The only way to take on ISIS is to take on Wahhabi doctrine
Middle East
Samer Abboud on November 23, 2015 14 Comments
ISIS flag raised near Turkish Syrian border
In the last month, ISIS has been responsible for bombings in Ankara, Baghdad,
Beirut, and Paris, taking the lives of hundreds of innocent people while
expanding the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts well beyond their borders. For better
or worse, the bombings in Paris set off a wave of social media debates about
ISIS that became wrapped up in larger conversations about hierarchy, hegemony,
and the politics of global grief. Why, for example, did Facebook offer a safety
check-in for Parisians and not Lebanese? Why did the Western media only notice
ISIS’ expansion when Europeans, and not Lebanese, Turks, or Iraqis, were killed
by ISIS suicide bombers? These debates are important and valuable to have in
the aftermath of such tragedies because they de-normalize narratives of
exceptionalism that permeate global discussions when terrorism strikes in the
West. In Europe, Canada, and the United States, we immediately witnessed
differing responses from political leaders to the tragedy, from US presidential
candidates such as Donald Trump declaring that he would “bomb the shit out of
them [ISIS]” and governors “banning” Syrian refugees from entering their
states, to European countries closing their borders to refugees. Such calls for
more violence or for restrictions on refugees – who are themselves fleeing the
kind of terror we saw in Baghdad, Ankara, Beirut, and Paris – are not only
misguided, but they reinforce ISIS’ eschatological worldview. They are also
unhelpful in answering the question that everyone has on their minds right now
– What is to be done about ISIS?
Serious, sober responses to this question first require parsing through the web
of anger, xenophobia, and prejudice that the bombings of the last month have
engendered. France’s initial response – the bombing of more than 20 targets in
Syria that included a medical clinic – may have satisfied the immediate need
for retribution but this came at the expense of innocent Syrian lives.
Similarly, the moves within Europe and the United States to restrict refugee
flows will only hurt those already suffering from violence and repression in
places like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Surely, there are better
options and pathways moving forward.
Cover of ‘Syria’ by Samer Abboud
Such directions must be informed by a fundamentally different framing of the
conflict that does not see ISIS simply as a problem simply to be erased or
bombed out of existence. The attacks of the last month demonstrate the failure
and vacuity of the American-led bombing campaign against ISIS in Syria begun in
August 2014. Since the air campaign began, the group has not suffered
significant contraction of territory under its control and, as the bombings of
the last month have demonstrated, has actually increased their capacity to
commit mass violence beyond Syria and Iraq. The group’s expansion in a context
of sustained aerial attacks highlights one of the main criticisms of the
American-led campaign from the beginning, mainly, that it was treating symptoms
and not the problem. By concentrating attacks against ISIS targets while
refusing to implement a no-fly zone or provide heavy weaponry to rebel groups
fighting the Syrian regime, the American strategy was doomed to failure from
the very beginning because it never involved serious efforts to bring about a
political transition in Syria that could end the conflict. In large part, this
stemmed from a false dichotomy adopted in the West, that the ‘choice’ in the
conflict was either between ISIS or the Syrian regime. The revival of the
Hitler or Stalin dilemma the West faced in the 20th century is highly
problematic because it assumes that these are the only choices for Syrians
moving forward. This is simply not the case. As such, these realities should
force a rethinking of the strategy of confronting ISIS solely through bombing
campaigns.
The expansion of ISIS violence beyond Syria and Iraq is shifting the
international dimensions of these conflicts in disturbing ways. The increased
transnational capacities of ISIS portend unknowable shifts in the Syrian and
Iraqi conflicts and the potential for continued and sustained spillover into
neighboring countries and into Europe. The expansion of the geographic
battlefield of these conflicts thus necessitates a comprehensive, generational
response to the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, one which eschews simplistic and
temporary solutions involving bombing campaigns that simply do not work and
hurt civilians, for ones that address the root structural causes of ISIS’ rise
and its expansion beyond Syria and Iraq.
