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5 Ways Iraq and Syria Continue to Slide Toward Chaos
By Peter Van Buren [1] / Tom Dispatch [2]
May 15, 2016
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This piece originally appeared on TomDispatch [3].
On February 15, 2003, an almost unimaginable 13-plus years ago, I took part
in a court-banned antiwar march in New York City. The police, it turned
out, couldnt stop us (though they could, in various ways, pen us in).
Depending on whether you believed the police or the demonstration's
organizers, I was one of either 100,000 or 400,000 people who clogged the
streets of the Big Apple that day, one of literally millions of protesters
(no one knows just how many) who turned out across the planet in an
unprecedented effort to stop George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and the rest of
that crew from launching their deeply desired invasion of Iraq.
I wrote about the experience the next day and, looking back, its clear that
I was, in a sense, quite realistic about what the largest prewar
demonstrations in history could (or couldnt) do to stop that invasion from
happening. I was a good deal less realistic about what the future might
hold (though I was in good company on that). Heres a little of what I
wrote [4] the next day:
Excuse my enthusiasm -- but it must have felt similarly in Rome, London,
Sydney, Berlin, Madrid, and on and on. As with our crowd, the largest I've
ever experienced and I was at two marches on the Pentagon in the 1960s,
every reporter or commentator I've read has noted the unexpected range of
people by age, race, occupation, and political conviction who turned out
globally.
I'm not a total fool. I know -- as I've long been writing in these
dispatches -- that this administration is hell-bent for a war. The build-up
in the Gulf during these days of demonstrations has been unceasing. I still
expect that war to come, and soon. Nonetheless, I find myself amazed by the
variegated mass of humanity that turned out yesterday. It felt wonderful. A
mass truly, but each part of it, each individually made sign and human
gesture of it, spoke to its deeply spontaneous nature. That is the statement
of the moment. The world has actually spoken and largely in words of its
own. It has issued a warning to our leaders, which, given the history of
the people and the countless demonstrations of the people's many
(sometimes frightening) powers from 1776 on, is to be ignored at the
administration's peril.
Imagine, now, that you could transport yourself back 13-plus years and tell
that Tom Engelhardt and the rest of the protesters in those vast global
crowds not just that Iraq would be invaded, not just that it would be
disastrously garrisoned and occupied for eight years by the U.S. military
and the civilian authorities of the Bush administration, not just that out
of the invasion and occupation would come [5] the most brutal (and
successful) jihadist group imaginable to date, and not just that the U.S.
was, unbelievably enough, again in Iraq, fighting yet another war there, but
that, all this time later, the people were nowhere to be found. They had,
with [6] rare [7] exceptions [8], been MIA since not so long after that
invasion in the spring of 2003.
The world, it seems, instead of speaking truth to power again and again,
packed up its signs and went home, while fruitless [9], destructive [10]
American wars rolled on and on. Peter Van Buren, who that long ago February
was a diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, generally cleaving to the State
Department mantra of being policy neutral and opinion-free, would some six
years later be sent [11] to two forward operating bases in Iraq, and would
prove one of those exceptions to the rule. He returned from his Iraqi
experience and wrote a book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for
the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People [12], exposing the fraudulence of
the State Department's war effort, and hes never stopped speaking up since.
Today, he looks back on the strange repetitiveness of our never-ending Iraq
wars in which the same lessons are always there to be absorbed, but no one
in Washington ever seems to learn, while the people, who might have given
their government a lesson its officials couldnt ignore, slumber on.-Tom
Engelhardt
Poof! Its Forgotten
Five Ways the Newest Story in Iraq and Syria is... That There Is No New
Story
By Peter Van Buren [13]
One of the most popular apps these days is Snapchat. It allows the sender to
set a timer for any photo dispatched via the app, so that a few seconds
after the recipient opens the message, the photo is automatically deleted.
The evidence of what you did at that party last night is seen and then
disappears. POOF!
I hope you'll forgive me if I suggest that the Iraq-Syria War against the
Islamic State (ISIS) is being conveyed to us via Snapchat. Important things
happen, they appear in front of us, and then... POOF!... they're gone. No
one seems to remember them. Who cares that theyve happened at all, when
there's a new snap already arriving for your attention? As with most of what
flows through the real Snapchat, whats of some interest at first makes no
difference in the long run.
Just because we now have terrifyingly short memories does not, however, mean
that things did not happen. Despite the POOF! effect, events that genuinely
mattered when it comes to the region in which Washington has, since the
1980s, been embroiled in four wars, actually did occur last week, last
month, a war or two ago, or, in some cases, more than half a century in the
past. What follows are just some of the things we've forgotten that couldnt
matter more.
It's a Limited Mission -- POOF!
Perhaps General David Petraeuss all-time sharpest comment came in the
earliest days of Iraq War 2.0. "Tell me how this ends," he said [14],
referring to the Bush administrations invasion. At the time, he was already
worried that there was no endgame.
That question should be asked daily in Washington. It and the underlying
assumption that there must be a clear scope and duration to Americas wars
are too easily forgotten. It took eight long years until the last American
combat troops were withdrawn from Iraq. Though there were no ticker tape
parades or iconic photos of sailors smooching their gals in Times Square in
2011, the war was indeed finally over and Barack Obamas campaign promise
fulfilled...
Until, of course, it wasn't, and in 2014 the same president restarted [15]
the war, claiming that a genocide against the Yazidis, a group hitherto
unknown to most of us and since largely forgotten, was in process. Air
strikes were authorized to support a limited [16] rescue mission. Then,
more -- limited -- American military power was needed to stop the Islamic
State from conquering Iraq. Then more air strikes, along with limited
numbers of military advisers and trainers, were sure to wrap things up, and
somehow, by May 2016 [17], the U.S. has 5,400 military personnel, including
Special Operations forces, on the ground across Iraq and Syria, with
expectations that more [18] would soon be needed, even as a massive regional
air campaign drags on. That's how Washingtons wars seem to go these days,
with no real debate, no Congressional declaration, just, if we're lucky, a
news item announcing whats happened.
