This is a really fascinating article, one of the best explanations I've
read.
Miriam
Weissman writes: "'If the Americans destroy Saddam Hussein and then leave,
the situation will be explosive,' Dr. Olivier Roy warned back in 2002. 'Iraq
won't be a stable country. Neither will the region.'"
Paris after the recent terrorist attacks. (photo: Martin Bureau/Getty
Images)
Who Are the Terrorists? Look and You'll See Why Bombing in Syria Won't Stomp
Them Out
By Steve Weissman, Reader Supported News
29 November 15
I f the Americans destroy Saddam Hussein and then leave, the situation will
be explosive, Dr. Olivier Roy warned back in 2002. Iraq won't be a stable
country. Neither will the region.
A political scientist and leading scholar of Persian language and
civilization, Dr. Roy helped persuade Frances center-right president
Jacques Chirac, his foreign minister Dominique de Villepin, and other
cheese-eating surrender monkeys not to buy into George W. Bushs ill-fated
invasion of Iraq.
Thirteen years have passed. Iraq, Syria, and much of the region have become
even more unstable, just as Dr. Roy predicted would happen. Only now,
Frances socialist president François Hollande is leading the effort to
include Russia in a global coalition to intervene more forcefully, this time
against both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Prescient as ever, Dr. Roy is
warning the world not to expect the new intervention to stop terror attacks
in Europe or, by extension, in the United States.
In France alone, he has identified some 1500 Islamist radicals who have
become known to police and journalists over the past two decades. These
radicals include Abdelhamid Abaaoud, or Abu Omar the Belgian, and most of
the others in the November 13 attacks in Paris. Some who jumped into
action went on jihad to Yemen, Syria, Iraq, or previously Bosnia or
Afghanistan. Some perpetrated or were caught preparing terrorist attacks.
Dr. Roy also looked at another 7000 who had manifested an intention to
follow suit, but had not done so for a variety of reasons.
Can we draw a general portrait of an Islamist radical? he asked a week
after the Paris attacks. Can we define the conditions and circumstances
under which he or she may become radical?
In their life stories, Roy discovered some surprising patterns, along with a
lack of patterns one might expect. It is not the uprising of a Muslim
community victim of poverty and racism, he concludes. Only young people
join, including converts who did not share the sufferings of Muslims in
Europe. The converts number about 25% of the 1500, and 37% of the 7000.
In the USA, he adds, 40 percent of those charged in 2011 for jihadist
radicalization were converts to Islam, slightly more than the 35 percent of
those charged since the 2001 attacks.
This is not to deny the very real grievances that Muslims suffer, more so in
Europe than in the United States. But the young French rebels Roy studied
had a loose or no connection to the organized Muslim community, to the
mosques, or to extremist imams. None of the radicals has a past of piety,
Roy observes. Most of them either broke with the Islam of their parents, or
had no religious transmission from their parents.
Almost none followed a real process of religious education, he says.
Their religious knowledge is low. In fact, few of them speak explicitly
about paradise and some carried with them the book Islam for Dummies.
Many have a past of petty delinquency and drug dealing, Roy finds. Before
turning born-again or converts, they shared a youth culture which had
nothing to do with Islam.
It is clearly a youth movement, says Roy, a youth revolt against
society. Psychologically, they share frustration and resentment against
society, and they become radicals in a small network of friends, of
peers, where nominal Muslims and non-Muslims meet because they live in the
same neighborhood, share the same patterns of petty delinquency, found
themselves together in jail, or are members of the same family.
This puts them often at odds with the traditional view of family and women
in Islam, he adds. These groups are often mixed in gender terms, and the
women play often a far more important role than they themselves claim
. They
intermarry between themselves, without the parents consent.
Where, then, do Islamic State and al-Qaeda fit in?
The main motivation of young men for joining jihad seems to be the
fascination for a narrative: the small brotherhood of super-heroes who
avenge the Muslim Ummah, Roy concludes. This remains global and abstract,
unconnected to real people either in Europe or the Middle East. They build
their narrative using schemes taken from the contemporary youth culture:
video-games (Call of Duty, Assassins). And they stage their super-hero
fantasies using modern techniques and very contemporary aesthetics, with a
special role for aesthetics of violence.
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State offer them a narrative of heroism, while the
religious dimension offers them a framework to restructure their lives: the
truth, the good, a clear set of norms, brothers in arms, a clear objective,
and salvation.
Jihad is the only cause on the global market, Dr. Roy explains with
obvious disdain. If you kill in silence, it will be reported by the local
newspaper, if you kill yelling Allahuakbar, you are sure to make the
national headlines.
In short, the radicals are there to be used, and neither al-Qaeda nor the
Islamic State has any qualms about using them. The eight knights brought
Paris down on its knees, after years of French conceit in the face of
Islam, wrote the Islamic State in the latest issue of their English
language magazine Dabiq. A nationwide state of emergency was declared as a
result of the actions of eight men armed only with assault rifles and
explosive belts.
The solution is not easy to see, though Dr. Roy knows what it is not.
To promote a moderate Islam to bring radicals back to the mainstream is
nonsense, he says. They just reject moderation as such
and dont care
what Islam really means.
To ask the Muslim community to bring radicals back to normal life is also
nonsense. Radicals just dont care about people they consider as traitors,
apostates, or collaborators.
To consider Islam only through the lens of fighting terrorism will
validate the narrative of persecution and revenge that feeds the process of
radicalization.
Dr. Roy offers four alternatives: A more sophisticated intelligence system,
which wont waste time monitoring mosques, which the radicals rarely attend.
Debunking the narrative of heroism, which in my opinion would require an
extremely sophisticated use of humor. Breaking the success story of the
Islamic State, which will require a lot more than dropping bombs. And, most
important, letting Islam be a normal religion. Sadly, that is a direction
that France, Europe, and nativist Americans are unwilling to take.