Thus, beyond merely rethinking the efficacy and utility of sustained aerial
bombardment as the response to ISIS in Syria and Iraq, there needs to be a
long-term commitment to unraveling the material and ideological structures that
sustain ISIS. In a region where the conflicts are multilayered and complicated,
the waters in this regard are much less murky. Wahhabi doctrine, which lies at
the core of ISIS’ worldview, is one that fosters sectarian hatred, violence,
and extreme social conservatism, and emanates from the West’s second-most
strategic ally in the region, Saudi Arabia. This doctrine has provided the
ideological background for ISIS’ leadership, its core fighters, and adherents
and provides the ideational structure for the new Islamic society ISIS purports
to want to create. It is precisely this doctrine that has given rise to the
kind of iniquitous practices of ISIS and which has fostered such extreme
violence against civilians in Syria, Iraq, and beyond.
Doctrine cannot simply be blown up or willed away. Delegitimizing the ideology
that sustains ISIS involves direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia and
engagement with its network of clerics that propagate and disseminate Wahhabi
doctrine throughout the world. The conditions that permit such doctrines to
gain traction must thus be at the core of any framing of the problem. This is
an extremely sensitive issue, both in the West and in Saudi Arabia. It is
especially sensitive in a context where military contracts – including a 10
billion Euro contract signed by France and Saudi Arabia in October 2015 – bind
Western states economically to Saudi Arabia. Whether and how to engage with and
delegitimize Wahhabi doctrine is one of the central dilemmas facing the region
and the world today.
It is high time that we begin to name and identify some of the central
structural and ideological issue plaguing the region that foster instability,
chaos, and violence. Such a discussion should begin by rejecting the strategic
foundations of aerial bombardment or border closures as strategies to deal with
ISIS and instead engage directly with both the ideological underpinnings of
ISIS and the ways in which continued stalemate in Syria makes possible ISIS’
expansion in that country and, now, the world.
About Samer Abboud
Samer Abboud is an associate professor of international studies at Arcadia
University in Pennsylvania and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for
Syrian Studies at St. Andrews University in Scotland. He had published widely
on contemporary Syria, including a book about the current conflict entitled
Syria (Polity, 2015).
The only way to take on ISIS is to take on Wahhabi doctrine
Middle East
Samer Abboud on November 23, 2015 14 Comments
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ISIS flag raised near Turkish Syrian border
In the last month, ISIS has been responsible for bombings in Ankara, Baghdad,
Beirut, and Paris, taking the lives of hundreds of innocent people while
expanding the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts well beyond their borders. For better
or worse, the bombings in Paris set off a wave of social media debates about
ISIS that became wrapped up in larger conversations about hierarchy, hegemony,
and the politics of global grief. Why, for example, did Facebook offer a safety
check-in for Parisians and not Lebanese? Why did the Western media only notice
ISIS’ expansion when Europeans, and not Lebanese, Turks, or Iraqis, were killed
by ISIS suicide bombers? These debates are important and valuable to have in
the aftermath of such tragedies because they de-normalize narratives of
exceptionalism that permeate global discussions when terrorism strikes in the
West. In Europe, Canada, and the United States, we immediately witnessed
differing responses from political leaders to the tragedy, from US presidential
candidates such as Donald Trump declaring that he would “bomb the shit out of
them [ISIS]” and governors “banning” Syrian refugees from entering their
states, to European countries closing their borders to refugees. Such calls for
more violence or for restrictions on refugees – who are themselves fleeing the
kind of terror we saw in Baghdad, Ankara, Beirut, and Paris – are not only
misguided, but they reinforce ISIS’ eschatological worldview. They are also
unhelpful in answering the question that everyone has on their minds right now
– What is to be done about ISIS?
Serious, sober responses to this question first require parsing through the web
of anger, xenophobia, and prejudice that the bombings of the last month have
engendered. France’s initial response – the bombing of more than 20 targets in
Syria that included a medical clinic – may have satisfied the immediate need
for retribution but this came at the expense of innocent Syrian lives.
