Mondoweiss
Marc Lynch warns against the U.S. escalation in Syria
Middle East
(((James North))) on September 2, 2016 41 Comments
Marc Lynch's new book, The New Arab Wars
The drumbeat to increase American involvement in the war in Syria continues,
spurred on by that painful photograph of 5-year-old Omran Daqneesh covered with
blood and dirt. Steve Coll, a normally cautious New Yorker reporter, is the
latest to join in. He writes,
“[U.S.] aid has helped to keep the rebels in the field but it has not been
enough to defeat Assad, or to deter his forces from employing unconscionable
tactics, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that this caution has enabled
the apparent war crimes of Assad and his allies.”
Marc Lynch is one of the few experts who has over time been proven right about
Syria, and his informed warnings must be taken seriously. Lynch, a professor of
political science at George Washington University who also tweets as
@abuaardvark, recently published The New Arab Wars, one of the best of the
recent books about the Mideast. Lynch notes, in sorrow rather than pride, that
he “was among the minority of analysts who vocally opposed the militarization
of the [Syrian opposition], because I feared precisely the disaster which would
soon unfold.”
Marc Lynch
Lynch is certainly no apologist for the Assad regime. He reminds us that the
original 2011 uprising in Syria was nonviolent, and “involved almost
unbelievably heroic popular participation in the face of extreme state
violence.” But he is also realistic. He explains that, in contrast to Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya, the Syrian regime did not become totally isolated:
“Asad retained considerable support among wide sectors of the Syrian citizenry,
including not only minority communities but also much of the urban Sunni elites
who had benefitted from his rule and feared change.”
Once the Syrian civil war got started, you needed a flow chart to depict the
extraordinary complexity of the violence. Here is a rough census of the
protagonists: the Assad regime; the Syrian nonviolent opposition; the Syrian
armed resistance, divided among jihadist forces, former Syrian military, ISIS;
and Hezbollah militias, who crossed over from Lebanon. The outside actors
include: the U.S.; Russia; Turkey; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Qatar — all of them
supplying arms to one faction or another. By contrast, the warring Balkans in
the years leading up to World War 1 were a model of simplicity. Lynch has
followed the story closely, and he notes that “the complexities of this debate,
mostly in Arabic, were often lost on a Western discourse framed around a
simpler story of a united Syrian people against a reviled dictator.”
What’s more, Lynch reminds us that America is already stoking the many-sided
conflict with weapons: “The United States remained publicly cautious about
arming the insurgents, but rapidly developed a covert program to arm and
support vetted rebel groups.” He explains that escalating the violence,
especially in a conflict with so many armed actors, can never bring peace, but
only promote what he calls “a dynamic stalemate.” He elaborates: “As rebel
groups began to take up arms in response to the Asad regime’s brutality, they
found ample sources of funds and weapons from abroad to support their
insurgency. When they began to demonstrate too much success, Asad’s backers
ramped up their own support to the regime.”
Lynch gives President Obama credit for digging in his heels against the more
extreme interventionists, some of whom are in his own administration. That
could change on January 20, 2017, if the more hawkish Hillary Clinton takes
office.
So far, most U.S. interventionists have not called for American troops in large
numbers. They insist, against the evidence of the past 5 years, Lynch states,
that ratcheting up pressure with no-fly zones and other aggressive measures
will force Assad and his patrons to back down. Lynch is (excessively) polite
with the hawks, but he does note wryly, “It baffles me that the lesson most of
Washington learned from the tribulations of the Libya intervention was that
Obama should also have intervened in Syria.”
Among ordinary Americans, that awful photograph of 5-year-old Omran Daqneesh
understandably prompted calls for action (although the failure of the West,
including the United States, to do more for Syrian refugees is a big part of
the problem). For those who ask, What should we do? Lynch’s answer is, First do
no harm. American policymakers are supposed to be better informed. They should
understand that promoting more violence, even with ostensibly humanitarian
intentions, can make a bad situation even worse. After endless wars across the
Mideast for what feels like an eternity, the foreign policy establishment
should know better. But for many of them, auditioning for a ranking job in the
Hillary Clinton administration must be more important.
