement says.
"Decisions concerning corrosion control were made by the city and the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality and not by LAN. LAN continues to assist
the city of Flint as it addresses the various water issues confronting the city
today."
Glasgow told former Flint Department of Public Works director Howard Croft in
an Aug. 31, 2015, email that phosphates were included in plans that LAN
developed.
Croft also said in a Sept. 3, 2015, email to DEQ officials that "optimization
for lead was addressed and discussed with the engineering firm and with the
DEQ" before the city water plant went into full-time service.
"It was determined that having more data was advisable prior to the commitment
of a specific optimization method," the email said. "Most chemicals used
in this process are phosphate based and phosphate can be a 'food' for bacteria."
Glasgow told the special state legislative committee investigating the Flint
water crisis that he regrets not having slowed down the process of putting
the plant into service.
"I did have some concerns and misgivings at first but, as I look back, I relied
on engineers and state regulators to kind of direct the decisions," he said.
Flint water supervisor warned state of problems before switch to river
Although DEQ employees declined comment to MLive, they were interviewed by the
Flint Water Advisory Task Force.
Eric Rothstein, a national water issues consultant and principal at the Galardi
Rothstein Group, said the group never got a clear answer as to why the DEQ
didn't require corrosion control.
"We asked the question and there was no compelling response," Rothstein said.
"Frankly, there's not a good explanation. I think there was a lack of
understanding
about the potential consequences, and perhaps indifference."
Ron Fonger is a reporter on MLive's Impact Team. Contact him at
rfonger1@xxxxxxxxx.
MLive staff reporter Julie Mack contributed to this report.
Source:
http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/05/deq_removed_plan_for_corrosion.html