Starting wars under murky circumstances and then watching limited
commitments expand exponentially is by now so ingrained in America's global
strategy that its barely noticed. Recall, for instance, those weapons of
mass destruction [19] that justified George W. Bush's initial invasion of
Iraq, the one that turned into eight years of occupation and
nation-building? Or to step a couple of no-less-forgettable years further
into the past, bring to mind the 2001 U.S. mission that was to quickly
defeat the ragged Taliban and kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. That's
now heading into its 16th year as the situation there only continues to
disintegrate.
For those who prefer an even more forgotten view of history, America's war
in Vietnam kicked into high gear thanks to then-President Lyndon Johnsons
false claim about an attack on American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin. The
early stages of that war followed a path somewhat similar to the one on
which we now seem to be staggering along in Iraq War 3.0 -- from a limited
number of advisers to the full deployment of almost all the available tools
of war.
Or for those who like to look ahead, the U.S. has just put troops back on
the ground in Yemen [20], part of what the Pentagon is describing as
limited support for the U.S.-backed war the Saudis and the United Arab
Emirates launched in that country.
The new story is also the old story: just as you can't be a little pregnant,
the mission never really turns out to be limited, and if Washington
doesnt know where the exit is, its going to be trapped yet again inside
its own war, spinning in unpredictable and disturbing directions.
No Boots on the Ground -- POOF!
Having steadfastly maintained since the beginning of Iraq War 3.0 that it
would never put "American boots on the ground," the Obama administration has
deepened its military campaign against the Islamic State by increasing the
number of Special Operations forces in Syria from 50 to 300 [21]. The
administration also recently authorized the use of Apache attack
helicopters, long stationed in Iraq to protect U.S. troops, as offensive
weapons.
American advisers are increasingly involved in actual fighting in Iraq, even
as the U.S. deployed B-52 bombers [22] to an air base in Qatar before
promptly sending them into combat [23] over Iraq and Syria. Another group of
Marines was dispatched to help defend [24] the American Embassy in Baghdad
after the Green Zone, in the heart of that city, was recently breached by
masses of protesters. Of all those moves, at least some have to qualify as
boots on the ground.
The word play involved in maintaining the official no-boots fiction has been
a high-wire act. Following the loss of an American in Iraqi Kurdistan
recently, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter labeled [25] it a combat death.
White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest then tried to explain how an
American who was not on a combat mission could be killed in combat. He was
killed, and he was killed in combat. But that was not part of his mission,
Earnest told [26] reporters.
Much more quietly, the U.S. surged -- surge being the replacement word for
the Vietnam-era escalate -- the number of private contractors working in
Iraq; their ranks have grown eight-fold [27] over the past year, to the
point where there are an estimated 2,000 of them working directly for the
Department of Defense and 5,800 working for the Department of State inside
Iraq. And don't be too sanguine about those State Department contractors.
While some of them are undoubtedly cleaning diplomatic toilets and preparing
elegant receptions, many are working [28] as military trainers, paramilitary
police advisers, and force protection personnel. Even some aircraft
maintenance crews and CIA paramilitaries fall [29] under the State
Department's organizational chart.
The new story in Iraq and Syria when it comes to boots on the ground is the
old story: air power alone has never won wars, advisers and trainers never
turn out to be just that, and for every soldier in the fight you need five
[30] or more support people behind him.
We're Winning -- POOF!
We've been winning in Iraq for some time now -- a quarter-century of
successes, from 1991's triumphant Operation Desert Storm to 2003's soaring
Mission Accomplished moment to just about right now [31] in the upbeat third
iteration of Americas Iraq wars. But in each case, in a Snapchat version of
victory, success has never seemed to catch on.
At the end of April, for instance, Army Colonel Steve Warren, a U.S.
military spokesperson, hailed the way American air power had set fire to
$500 million of ISISs money, actual cash that its militants had apparently
forgotten to disperse or hide in some reasonable place. He was similarly
positive about other recent gains, including the taking of the Iraqi city of
Hit, which, he swore [32], was a linchpin for ISIL. In this, he echoed the
language used when ISIS-occupied Ramadi (and Baiji and Sinjar and...) fell,
language undoubtedly no less useful when the next town is liberated. In the
same fashion, USA Today quoted [32] an anonymous U.S. official as saying
that American actions had cut ISIS's oil revenues by an estimated 50%,
forcing them to ration fuel in some areas, while cutting pay to its fighters
and support staff.
Only a month ago, National Security Adviser Susan Rice let us know [33]
that, day by day, mile by mile, strike by strike, we are making substantial
progress. Every few days, were taking out another key ISIL leader,
hampering ISILs ability to plan attacks or launch new offensives. She even
cited a poll indicating that nearly 80% of young Muslims across the Middle
East are strongly opposed to that group and its caliphate.
In the early spring, Brett McGurk, U.S. special envoy to the global
coalition to counter the Islamic State, took to Twitter to assure [34]
everyone that "terrorists are now trapped and desperate on Mosul fronts."
Speaking at a security forum [35] I attended, retired general Chuck Jacoby,
the last multinational force commander for Iraq 2.0, described another sign
of progress, insisting that Iraq today is a "maturing state." On the same
panel, Douglas Ollivant, a member of former Iraq commander General David
Petraeus's "brain trust of warrior-intellectuals," talked about "streams of
hope" in Iraq.