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
Paris after the recent terrorist attacks. (photo: Martin Bureau/Getty
Images)
http://readersupportednews.org/http://readersupportednews.org/
Who Are the Terrorists? Look and You'll See Why Bombing in Syria Won't Stomp
Them Out
By Steve Weissman, Reader Supported News
29 November 15
f the Americans destroy Saddam Hussein and then leave, the situation will
be explosive, Dr. Olivier Roy warned back in 2002. Iraq won't be a stable
country. Neither will the region.
A political scientist and leading scholar of Persian language and
civilization, Dr. Roy helped persuade Frances center-right president
Jacques Chirac, his foreign minister Dominique de Villepin, and other
cheese-eating surrender monkeys not to buy into George W. Bushs ill-fated
invasion of Iraq.
Thirteen years have passed. Iraq, Syria, and much of the region have become
even more unstable, just as Dr. Roy predicted would happen. Only now,
Frances socialist president François Hollande is leading the effort to
include Russia in a global coalition to intervene more forcefully, this time
against both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Prescient as ever, Dr. Roy is
warning the world not to expect the new intervention to stop terror attacks
in Europe or, by extension, in the United States.
In France alone, he has identified some 1500 Islamist radicals who have
become known to police and journalists over the past two decades. These
radicals include Abdelhamid Abaaoud, or Abu Omar the Belgian, and most of
the others in the November 13 attacks in Paris. Some who jumped into
action went on jihad to Yemen, Syria, Iraq, or previously Bosnia or
Afghanistan. Some perpetrated or were caught preparing terrorist attacks.
Dr. Roy also looked at another 7000 who had manifested an intention to
follow suit, but had not done so for a variety of reasons.
Can we draw a general portrait of an Islamist radical? he asked a week
after the Paris attacks. Can we define the conditions and circumstances
under which he or she may become radical?
In their life stories, Roy discovered some surprising patterns, along with a
lack of patterns one might expect. It is not the uprising of a Muslim
community victim of poverty and racism, he concludes. Only young people
join, including converts who did not share the sufferings of Muslims in
Europe. The converts number about 25% of the 1500, and 37% of the 7000.
In the USA, he adds, 40 percent of those charged in 2011 for jihadist
radicalization were converts to Islam, slightly more than the 35 percent of
those charged since the 2001 attacks.
This is not to deny the very real grievances that Muslims suffer, more so in
Europe than in the United States. But the young French rebels Roy studied
had a loose or no connection to the organized Muslim community, to the
mosques, or to extremist imams. None of the radicals has a past of piety,
Roy observes. Most of them either broke with the Islam of their parents, or
had no religious transmission from their parents.
Almost none followed a real process of religious education, he says.
Their religious knowledge is low. In fact, few of them speak explicitly
about paradise and some carried with them the book Islam for Dummies.
Many have a past of petty delinquency and drug dealing, Roy finds. Before
turning born-again or converts, they shared a youth culture which had
nothing to do with Islam.
It is clearly a youth movement, says Roy, a youth revolt against
society. Psychologically, they share frustration and resentment against
society, and they become radicals in a small network of friends, of
peers, where nominal Muslims and non-Muslims meet because they live in the
same neighborhood, share the same patterns of petty delinquency, found
themselves together in jail, or are members of the same family.
This puts them often at odds with the traditional view of family and women
in Islam, he adds. These groups are often mixed in gender terms, and the
women play often a far more important role than they themselves claim
. They
intermarry between themselves, without the parents consent.
Where, then, do Islamic State and al-Qaeda fit in?
The main motivation of young men for joining jihad seems to be the
fascination for a narrative: the small brotherhood of super-heroes who
avenge the Muslim Ummah, Roy concludes. This remains global and abstract,
unconnected to real people either in Europe or the Middle East. They build
their narrative using schemes taken from the contemporary youth culture:
video-games (Call of Duty, Assassins). And they stage their super-hero
fantasies using modern techniques and very contemporary aesthetics, with a
special role for aesthetics of violence.
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State offer them a narrative of heroism, while the
religious dimension offers them a framework to restructure their lives: the
truth, the good, a clear set of norms, brothers in arms, a clear objective,
and salvation.
Jihad is the only cause on the global market, Dr. Roy explains with
obvious disdain. If you kill in silence, it will be reported by the local
newspaper, if you kill yelling Allahuakbar, you are sure to make the
national headlines.
In short, the radicals are there to be used, and neither al-Qaeda nor the
Islamic State has any qualms about using them. The eight knights brought
Paris down on its knees, after years of French conceit in the face of
Islam, wrote the Islamic State in the latest issue of their English
language magazine Dabiq. A nationwide state of emergency was declared as a
result of the actions of eight men armed only with assault rifles and
explosive belts.
The solution is not easy to see, though Dr. Roy knows what it is not.
To promote a moderate Islam to bring radicals back to the mainstream is
nonsense, he says. They just reject moderation as such
and dont care
what Islam really means.
To ask the Muslim community to bring radicals back to normal life is also
nonsense. Radicals just dont care about people they consider as traitors,
apostates, or collaborators.
To consider Islam only through the lens of fighting terrorism will
validate the narrative of persecution and revenge that feeds the process of
radicalization.
Dr. Roy offers four alternatives: A more sophisticated intelligence system,
which wont waste time monitoring mosques, which the radicals rarely attend.
Debunking the narrative of heroism, which in my opinion would require an
extremely sophisticated use of humor. Breaking the success story of the
Islamic State, which will require a lot more than dropping bombs. And, most
important, letting Islam be a normal religion. Sadly, that is a direction
that France, Europe, and nativist Americans are unwilling to take.
http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize
http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize
