[Wittrs] [quickphilosophy] Re: Anscombe on Tractarian epistemology & its incompatibility with verificationism
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2010 00:41:11 -0000
--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@...> wrote:
>
> Hi Walter,
>
> Let me know if the following question and thoughts make any sense.
>
> What if by 'simples' we take W. to also have had 'concepts' in mind, despite
> the context where he's trying to give them (concepts) a simple linguistic
> form so as to represent them on paper?
Hi, Bud.
I don't think concepts (as generally understood) would do the trick for W,
since his argument requiring splitting of objects down to simples would seem to
apply to our everyday concepts too. In order for anybody to understand
anything there'd have to be atomic concepts. Furthermore, I'm not sure (pace
Frege) that he'd allow that concepts are the sorts of entities that can be
named.
Re the Fodor paper, when we finish TLP, I'll be seeking suggestions from
everybody for another piece to work through. In it's favor, IIRC, that paper is
a fun (and quick) read, and it's available on-line....
Walto
>
> Maybe there is a similar strategy going on in Fodor such that without some
> form of conceptual atomism, there might be too much trouble for an adequate
> science of psychology.
>
> The thought that we are always using them (simples) sounds like an abductive
> inference from the problem about holism, i.e., if holism is true, it would
> make it appear difficult to explain how we ever understood each other ('s
> concepts).
>
> If at some point you can comment on the paper referenced, I would be thankful
> for your thoughts on it.
>
> Ref.
>
> Jerry A. Fodor, Having concepts: A brief refutation of the ...Jan 28, 2009
> ... Jerry A. Fodor (2004). Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the
> Twentieth Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47. ...
> philpapers.org/rec/FODHCA - Cached - Similar.
>
>
> Budd
>
>
> --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <calhorn@> wrote:
> >
> > That's a very good question, Ron.
> >
> > As I've said, I think W's argument for simples is as audacious as any
> > philosophical argument I've ever heard. Maybe I could swallow an argument
> > that concludes that they (like Leibniz's monads) must exist. But W says
> > that we have to use them constantly since otherwise we'd understand
> > nothing. Everything we believe (not just know) requires us to constantly
> > utilize them, and yet somehow.....nobody can give an example of one.
> >
> > Walto
> >
> > --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Walter:
> > > Â
> > > If ostensive definition can apply only to elementary propositions, how
> > > can it be that we have no examples of elementary propositions?
> > > Â
> > > Thanks,
> > > --Ron
>
Other related posts:
