Obama Broke Pledge to Demand Syrian Opposition's Separation From Nusra Front
Wednesday, 11 May 2016 00:00 By Gareth Porter, Truthout | Report
President Barack Obama, with Secretary of State John Kerry, holds a news
conference after a meeting of the National Security Council regarding ISIS
and Syria, at the State Department in Washington, DC, February 25, 2016.
(Photo: Zach Gibson / The New York Times)
The gradual erosion of the cease-fire in Syria over the past month is the
result of multiple factors shaping the conflict, but one of the underlying
reasons is the Obama administration's failure to carry out its commitment to
Russia to get US-supported opposition groups to separate themselves
physically from the Nusra Front -- the al-Qaeda organization in Syria.
US Secretary of State John Kerry made the promise to separate the groups as
part of the understandings underlying the February 22 cease-fire, but never
delivered on it. And by the time Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov finished negotiating on how to make the "cessation of hostilities"
more effective in the Syrian city of Aleppo on May 2, the Obama
administration had effectively withdrawn that concession completely.
The joint US-Russian statement on Monday reaffirming the original February
agreement makes no mention of the proximity issue, despite its centrality to
the negotiations between the two powers on how to reduce the violence in
Syria.
The administration's vacillation on the issue reflects the reality that the
US-supported armed opposition has no intention to withdraw from its close
military collaboration with Nusra Front. It also reflects deep divisions
within the administration over Syria policy. Obama has leaned toward working
with Russia on a cease-fire as an alternative to reliance on the armed
opposition to put pressure on Bashar al-Assad, but senior officials in the
Pentagon, CIA and US State Department remain strongly committed to ramping
up military assistance to anti-Assad forces.
A central issue in the US-Russian cease-fire negotiations in February was
the fact that the opposition groups supported by the CIA operate in close
proximity to and full cooperation with units of al-Nusra Front. In January
2015, the former US ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, admitted that the
Obama administration had long "looked the other way while the Nusra Front
and armed groups on the ground, some of which are getting help from us, have
coordinated in military operations against the regime." That coordination
has been formalized in a joint command for Aleppo Province, where Nusra
Front controls the administration of the opposition zone in Aleppo city.
Lavrov argued in the February negotiations that opposition forces operating
in close proximity to al-Nusra Front and its closest allies could not claim
immunity from attacks on Nusra Front. The "cessation of hostilities"
excludes Nusra Front forces, which are considered legitimate targets. UN
Security Council Resolution 2254, passed in December 2015, also calls on all
states to "eradicate" the "safe havens" that Nusra Front had established in
Syria.
But as The Washington Post reported on February 19, Kerry was rejecting
Lavrov's demand in negotiations on a cease-fire, insisting that Russians
should halt airstrikes on Nusra Front-controlled areas to avoid hitting
"moderate" opposition forces. Kerry finally agreed to the Russian demand
that the US-supported opposition units separate themselves physically from
the Nusra Front forces in order to avoid being hit in Russian strikes
against the terrorist organization, as Lavrov revealed in April. Part of the
plan for the February cease-fire was a commonly agreed map that would
delineate the zones to be occupied by opposition forces, which would be
clearly separated from the Nusra zones.
In discussing the cease-fire agreement on February 22, Kerry's spokesman at
the State Department, Mark C. Toner, clearly implied that the United States
and Russia were in agreement on the aim of separating the non-jihadist
forces from the Nusra Front and its close allies. He told reporters, "If you
hang out with the wrong folks, then you make that decision.... You choose
who you hang out with, and that sends a signal."
The Russians agreed to refrain from air attacks on Nusra Front forces until
the expected physical separation could be carried out. That concession
explains the relative paucity of Russian air attacks against the Nusra Front
zones in Aleppo and Idlib provinces from late February through March.
In return the Obama administration apparently agreed to prevail on its
allies to halt the flow of arms and troops to Nusra Front and other
opposition units in northern Syria, as long as the Russians and Assad abided
by the cease-fire. The halt continued through late March, according to
Iranian sources described as "high officials present in Syria." The
"cessation of hostilities" resulting from the US-Russian understanding
dramatically reduced deaths and destruction in Syria from late February
until mid-April.
But Lavrov complained publicly in mid-April that, despite repeated promises
by the United States to get the moderates to move away from Nusra Front
forces, "those promises are still not fulfilled. A week later, Kerry
confirmed Lavrov's accusation, telling The New York Times editorial board
that "it was harder to separate them than we thought."
