Fw: [quickphilosophy] 1.21 Continued
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2010 08:54:03 -0700 (PDT)
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
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----- Forwarded Message ----
From: Martin N Brampton <martin.lists@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tue, July 20, 2010 11:39:58 PM
Subject: Re: [quickphilosophy] 1.21 Continued
How are we able to have a distinction or any kind of relationship
between "the constituents of thought" and "objects in the world" without
reference to the questions that are raised about realism and idealism?
Is such a distinction possible?
I've heard more convincing arguments than "because they must".
On 21/07/2010 00:01, walto wrote:
>
>
> 1.21 Each can be the case or not be the case and all else stay the same.
>
> 6. In his correspondence with Russell, W says that though he may not
> know WHAT the constituents of thought are or HOW they correspond with
> objects in the world, he knows THAT they do have constituents that
> correspond to the objects occurring in facts. Why? Because they MUST.
> [Ansc. at 28]
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