Fw: [quickphilosophy] Re: Leibnizian Interlude

  • From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2010 09:22:57 -0700 (PDT)

[sending manually because the feed to yahoo isn't working]
--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Martin N Brampton <martin.lists@...> 
> It's an interesting comparison.  Jumping beyond these basic assertions, 
> it is also interesting that Liebniz places far more emphasis on what can 
> be deduced about the world than about what can be observed, whereas 
> Wittgenstein is attached to asserting that logic contains no truths.
> But then there is very litle in the quoted statements of Liebniz that 
> does not follow directly from Parmenides and Democritus.  The arguments 
> over the possibility of change were already quite well developed prior 
> to Plato.
> What is frustrating about Wittgenstein is that he forever declines to 
> explain the context in which he is writing (something that is inclined 
> to make me think of him as rather a charlatan).
> I'd certainly be inclined to see Liebniz's rationalism as epistemic, 
> which is, of course, Kant's complaint.
> The trouble with claiming that Wittgenstein has gone beyond this and is 
> talking about ontology is that there seems no argument to that effect.
> There seems here to be a confusing conflation between what we can say 
> and what can be (in some strong sense than what we say there is).  To 
> what extent, if any, is Wittgenstein not an idealist?  If he is an 
> idealist, what kind of idealist is he?
> The idea that understanding is impossible without some basic (and 
> perhaps "real") facts sounds Davidsonian, and I don't find those 
> arguments persuasive.

I take it that his view in the TLP was that, in the end, there was no real 
difference between idealism and realism, that neither philosophy can even 

be stated without spewing nonsense.

> * * *
> As regards the conflict between X being red or X being green, I wonder 
> whether Wittgenstein regards this as a *logical* conflict?  It may well 
> be that he does not, and sees it as an empirical matter.  If that is so, 
> then the independence of the two assertions holds up in logic because 
> "red" and "green" are mere tokens which in logic have no particular 
> properties.
> Martin

Again, he discusses that matter in "Some Remarks on Logical Form."  I think he 
there holds "This is red" to be tantamount to "This item appears on line 4 
column 6."  That is, if something takes up that particular place, nothing else 



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