Whether or not Kerry actually believed the separation was possible, the
process of separation was bound to be resisted by the armed opposition in
the absence of a threat to cut off US assistance. So some senior
administration officials -- including Kerry himself -- who had been pushing
Obama to be more aggressive in supporting the CIA client opposition groups,
had reason to resist the very separation that the US had promised to carry
out.
By April 22, the cease-fire began to disintegrate in and around Aleppo, and
opponents of the policy of diplomatic cooperation with Russia on Syria
launched a counterattack. Unidentified Obama administration officials told
Reuters that Russia had "renewed airstrikes against moderate opposition
groups" in Aleppo and that "a failure to respond" could "encourage Russia to
escalate challenges to U.S. and allied militaries through more provocative
Russian air and naval maneuvers."
The State Department soon acknowledged indirectly that it had abandoned its
previous commitment to push for physical separation. Col. Steve Warren, the
spokesman for the US "Operation Inherent Resolve" against ISIS (also known
as Daesh) in Iraq and Syria, had let slip the admission that "It's primarily
al-Nusra who hold Aleppo" during an April 20 briefing. But on April 27,
State Department spokesman Mark Toner contradicted that admission. He
referred to a "misperception" that "some of these opposition groups were in
league with Nusra and other terrorist organizations" and that "Aleppo is
under Nusra control."
Toner then quoted from a letter from US Special Envoy for Syria Michael
Ratney to opposition groups that codified the new administration stance on
the separation issue. "The Syrian people and revolutionary factions," it
said, must "distance themselves from the terrorists to the maximum extent
possible." The qualifying phrase "to the maximum extent possible" clearly
signaled that the United States was no longer insisting on "distancing" by
the armed opposition as a requirement.
On May 3, the day after the last phone conversation between Kerry and Lavrov
on Aleppo and just before the undefined new understanding applying the truce
temporarily in Aleppo was to take effect, at the regular daily State
Department press briefing, a journalist asked State Department spokesman
John Kirby about the negotiations with Russia on "delineating terrorists
from rebels." Kirby said, "We have seen examples where groups like al-Nusra
and Daesh intermingle themselves with others so as to help protect
themselves from attacks" -- but said nothing about the necessity for the
US-supported groups to separate themselves geographically.
Then the same journalist asked whether the US supported the position taken
in a statement signed by 37 opposition groups that explicitly refused to
recognize any distinction between Nusra Front and other groups. "We the
armed groups across Syria will form a single bloc," it declared.
Only then did Kirby peel back slightly the veil of diplomatic secrecy over
the US position. "We want all parties -- everybody -- to abide by the
cessation of hostilities," he said, "and when we are able to come to an
agreement on some additional modalities, to agree to that." Although the
syntax was difficult to follow, Kirby was acknowledging that the US was
still dangling the possibility of separating the US-supported armed groups
from Nusra Front before the Russians -- but only as part of a larger
agreement that would presumably involve Russia's commitment to forcing the
Assad government to agree that Assad would step down.
On May 4, Kirby was asked if the United States now expected Russia to stop
its attacks on targets in Aleppo, in light of the lack of action on
separating the "moderates" from the legitimate targets presented by Nusra
Front. Kirby said only that the US demand was for "complete de-escalation"
in Aleppo, without any conditions.
The State Department has thus abandoned the commitment it had made in the
original cease-fire agreement to ensure that its opposition clients would
separate themselves from Nusra Front, while keeping the possibility on the
table as a bargaining chip to get the Russians to increase their pressure on
Assad.
In the May 9 joint statement, Russia agreed to work with the Syrian
government to "minimize aviation operation over areas that are predominantly
inhabited by civilians or parties to the cessation," but it said nothing
about Russian airstrikes on the Nusra Front zone. And the United States
committed to "intensifying its support and assistance to regional allies to
help them prevent the flow of fighters, weapons, or financial support to
terrorist organizations across their borders." But the statement made only
the most indirect allusion to the contentious "proximity" issue in referring
to working on "a shared understanding" of the territory controlled by Nusra
Front.
Copyright, Truthout. May not be reprinted without permission.
GARETH PORTER
Gareth Porter (@GarethPorter) is an independent investigative journalist and
historian writing on US national security policy. His latest book,
Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare, was
published in February 2014.
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Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
Obama Broke Pledge to Demand Syrian Opposition's Separation From Nusra Front
Wednesday, 11 May 2016 00:00 By Gareth Porter, Truthout | Report
. font size Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. Error! Hyperlink
reference not valid.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. Error! Hyperlink
reference not valid.