Above all, however, there is one sign of success often invoked in relation
to the war in Iraq and Syria: the body count [36], an infamous supposed
measure of success in the Vietnam War. Washington spokespeople regularly
offer stunning figures on the deaths of ISIS members, claiming that 10,000
to 25,000 Islamic State fighters have been wiped out via air strikes. The
CIA has estimated that, in 2014, the Islamic State had only perhaps 20,000
to 30,000 fighters under arms. If such victory statistics are accurate,
somewhere between a third and all of them should now be gone.
Other U.S. intelligence reports, clearly working off a different set of
data, suggest that there once were more than 30,000 [37] foreign fighters in
the Islamic States ranks. Now, the Pentagon tells us, the flow of new
foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria has been staunched, dropping over the
past year from roughly 2,000 to 200 [37] a month, further incontrovertible
proof of the Islamic States declining stature. One anonymous American
official typically insisted [38]: Were actually a little bit ahead of
where we wanted to be.
Yet despite success after American success, ISIS evidently isn't broke, or
running out of fighters, or too desperate to stay in the fray, and despite
all the upbeat news there are few signs of hope in the Iraqi body politic or
its military.
The new story is again a very old story: when you have to repeatedly explain
how much you're winning, youre likely not winning much of anything at all.
It's Up to the Iraqis -- POOF!
From the early days of Iraq War 2.0, one key to success for Washington has
been assigning the Iraqis a to-do list based on America's foreign policy
goals. They were to hold decisive elections, write a unifying Constitution,
take charge of their future, share their oil with each other, share their
government with each other, and then defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq, and later, the
Islamic State.
As each item failed to get done properly, it became the Iraqis' fault that
Washington hadnt achieved its goals. A classic example was the surge of
2007, when the Bush administration sent in a significant number of
additional troops to whip the Iraqis into shape and just plain whip [39]
al-Qaeda, and so open up the space for Shiites and Sunnis to come together
in an American-sponsored state of national unity. The Iraqis, of course,
screwed up [40] the works with their sectarian politics and so lost the
stunning potential gains in freedom we had won them, leaving the Americans
heading for the exit.
In Iraq War 3.0, the Obama administration again began shuffling leaders in
Baghdad to suit its purposes, helping force aside [41] once-golden boy Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and pushing forward new golden boy Prime Minister
Haider al-Abadi to -- you guessed it -- unify Iraq. "Today, Iraqis took
another major step forward in uniting their country," National Security
Adviser Susan Rice said [42] as Abadi took office.
Of course, unity did not transpire, thanks to Abadi [43], not us. "It would
be disastrous," editorialized [44] the New York Times, "if Americans,
Iraqis, and their partners were to succeed in the military campaign against
the Islamic State only to have the politicians in Baghdad squander another
chance to build a better future." The Times added: "More than 13 years since
Saddam Husseins overthrow, theres less and less reason to be optimistic."
The latest Iraqi screw-up came on April 30th, when dissident Shia leader
Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters broke into the previously sacrosanct Green Zone
[45] established by the Americans in Iraq War 2.0 and stormed Iraq's
parliament. Sadr clearly remembers his history better than most Americans.
In 2004, he emboldened his militias, then fighting the U.S. military, by
reminding [46] them of how irregular forces had defeated the Americans in
Vietnam. This time, he was apparently diplomatic enough not to mention that
Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese 41 years ago on the day of the Green
Zone incursion.
Sadrs supporters crossed into the enclave to protest Prime Minister Abadi's
failure [47] to reform a disastrous government, rein in corruption (you can
buy command of an entire army division and plunder its budget indefinitely
for about $2 million [48]), and provide basic services like water and
electricity to Baghdadis. The tens of billions of dollars that U.S.
officials spent reconstructing Iraq during the American occupation of 2003
to 2011 were supposed to make such services effective, but did not.
And anything said about Iraqi governmental failures might be applied no less
accurately to the Iraqi army.
Despite the estimated $26 billion [49] the U.S. spent training and equipping
that military between 2003 and 2011, whole units broke, shed their uniforms,
ditched their American equipment, and fled when faced with relatively small
numbers of ISIS militants in June 2014, abandoning four northern cities
[50], including Mosul. This, of course, created the need for yet more
training, the ostensible role of many of the U.S. troops now in Iraq. Since
most of the new Iraqi units are still only almost ready to fight, however,
those American ground troops and generals [51] and Special Operations forces
and forward air controllers and planners and logistics personnel and close
air support pilots are still needed for the fight to come.
The inability of the U.S. to midwife a popularly supported government or a
confident citizens army, Washingtons twin critical failures of Iraq War
2.0, may once again ensure that its latest efforts implode. Few Iraqis are
left who imagine that the U.S. can be an honest broker in their country. A
recent State Department report found that one-third of Iraqis believe the
United States is actually supporting ISIS, while 40% are convinced that the
United States is trying to destabilize [52] Iraq for its own purposes.
The new story is again the old story: corrupt governments imposed by an
outside power fail. And in the Iraq case, every problem that can't be
remedied by aerial bombardment and Special Forces must be the Iraqis' fault.
Same Leadership, Same Results -- POOF!
With the last four presidents all having made war in Iraq, and little doubt
that the next president will dive in, keep another forgotten aspect of
Washingtons Iraq in mind: some of the same American leadership figures have
been in place under both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and they will
initially still be in place when Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump enters the
Oval Office.
Start with Brett McGurk, the current special presidential envoy for the
global coalition to counter ISIS. His résumé [53]is practically [53] a
Wikipedia page for Americas Iraq, 2003-2016: Deputy Secretary of State for
Iraq and Iran from August 2013 until his current appointment. Before that,
Senior Advisor in the State Department for Iraq, a special advisor to the
National Security Staff, Senior Advisor to Ambassadors to Iraq Ryan Crocker,
Christopher Hill, and James Jeffrey. McGurk participated in President
Obamas 2009 review of Iraq policy and the transition following the U.S.
military departure from Iraq. During the Bush administration, McGurk served
as Director for Iraq, then as Special Assistant to the President, and also
Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2008 McGurk was the lead
negotiator with the Iraqi Government on both a long-term Strategic Framework
Agreement and a Security Agreement to govern the presence of U.S. forces. He
was also one of the chief Washington-based architects of The Surge, having
earlier served as a legal advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority
from nearly the first shots of 2003.
A little lower down the chain of command is Lieutenant General Sean
MacFarland. He is now leading Sunni tribal coordination [18] to help
defeat ISIS, as well as serving [54] as commanding general of the Combined
Joint Task Force. As a colonel back in 2006, MacFarland similarly helped
organize [55] the surge's Anbar Sunni Awakening movement against al-Qaeda in
Iraq.
And on the ground level, you can be sure that some of the current colonels
were majors in Iraq War 2.0, and some of their subordinates put their boots
on the same ground theyre on now.
In other words, the new story is the old story: some of the same people have
been losing this war for Washington since 2003, with neither accountability
nor culpability in play.
What If They Gave a War and No One Remembered?
All those American memories lost to oblivion. Such forgetfulness only allows
our war makers to do yet more of the same things in Iraq and Syria, acts
that someone on the ground will be forced to remember forever, perhaps under
the shadow of a drone overhead.
Placing our service people in harms way, spending our money in prodigious
amounts, and laying the countrys credibility on the line once required at
least the pretext that some national interest was at stake. Not any more.
Anytime some group we dont like threatens a group we care not so much
about, the United States must act to save a proud people, stop a
humanitarian crisis, take down a brutal leader, put an end to genocide,
whatever will briefly engage the public and spin up some vague facsimile of
war fever.
But back to Snapchat. It turns out that while the app was carefully designed
to make whatever is transmitted quickly disappear, some clever folks have
since found ways to preserve the information. If only the same could be said
of our Snapchat wars. How soon we forget. Until the next time...
To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the
latest updates from TomDispatch.com here [56].
Peter Van Buren, a TomDispatch regular [57], blew the whistle on State
Department waste and mismanagement during the Iraqi reconstruction in We
Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the
Iraqi People [12]. A TomDispatch [58] regular, he writes about current
events at We Meant Well [59]. His latest book is Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story
of the #99Percent [60]. His next work will be a novel, Hooper's War [61].
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Source URL:
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Links:
[1] http://www.alternet.org/authors/peter-van-buren
[2] http://www.tomdispatch.com/
[3] http://www.tomdispatch.com
[4] http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/410/the_march_that_wasn%27t_to_be
[5] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story
[6] http://www.ivaw.org/about
[7]
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[8]
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he_young_in_a_world_that_will_never_truly_be_%22postwar%22/
[9]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175854/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_a_record_of_un
paralleled_failure/
[10]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176094/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_tomorrow%27s_n
ews_today/
[11]
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iraq
[12] http://www.amazon.com/dp/0805096817/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[13] http://www.tomdispatch.com/authors/petervanburen
[14]
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[15] http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/world/meast/iraq-rescue-mission/
[16] http://wemeantwell.com/blog/?s=yazidi
[17] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-us-policy-isis
[18]
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[23]
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[30]
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[35] http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/events/hindsight
[36]
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[37]
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[41]
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[43]
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[44]
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after-protesters-storm-green-zone
[46] http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/al-sadr-compares-iraq-to-vietnam-1.518555
[47]
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form-response-mass-protests
[48]
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/10/you-too-can-command-an-iraq
i-army-division-for-only-2-million/
[49]
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/iraq-army-security-force-billion
s
[50]
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tates
[51]
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an-isis-war-the-u-s-denies.html
[52] https://oig.state.gov/system/files/isp-i-16-10.pdf
[53] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/bureau/213058.htm
[54] http://www.hood.army.mil/leaders/bios/CG.pdf
[55] http://time.com/4301571/sean-macfarland-2016-time-100/
[56]
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&id=1e41682ade
[57]
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fight_the_islamic_state/
[58]
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_war_in_the_middle_east/
[59] http://www.wemeantwell.com/
[60] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1935462911/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[61] http://www.hooperswar.com/
[62] mailto:corrections@xxxxxxxxxxxx?Subject=Typo on 5 Ways Iraq and Syria
Continue to Slide Toward Chaos
[63] http://www.alternet.org/
[64] http://www.alternet.org/%2Bnew_src%2B
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Home > 5 Ways Iraq and Syria Continue to Slide Toward Chaos
5 Ways Iraq and Syria Continue to Slide Toward Chaos
By Peter Van Buren [1] / Tom Dispatch [2]
May 15, 2016
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This piece originally appeared on TomDispatch [3].
On February 15, 2003, an almost unimaginable 13-plus years ago, I took part
in a court-banned antiwar march in New York City. The police, it turned out,
couldnt stop us (though they could, in various ways, pen us in). Depending
on whether you believed the police or the demonstration's organizers, I was
one of either 100,000 or 400,000 people who clogged the streets of the Big
Apple that day, one of literally millions of protesters (no one knows just
how many) who turned out across the planet in an unprecedented effort to
stop George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and the rest of that crew from launching
their deeply desired invasion of Iraq.