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Marc Lynch warns against the U.S. escalation in Syria
Middle East
(((James North))) on September 2, 2016 41 Comments
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Marc Lynch's new book, The New Arab Wars
The drumbeat to increase American involvement in the war in Syria continues,
spurred on by that painful photograph of 5-year-old Omran Daqneesh covered with
blood and dirt. Steve Coll, a normally cautious New Yorker reporter, is the
latest to join in. He writes,
“[U.S.] aid has helped to keep the rebels in the field but it has not been
enough to defeat Assad, or to deter his forces from employing unconscionable
tactics, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that this caution has enabled
the apparent war crimes of Assad and his allies.”
Marc Lynch is one of the few experts who has over time been proven right about
Syria, and his informed warnings must be taken seriously. Lynch, a professor of
political science at George Washington University who also tweets as
@abuaardvark, recently published The New Arab Wars, one of the best of the
recent books about the Mideast. Lynch notes, in sorrow rather than pride, that
he “was among the minority of analysts who vocally opposed the militarization
of the [Syrian opposition], because I feared precisely the disaster which would
soon unfold.”
Marc Lynch
Lynch is certainly no apologist for the Assad regime. He reminds us that the
original 2011 uprising in Syria was nonviolent, and “involved almost
unbelievably heroic popular participation in the face of extreme state
violence.” But he is also realistic. He explains that, in contrast to Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya, the Syrian regime did not become totally isolated:
“Asad retained considerable support among wide sectors of the Syrian citizenry,
including not only minority communities but also much of the urban Sunni elites
who had benefitted from his rule and feared change.”
Once the Syrian civil war got started, you needed a flow chart to depict the
extraordinary complexity of the violence. Here is a rough census of the
protagonists: the Assad regime; the Syrian nonviolent opposition; the Syrian
armed resistance, divided among jihadist forces, former Syrian military, ISIS;
and Hezbollah militias, who crossed over from Lebanon. The outside actors
include: the U.S.; Russia; Turkey; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Qatar — all of them
supplying arms to one faction or another. By contrast, the warring Balkans in
the years leading up to World War 1 were a model of simplicity. Lynch has
followed the story closely, and he notes that “the complexities of this debate,
mostly in Arabic, were often lost on a Western discourse framed around a
simpler story of a united Syrian people against a reviled dictator.”
What’s more, Lynch reminds us that America is already stoking the many-sided
conflict with weapons: “The United States remained publicly cautious about
arming the insurgents, but rapidly developed a covert program to arm and
support vetted rebel groups.” He explains that escalating the violence,
especially in a conflict with so many armed actors, can never bring peace, but
only promote what he calls “a dynamic stalemate.” He elaborates: “As rebel
groups began to take up arms in response to the Asad regime’s brutality, they
found ample sources of funds and weapons from abroad to support their
insurgency. When they began to demonstrate too much success, Asad’s backers
ramped up their own support to the regime.”
Lynch gives President Obama credit for digging in his heels against the more
extreme interventionists, some of whom are in his own administration. That
could change on January 20, 2017, if the more hawkish Hillary Clinton takes
office.
So far, most U.S. interventionists have not called for American troops in large
numbers. They insist, against the evidence of the past 5 years, Lynch states,
that ratcheting up pressure with no-fly zones and other aggressive measures
will force Assad and his patrons to back down. Lynch is (excessively) polite
with the hawks, but he does note wryly, “It baffles me that the lesson most of
Washington learned from the tribulations of the Libya intervention was that
Obama should also have intervened in Syria.”
Among ordinary Americans, that awful photograph of 5-year-old Omran Daqneesh
understandably prompted calls for action (although the failure of the West,
including the United States, to do more for Syrian refugees is a big part of
the problem). For those who ask, What should we do? Lynch’s answer is, First do
no harm. American policymakers are supposed to be better informed. They should
understand that promoting more violence, even with ostensibly humanitarian
intentions, can make a bad situation even worse. After endless wars across the
Mideast for what feels like an eternity, the foreign policy establishment
should know better. But for many of them, auditioning for a ranking job in the
Hillary Clinton administration must be more important.