. President Barack Obama, with Secretary of State John Kerry, holds a
news conference after a meeting of the National Security Council regarding
ISIS and Syria, at the State Department in Washington, DC, February 25,
2016. (Photo: Zach Gibson / The New York Times)
. The gradual erosion of the cease-fire in Syria over the past month
is the result of multiple factors shaping the conflict, but one of the
underlying reasons is the Obama administration's failure to carry out its
commitment to Russia to get US-supported opposition groups to separate
themselves physically from the Nusra Front -- the al-Qaeda organization in
Syria.
US Secretary of State John Kerry made the promise to separate the groups as
part of the understandings underlying the February 22 cease-fire, but never
delivered on it. And by the time Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov finished negotiating on how to make the "cessation of hostilities"
more effective in the Syrian city of Aleppo on May 2, the Obama
administration had effectively withdrawn that concession completely.
The joint US-Russian statement on Monday reaffirming the original February
agreement makes no mention of the proximity issue, despite its centrality to
the negotiations between the two powers on how to reduce the violence in
Syria.
The administration's vacillation on the issue reflects the reality that the
US-supported armed opposition has no intention to withdraw from its close
military collaboration with Nusra Front. It also reflects deep divisions
within the administration over Syria policy. Obama has leaned toward working
with Russia on a cease-fire as an alternative to reliance on the armed
opposition to put pressure on Bashar al-Assad, but senior officials in the
Pentagon, CIA and US State Department remain strongly committed to ramping
up military assistance to anti-Assad forces.
A central issue in the US-Russian cease-fire negotiations in February was
the fact that the opposition groups supported by the CIA operate in close
proximity to and full cooperation with units of al-Nusra Front. In January
2015, the former US ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, admitted that the
Obama administration had long "looked the other way while the Nusra Front
and armed groups on the ground, some of which are getting help from us, have
coordinated in military operations against the regime." That coordination
has been formalized in a joint command for Aleppo Province, where Nusra
Front controls the administration of the opposition zone in Aleppo city.
Lavrov argued in the February negotiations that opposition forces operating
in close proximity to al-Nusra Front and its closest allies could not claim
immunity from attacks on Nusra Front. The "cessation of hostilities"
excludes Nusra Front forces, which are considered legitimate targets. UN
Security Council Resolution 2254, passed in December 2015, also calls on all
states to "eradicate" the "safe havens" that Nusra Front had established in
Syria.
But as The Washington Post reported on February 19, Kerry was rejecting
Lavrov's demand in negotiations on a cease-fire, insisting that Russians
should halt airstrikes on Nusra Front-controlled areas to avoid hitting
"moderate" opposition forces. Kerry finally agreed to the Russian demand
that the US-supported opposition units separate themselves physically from
the Nusra Front forces in order to avoid being hit in Russian strikes
against the terrorist organization, as Lavrov revealed in April. Part of the
plan for the February cease-fire was a commonly agreed map that would
delineate the zones to be occupied by opposition forces, which would be
clearly separated from the Nusra zones.
In discussing the cease-fire agreement on February 22, Kerry's spokesman at
the State Department, Mark C. Toner, clearly implied that the United States
and Russia were in agreement on the aim of separating the non-jihadist
forces from the Nusra Front and its close allies. He told reporters, "If you
hang out with the wrong folks, then you make that decision.... You choose
who you hang out with, and that sends a signal."
The Russians agreed to refrain from air attacks on Nusra Front forces until
the expected physical separation could be carried out. That concession
explains the relative paucity of Russian air attacks against the Nusra Front
zones in Aleppo and Idlib provinces from late February through March.
In return the Obama administration apparently agreed to prevail on its
allies to halt the flow of arms and troops to Nusra Front and other
opposition units in northern Syria, as long as the Russians and Assad abided
by the cease-fire. The halt continued through late March, according to
Iranian sources described as "high officials present in Syria." The
"cessation of hostilities" resulting from the US-Russian understanding
dramatically reduced deaths and destruction in Syria from late February
until mid-April.
But Lavrov complained publicly in mid-April that, despite repeated promises
by the United States to get the moderates to move away from Nusra Front
forces, "those promises are still not fulfilled. A week later, Kerry
confirmed Lavrov's accusation, telling The New York Times editorial board
that "it was harder to separate them than we thought."