I wrote about the experience the next day and, looking back, its clear that
I was, in a sense, quite realistic about what the largest prewar
demonstrations in history could (or couldnt) do to stop that invasion from
happening. I was a good deal less realistic about what the future might hold
(though I was in good company on that). Heres a little of what I wrote [4]
the next day:
Excuse my enthusiasm -- but it must have felt similarly in Rome, London,
Sydney, Berlin, Madrid, and on and on. As with our crowd, the largest I've
ever experienced and I was at two marches on the Pentagon in the 1960s,
every reporter or commentator I've read has noted the unexpected range of
people by age, race, occupation, and political conviction who turned out
globally.
I'm not a total fool. I know -- as I've long been writing in these
dispatches -- that this administration is hell-bent for a war. The build-up
in the Gulf during these days of demonstrations has been unceasing. I still
expect that war to come, and soon. Nonetheless, I find myself amazed by the
variegated mass of humanity that turned out yesterday. It felt wonderful. A
mass truly, but each part of it, each individually made sign and human
gesture of it, spoke to its deeply spontaneous nature. That is the statement
of the moment. The world has actually spoken and largely in words of its
own. It has issued a warning to our leaders, which, given the history of
the people and the countless demonstrations of the people's many
(sometimes frightening) powers from 1776 on, is to be ignored at the
administration's peril.
Imagine, now, that you could transport yourself back 13-plus years and tell
that Tom Engelhardt and the rest of the protesters in those vast global
crowds not just that Iraq would be invaded, not just that it would be
disastrously garrisoned and occupied for eight years by the U.S. military
and the civilian authorities of the Bush administration, not just that out
of the invasion and occupation would come [5] the most brutal (and
successful) jihadist group imaginable to date, and not just that the U.S.
was, unbelievably enough, again in Iraq, fighting yet another war there, but
that, all this time later, the people were nowhere to be found. They had,
with [6] rare [7] exceptions [8], been MIA since not so long after that
invasion in the spring of 2003.
The world, it seems, instead of speaking truth to power again and again,
packed up its signs and went home, while fruitless [9], destructive [10]
American wars rolled on and on. Peter Van Buren, who that long ago February
was a diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, generally cleaving to the State
Department mantra of being policy neutral and opinion-free, would some six
years later be sent [11] to two forward operating bases in Iraq, and would
prove one of those exceptions to the rule. He returned from his Iraqi
experience and wrote a book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for
the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People [12], exposing the fraudulence of
the State Department's war effort, and hes never stopped speaking up since.
Today, he looks back on the strange repetitiveness of our never-ending Iraq
wars in which the same lessons are always there to be absorbed, but no one
in Washington ever seems to learn, while the people, who might have given
their government a lesson its officials couldnt ignore, slumber on.-Tom
Engelhardt
Poof! Its Forgotten
Five Ways the Newest Story in Iraq and Syria is... That There Is No New
Story
By Peter Van Buren [13]
One of the most popular apps these days is Snapchat. It allows the sender to
set a timer for any photo dispatched via the app, so that a few seconds
after the recipient opens the message, the photo is automatically deleted.
The evidence of what you did at that party last night is seen and then
disappears. POOF!
I hope you'll forgive me if I suggest that the Iraq-Syria War against the
Islamic State (ISIS) is being conveyed to us via Snapchat. Important things
happen, they appear in front of us, and then... POOF!... they're gone. No
one seems to remember them. Who cares that theyve happened at all, when
there's a new snap already arriving for your attention? As with most of what
flows through the real Snapchat, whats of some interest at first makes no
difference in the long run.
Just because we now have terrifyingly short memories does not, however, mean
that things did not happen. Despite the POOF! effect, events that genuinely
mattered when it comes to the region in which Washington has, since the
1980s, been embroiled in four wars, actually did occur last week, last
month, a war or two ago, or, in some cases, more than half a century in the
past. What follows are just some of the things we've forgotten that couldnt
matter more.
It's a Limited Mission -- POOF!
Perhaps General David Petraeuss all-time sharpest comment came in the
earliest days of Iraq War 2.0. "Tell me how this ends," he said [14],
referring to the Bush administrations invasion. At the time, he was already
worried that there was no endgame.
That question should be asked daily in Washington. It and the underlying
assumption that there must be a clear scope and duration to Americas wars
are too easily forgotten. It took eight long years until the last American
combat troops were withdrawn from Iraq. Though there were no ticker tape
parades or iconic photos of sailors smooching their gals in Times Square in
2011, the war was indeed finally over and Barack Obamas campaign promise
fulfilled...
Until, of course, it wasn't, and in 2014 the same president restarted [15]
the war, claiming that a genocide against the Yazidis, a group hitherto
unknown to most of us and since largely forgotten, was in process. Air
strikes were authorized to support a limited [16] rescue mission. Then,
more -- limited -- American military power was needed to stop the Islamic
State from conquering Iraq. Then more air strikes, along with limited
numbers of military advisers and trainers, were sure to wrap things up, and
somehow, by May 2016 [17], the U.S. has 5,400 military personnel, including
Special Operations forces, on the ground across Iraq and Syria, with
expectations that more [18] would soon be needed, even as a massive regional
air campaign drags on. That's how Washingtons wars seem to go these days,
with no real debate, no Congressional declaration, just, if we're lucky, a
news item announcing whats happened.
Starting wars under murky circumstances and then watching limited
commitments expand exponentially is by now so ingrained in America's global
strategy that its barely noticed. Recall, for instance, those weapons of
mass destruction [19] that justified George W. Bush's initial invasion of
Iraq, the one that turned into eight years of occupation and
nation-building? Or to step a couple of no-less-forgettable years further
into the past, bring to mind the 2001 U.S. mission that was to quickly
defeat the ragged Taliban and kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. That's
now heading into its 16th year as the situation there only continues to
disintegrate.