Similarly, the moves within Europe and the United States to restrict refugee
flows will only hurt those already suffering from violence and repression in
places like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Surely, there are better
options and pathways moving forward.
http://www.politybooks.com/book.asp?ref=9780745697987
http://www.politybooks.com/book.asp?ref=9780745697987
Cover of ‘Syria’ by Samer Abboud
Such directions must be informed by a fundamentally different framing of the
conflict that does not see ISIS simply as a problem simply to be erased or
bombed out of existence. The attacks of the last month demonstrate the failure
and vacuity of the American-led bombing campaign against ISIS in Syria begun in
August 2014. Since the air campaign began, the group has not suffered
significant contraction of territory under its control and, as the bombings of
the last month have demonstrated, has actually increased their capacity to
commit mass violence beyond Syria and Iraq. The group’s expansion in a context
of sustained aerial attacks highlights one of the main criticisms of the
American-led campaign from the beginning, mainly, that it was treating symptoms
and not the problem. By concentrating attacks against ISIS targets while
refusing to implement a no-fly zone or provide heavy weaponry to rebel groups
fighting the Syrian regime, the American strategy was doomed to failure from
the very beginning because it never involved serious efforts to bring about a
political transition in Syria that could end the conflict. In large part, this
stemmed from a false dichotomy adopted in the West, that the ‘choice’ in the
conflict was either between ISIS or the Syrian regime. The revival of the
Hitler or Stalin dilemma the West faced in the 20th century is highly
problematic because it assumes that these are the only choices for Syrians
moving forward. This is simply not the case. As such, these realities should
force a rethinking of the strategy of confronting ISIS solely through bombing
campaigns.
The expansion of ISIS violence beyond Syria and Iraq is shifting the
international dimensions of these conflicts in disturbing ways. The increased
transnational capacities of ISIS portend unknowable shifts in the Syrian and
Iraqi conflicts and the potential for continued and sustained spillover into
neighboring countries and into Europe. The expansion of the geographic
battlefield of these conflicts thus necessitates a comprehensive, generational
response to the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, one which eschews simplistic and
temporary solutions involving bombing campaigns that simply do not work and
hurt civilians, for ones that address the root structural causes of ISIS’ rise
and its expansion beyond Syria and Iraq.
Thus, beyond merely rethinking the efficacy and utility of sustained aerial
bombardment as the response to ISIS in Syria and Iraq, there needs to be a
long-term commitment to unraveling the material and ideological structures that
sustain ISIS. In a region where the conflicts are multilayered and complicated,
the waters in this regard are much less murky. Wahhabi doctrine, which lies at
the core of ISIS’ worldview, is one that fosters sectarian hatred, violence,
and extreme social conservatism, and emanates from the West’s second-most
strategic ally in the region, Saudi Arabia. This doctrine has provided the
ideological background for ISIS’ leadership, its core fighters, and adherents
and provides the ideational structure for the new Islamic society ISIS purports
to want to create. It is precisely this doctrine that has given rise to the
kind of iniquitous practices of ISIS and which has fostered such extreme
violence against civilians in Syria, Iraq, and beyond.
Doctrine cannot simply be blown up or willed away. Delegitimizing the ideology
that sustains ISIS involves direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia and
engagement with its network of clerics that propagate and disseminate Wahhabi
doctrine throughout the world. The conditions that permit such doctrines to
gain traction must thus be at the core of any framing of the problem. This is
an extremely sensitive issue, both in the West and in Saudi Arabia. It is
especially sensitive in a context where military contracts – including a 10
billion Euro contract signed by France and Saudi Arabia in October 2015 – bind
Western states economically to Saudi Arabia. Whether and how to engage with and
delegitimize Wahhabi doctrine is one of the central dilemmas facing the region
and the world today.
It is high time that we begin to name and identify some of the central
structural and ideological issue plaguing the region that foster instability,
chaos, and violence. Such a discussion should begin by rejecting the strategic
foundations of aerial bombardment or border closures as strategies to deal with
ISIS and instead engage directly with both the ideological underpinnings of
ISIS and the ways in which continued stalemate in Syria makes possible ISIS’
expansion in that country and, now, the world.
About Samer Abboud
Samer Abboud is an associate professor of international studies at Arcadia
University in Pennsylvania and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for
Syrian Studies at St. Andrews University in Scotland. He had published widely
on contemporary Syria, including a book about the current conflict entitled
Syria (Polity, 2015).