Whether or not Kerry actually believed the separation was possible, the
process of separation was bound to be resisted by the armed opposition in
the absence of a threat to cut off US assistance. So some senior
administration officials -- including Kerry himself -- who had been pushing
Obama to be more aggressive in supporting the CIA client opposition groups,
had reason to resist the very separation that the US had promised to carry
out.
By April 22, the cease-fire began to disintegrate in and around Aleppo, and
opponents of the policy of diplomatic cooperation with Russia on Syria
launched a counterattack. Unidentified Obama administration officials told
Reuters that Russia had "renewed airstrikes against moderate opposition
groups" in Aleppo and that "a failure to respond" could "encourage Russia to
escalate challenges to U.S. and allied militaries through more provocative
Russian air and naval maneuvers."
The State Department soon acknowledged indirectly that it had abandoned its
previous commitment to push for physical separation. Col. Steve Warren, the
spokesman for the US "Operation Inherent Resolve" against ISIS (also known
as Daesh) in Iraq and Syria, had let slip the admission that "It's primarily
al-Nusra who hold Aleppo" during an April 20 briefing. But on April 27,
State Department spokesman Mark Toner contradicted that admission. He
referred to a "misperception" that "some of these opposition groups were in
league with Nusra and other terrorist organizations" and that "Aleppo is
under Nusra control."
Toner then quoted from a letter from US Special Envoy for Syria Michael
Ratney to opposition groups that codified the new administration stance on
the separation issue. "The Syrian people and revolutionary factions," it
said, must "distance themselves from the terrorists to the maximum extent
possible." The qualifying phrase "to the maximum extent possible" clearly
signaled that the United States was no longer insisting on "distancing" by
the armed opposition as a requirement.
On May 3, the day after the last phone conversation between Kerry and Lavrov
on Aleppo and just before the undefined new understanding applying the truce
temporarily in Aleppo was to take effect, at the regular daily State
Department press briefing, a journalist asked State Department spokesman
John Kirby about the negotiations with Russia on "delineating terrorists
from rebels." Kirby said, "We have seen examples where groups like al-Nusra
and Daesh intermingle themselves with others so as to help protect
themselves from attacks" -- but said nothing about the necessity for the
US-supported groups to separate themselves geographically.
Then the same journalist asked whether the US supported the position taken
in a statement signed by 37 opposition groups that explicitly refused to
recognize any distinction between Nusra Front and other groups. "We the
armed groups across Syria will form a single bloc," it declared.
Only then did Kirby peel back slightly the veil of diplomatic secrecy over
the US position. "We want all parties -- everybody -- to abide by the
cessation of hostilities," he said, "and when we are able to come to an
agreement on some additional modalities, to agree to that." Although the
syntax was difficult to follow, Kirby was acknowledging that the US was
still dangling the possibility of separating the US-supported armed groups
from Nusra Front before the Russians -- but only as part of a larger
agreement that would presumably involve Russia's commitment to forcing the
Assad government to agree that Assad would step down.
On May 4, Kirby was asked if the United States now expected Russia to stop
its attacks on targets in Aleppo, in light of the lack of action on
separating the "moderates" from the legitimate targets presented by Nusra
Front. Kirby said only that the US demand was for "complete de-escalation"
in Aleppo, without any conditions.
The State Department has thus abandoned the commitment it had made in the
original cease-fire agreement to ensure that its opposition clients would
separate themselves from Nusra Front, while keeping the possibility on the
table as a bargaining chip to get the Russians to increase their pressure on
Assad.
In the May 9 joint statement, Russia agreed to work with the Syrian
government to "minimize aviation operation over areas that are predominantly
inhabited by civilians or parties to the cessation," but it said nothing
about Russian airstrikes on the Nusra Front zone. And the United States
committed to "intensifying its support and assistance to regional allies to
help them prevent the flow of fighters, weapons, or financial support to
terrorist organizations across their borders." But the statement made only
the most indirect allusion to the contentious "proximity" issue in referring
to working on "a shared understanding" of the territory controlled by Nusra
Front.
Copyright, Truthout. May not be reprinted without permission.
Gareth Porter
Gareth Porter (@GarethPorter) is an independent investigative journalist and
historian writing on US national security policy. His latest book,
Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare, was
published in February 2014.
Related Stories
Syria and Iraq: IS Casts a Chilling Shadow
By Richard Sale, Truthout | News AnalysisSyria's White Helmets - the Most
Dangerous Job In the World
By Anna Lekas Miller, Waging Nonviolence | ReportSyrian War Set to Explode
Again
By Shamus Cooke, Countercurrents | News Analysis
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