[Wittrs] Re: [quickphilosophy] Re: 1.21 Continued

  • From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2010 12:57:57 +0100

OK, but that just brings me back to asking the same question over again:

"There seems here to be a confusing conflation between what we can say
and what can be (in some stronger sense than what we say there is). To
what extent, if any, is X not an idealist? If he is an
idealist, what kind of idealist is he?"

When I first asked the question, Wittgenstein was substituted in place 
of X since Wittgenstein proclaims himself the author of TLP.  You could, 
if you prefer, substitute various alternatives.  Pseudo-Wittgenstein? 
An opponent of Wittgenstein?  A straw man?  What?

Unless we're just going to throw out most of TLP right away, it seems 
that we need an answer to what the "person" who is putting forward the 
arguments in the early parts of TLP thinks about the context, and 
particularly about matters to do with realism/idealism.

That Wittgenstein finished up concluding that all questions about 
realism and idealism are "nonsense" doesn't really respond to the question.

You can change the original

>  > How are we able to have a distinction or any kind of relationship
>  > between "the constituents of thought" and "objects in the world" without
>  > reference to the questions that are raised about realism and idealism?
>  > Is such a distinction possible?
> Well, as you know, he ends up holding that much of what is in the TLP
> must be also thrown out as nonsense. So I guess he'd say there isn't
> actually any such distinction.
>  >
>  > I've heard more convincing arguments than "because they must".
>  >
> His argument seems to have been that without atoms no prop could be
> understood without knowledge that some other prop was true or false.
> That is, that determinate thoughts require atoms. It all seems so
> Leibnizian to me.
> W

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