For those who prefer an even more forgotten view of history, America's war
in Vietnam kicked into high gear thanks to then-President Lyndon Johnsons
false claim about an attack on American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin. The
early stages of that war followed a path somewhat similar to the one on
which we now seem to be staggering along in Iraq War 3.0 -- from a limited
number of advisers to the full deployment of almost all the available tools
of war.
Or for those who like to look ahead, the U.S. has just put troops back on
the ground in Yemen [20], part of what the Pentagon is describing as
limited support for the U.S.-backed war the Saudis and the United Arab
Emirates launched in that country.
The new story is also the old story: just as you can't be a little pregnant,
the mission never really turns out to be limited, and if Washington
doesnt know where the exit is, its going to be trapped yet again inside
its own war, spinning in unpredictable and disturbing directions.
No Boots on the Ground -- POOF!
Having steadfastly maintained since the beginning of Iraq War 3.0 that it
would never put "American boots on the ground," the Obama administration has
deepened its military campaign against the Islamic State by increasing the
number of Special Operations forces in Syria from 50 to 300 [21]. The
administration also recently authorized the use of Apache attack
helicopters, long stationed in Iraq to protect U.S. troops, as offensive
weapons.
American advisers are increasingly involved in actual fighting in Iraq, even
as the U.S. deployed B-52 bombers [22] to an air base in Qatar before
promptly sending them into combat [23] over Iraq and Syria. Another group of
Marines was dispatched to help defend [24] the American Embassy in Baghdad
after the Green Zone, in the heart of that city, was recently breached by
masses of protesters. Of all those moves, at least some have to qualify as
boots on the ground.
The word play involved in maintaining the official no-boots fiction has been
a high-wire act. Following the loss of an American in Iraqi Kurdistan
recently, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter labeled [25] it a combat death.
White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest then tried to explain how an
American who was not on a combat mission could be killed in combat. He was
killed, and he was killed in combat. But that was not part of his mission,
Earnest told [26] reporters.
Much more quietly, the U.S. surged -- surge being the replacement word for
the Vietnam-era escalate -- the number of private contractors working in
Iraq; their ranks have grown eight-fold [27] over the past year, to the
point where there are an estimated 2,000 of them working directly for the
Department of Defense and 5,800 working for the Department of State inside
Iraq. And don't be too sanguine about those State Department contractors.
While some of them are undoubtedly cleaning diplomatic toilets and preparing
elegant receptions, many are working [28] as military trainers, paramilitary
police advisers, and force protection personnel. Even some aircraft
maintenance crews and CIA paramilitaries fall [29] under the State
Department's organizational chart.
The new story in Iraq and Syria when it comes to boots on the ground is the
old story: air power alone has never won wars, advisers and trainers never
turn out to be just that, and for every soldier in the fight you need five
[30] or more support people behind him.
We're Winning -- POOF!
We've been winning in Iraq for some time now -- a quarter-century of
successes, from 1991's triumphant Operation Desert Storm to 2003's soaring
Mission Accomplished moment to just about right now [31] in the upbeat third
iteration of Americas Iraq wars. But in each case, in a Snapchat version of
victory, success has never seemed to catch on.
At the end of April, for instance, Army Colonel Steve Warren, a U.S.
military spokesperson, hailed the way American air power had set fire to
$500 million of ISISs money, actual cash that its militants had apparently
forgotten to disperse or hide in some reasonable place. He was similarly
positive about other recent gains, including the taking of the Iraqi city of
Hit, which, he swore [32], was a linchpin for ISIL. In this, he echoed the
language used when ISIS-occupied Ramadi (and Baiji and Sinjar and...) fell,
language undoubtedly no less useful when the next town is liberated. In the
same fashion, USA Today quoted [32] an anonymous U.S. official as saying
that American actions had cut ISIS's oil revenues by an estimated 50%,
forcing them to ration fuel in some areas, while cutting pay to its fighters
and support staff.
Only a month ago, National Security Adviser Susan Rice let us know [33]
that, day by day, mile by mile, strike by strike, we are making substantial
progress. Every few days, were taking out another key ISIL leader,
hampering ISILs ability to plan attacks or launch new offensives. She even
cited a poll indicating that nearly 80% of young Muslims across the Middle
East are strongly opposed to that group and its caliphate.
In the early spring, Brett McGurk, U.S. special envoy to the global
coalition to counter the Islamic State, took to Twitter to assure [34]
everyone that "terrorists are now trapped and desperate on Mosul fronts."
Speaking at a security forum [35] I attended, retired general Chuck Jacoby,
the last multinational force commander for Iraq 2.0, described another sign
of progress, insisting that Iraq today is a "maturing state." On the same
panel, Douglas Ollivant, a member of former Iraq commander General David
Petraeus's "brain trust of warrior-intellectuals," talked about "streams of
hope" in Iraq.
Above all, however, there is one sign of success often invoked in relation
to the war in Iraq and Syria: the body count [36], an infamous supposed
measure of success in the Vietnam War. Washington spokespeople regularly
offer stunning figures on the deaths of ISIS members, claiming that 10,000
to 25,000 Islamic State fighters have been wiped out via air strikes. The
CIA has estimated that, in 2014, the Islamic State had only perhaps 20,000
to 30,000 fighters under arms. If such victory statistics are accurate,
somewhere between a third and all of them should now be gone.
Other U.S. intelligence reports, clearly working off a different set of
data, suggest that there once were more than 30,000 [37] foreign fighters in
the Islamic States ranks. Now, the Pentagon tells us, the flow of new
foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria has been staunched, dropping over the
past year from roughly 2,000 to 200 [37] a month, further incontrovertible
proof of the Islamic States declining stature. One anonymous American
official typically insisted [38]: Were actually a little bit ahead of
where we wanted to be.
Yet despite success after American success, ISIS evidently isn't broke, or
running out of fighters, or too desperate to stay in the fray, and despite
all the upbeat news there are few signs of hope in the Iraqi body politic or
its military.
The new story is again a very old story: when you have to repeatedly explain
how much you're winning, youre likely not winning much of anything at all.
It's Up to the Iraqis -- POOF!
From the early days of Iraq War 2.0, one key to success for Washington has
been assigning the Iraqis a to-do list based on America's foreign policy
goals. They were to hold decisive elections, write a unifying Constitution,
take charge of their future, share their oil with each other, share their
government with each other, and then defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq, and later, the
Islamic State.
As each item failed to get done properly, it became the Iraqis' fault that
Washington hadnt achieved its goals. A classic example was the surge of
2007, when the Bush administration sent in a significant number of
additional troops to whip the Iraqis into shape and just plain whip [39]
al-Qaeda, and so open up the space for Shiites and Sunnis to come together
in an American-sponsored state of national unity. The Iraqis, of course,
screwed up [40] the works with their sectarian politics and so lost the
stunning potential gains in freedom we had won them, leaving the Americans
heading for the exit.
In Iraq War 3.0, the Obama administration again began shuffling leaders in
Baghdad to suit its purposes, helping force aside [41] once-golden boy Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and pushing forward new golden boy Prime Minister
Haider al-Abadi to -- you guessed it -- unify Iraq. "Today, Iraqis took
another major step forward in uniting their country," National Security
Adviser Susan Rice said [42] as Abadi took office.
Of course, unity did not transpire, thanks to Abadi [43], not us. "It would
be disastrous," editorialized [44] the New York Times, "if Americans,
Iraqis, and their partners were to succeed in the military campaign against
the Islamic State only to have the politicians in Baghdad squander another
chance to build a better future." The Times added: "More than 13 years since
Saddam Husseins overthrow, theres less and less reason to be optimistic."
The latest Iraqi screw-up came on April 30th, when dissident Shia leader
Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters broke into the previously sacrosanct Green Zone
[45] established by the Americans in Iraq War 2.0 and stormed Iraq's
parliament. Sadr clearly remembers his history better than most Americans.
In 2004, he emboldened his militias, then fighting the U.S. military, by
reminding [46] them of how irregular forces had defeated the Americans in
Vietnam. This time, he was apparently diplomatic enough not to mention that
Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese 41 years ago on the day of the Green
Zone incursion.
Sadrs supporters crossed into the enclave to protest Prime Minister Abadi's
failure [47] to reform a disastrous government, rein in corruption (you can
buy command of an entire army division and plunder its budget indefinitely
for about $2 million [48]), and provide basic services like water and
electricity to Baghdadis. The tens of billions of dollars that U.S.
officials spent reconstructing Iraq during the American occupation of 2003
to 2011 were supposed to make such services effective, but did not.
And anything said about Iraqi governmental failures might be applied no less
accurately to the Iraqi army.
Despite the estimated $26 billion [49] the U.S. spent training and equipping
that military between 2003 and 2011, whole units broke, shed their uniforms,
ditched their American equipment, and fled when faced with relatively small
numbers of ISIS militants in June 2014, abandoning four northern cities
[50], including Mosul. This, of course, created the need for yet more
training, the ostensible role of many of the U.S. troops now in Iraq. Since
most of the new Iraqi units are still only almost ready to fight, however,
those American ground troops and generals [51] and Special Operations forces
and forward air controllers and planners and logistics personnel and close
air support pilots are still needed for the fight to come.
The inability of the U.S. to midwife a popularly supported government or a
confident citizens army, Washingtons twin critical failures of Iraq War
2.0, may once again ensure that its latest efforts implode. Few Iraqis are
left who imagine that the U.S. can be an honest broker in their country. A
recent State Department report found that one-third of Iraqis believe the
United States is actually supporting ISIS, while 40% are convinced that the
United States is trying to destabilize [52] Iraq for its own purposes.
The new story is again the old story: corrupt governments imposed by an
outside power fail. And in the Iraq case, every problem that can't be
remedied by aerial bombardment and Special Forces must be the Iraqis' fault.
Same Leadership, Same Results -- POOF!
With the last four presidents all having made war in Iraq, and little doubt
that the next president will dive in, keep another forgotten aspect of
Washingtons Iraq in mind: some of the same American leadership figures have
been in place under both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and they will
initially still be in place when Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump enters the
Oval Office.
Start with Brett McGurk, the current special presidential envoy for the
global coalition to counter ISIS. His résumé [53]is practically [53] a
Wikipedia page for Americas Iraq, 2003-2016: Deputy Secretary of State for
Iraq and Iran from August 2013 until his current appointment. Before that,
Senior Advisor in the State Department for Iraq, a special advisor to the
National Security Staff, Senior Advisor to Ambassadors to Iraq Ryan Crocker,
Christopher Hill, and James Jeffrey. McGurk participated in President
Obamas 2009 review of Iraq policy and the transition following the U.S.
military departure from Iraq. During the Bush administration, McGurk served
as Director for Iraq, then as Special Assistant to the President, and also
Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2008 McGurk was the lead
negotiator with the Iraqi Government on both a long-term Strategic Framework
Agreement and a Security Agreement to govern the presence of U.S. forces. He
was also one of the chief Washington-based architects of The Surge, having
earlier served as a legal advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority
from nearly the first shots of 2003.
A little lower down the chain of command is Lieutenant General Sean
MacFarland. He is now leading Sunni tribal coordination [18] to help
defeat ISIS, as well as serving [54] as commanding general of the Combined
Joint Task Force. As a colonel back in 2006, MacFarland similarly helped
organize [55] the surge's Anbar Sunni Awakening movement against al-Qaeda in
Iraq.
And on the ground level, you can be sure that some of the current colonels
were majors in Iraq War 2.0, and some of their subordinates put their boots
on the same ground theyre on now.
In other words, the new story is the old story: some of the same people have
been losing this war for Washington since 2003, with neither accountability
nor culpability in play.
What If They Gave a War and No One Remembered?
All those American memories lost to oblivion. Such forgetfulness only allows
our war makers to do yet more of the same things in Iraq and Syria, acts
that someone on the ground will be forced to remember forever, perhaps under
the shadow of a drone overhead.
Placing our service people in harms way, spending our money in prodigious
amounts, and laying the countrys credibility on the line once required at
least the pretext that some national interest was at stake. Not any more.
Anytime some group we dont like threatens a group we care not so much
about, the United States must act to save a proud people, stop a
humanitarian crisis, take down a brutal leader, put an end to genocide,
whatever will briefly engage the public and spin up some vague facsimile of
war fever.
But back to Snapchat. It turns out that while the app was carefully designed
to make whatever is transmitted quickly disappear, some clever folks have
since found ways to preserve the information. If only the same could be said
of our Snapchat wars. How soon we forget. Until the next time...
To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the
latest updates from TomDispatch.com here [56].
Peter Van Buren, a TomDispatch regular [57], blew the whistle on State
Department waste and mismanagement during the Iraqi reconstruction in We
Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the
Iraqi People [12]. A TomDispatch [58] regular, he writes about current
events at We Meant Well [59]. His latest book is Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story
of the #99Percent [60]. His next work will be a novel, Hooper's War [61].
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
Report typos and corrections to 'corrections@xxxxxxxxxxxx'. [62]
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.[63]
Source URL:
http://www.alternet.org/world/5-ways-iraq-and-syria-continue-slide-toward-ch
aos
Links:
[1] http://www.alternet.org/authors/peter-van-buren
[2] http://www.tomdispatch.com/
[3] http://www.tomdispatch.com
[4] http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/410/the_march_that_wasn%27t_to_be
[5] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story
[6] http://www.ivaw.org/about
[7]
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museum
[8]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176125/tomgram%3A_rory_fanning,_talking_to_t
he_young_in_a_world_that_will_never_truly_be_%22postwar%22/
[9]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175854/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_a_record_of_un
paralleled_failure/
[10]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176094/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_tomorrow%27s_n
ews_today/
[11]
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iraq
[12] http://www.amazon.com/dp/0805096817/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[13] http://www.tomdispatch.com/authors/petervanburen
[14]
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[15] http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/world/meast/iraq-rescue-mission/
[16] http://wemeantwell.com/blog/?s=yazidi
[17] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-us-policy-isis
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[23]
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[25]
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[29]
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[30]
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[31]
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l
[32]
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[33]
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e-of-government-approach-to-defeating-isil
[34]
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/03/07/u-s-envoy-operation-to
-take-mosul-iraq-from-islamic-state-already-underway/
[35] http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/events/hindsight
[36]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176091/tomgram%3A_peter_van_buren,_how_to_re
solve_the_isis_crisis/
[37]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/26/number-of-forei
gn-fighters-entering-iraq-and-syria-drops-by-90-percent-pentagon-says/
[38]
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-war-against-the-islamic
-state-hits-hurdles-just-as-the-us-military-gears-up/2016/05/08/013897f8-10a
c-11e6-a9b5-bf703a5a7191_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_isisspeedbump6
40p:homepage/story
[39]
http://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/06/20/reviving-successful-surge-iraq-
myth
[40]
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/contenidos/2016/04/21/noticia_0015.html
[41]
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/13/maliki-may-go-but-that-wont
-keep-iraq-in-one-piece-nothing-will/
[42]
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/15/iraq-doomed-if-prime-minister-f
ails-unite-factions-haidar-al-abadi
[43]
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/sadr-challenge-iraq-sectari
an-politics-160421072216275.html
[44]
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/23/opinion/the-baghdad-follies.html?action=cl
ick&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-c
ol-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col
-left-region&_r=1
[45]
http://www.npr.org/2016/04/30/476314549/baghdad-state-of-emergency-declared-
after-protesters-storm-green-zone
[46] http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/al-sadr-compares-iraq-to-vietnam-1.518555
[47]
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/09/iraq-cabinet-haider-al-abadi-re
form-response-mass-protests
[48]
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/10/you-too-can-command-an-iraq
i-army-division-for-only-2-million/
[49]
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/iraq-army-security-force-billion
s
[50]
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-s
tates
[51]
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/31/exclusive-21-generals-lead-
an-isis-war-the-u-s-denies.html
[52] https://oig.state.gov/system/files/isp-i-16-10.pdf
[53] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/bureau/213058.htm
[54] http://www.hood.army.mil/leaders/bios/CG.pdf
[55] http://time.com/4301571/sean-macfarland-2016-time-100/
[56]
http://tomdispatch.us2.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=6cb39ff0b1f670c349f828c73
&id=1e41682ade
[57]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176079/tomgram%3A_peter_van_buren,_who_will_
fight_the_islamic_state/
[58]
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176059/tomgram%3A_peter_van_buren,_the_great
_war_in_the_middle_east/
[59] http://www.wemeantwell.com/
[60] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1935462911/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[61] http://www.hooperswar.com/
[62] mailto:corrections@xxxxxxxxxxxx?Subject=Typo on 5 Ways Iraq and Syria
Continue to Slide Toward Chaos
[63] http://www.alternet.org/
[64] http://www.alternet.org/%2Bnew_src%2B
