--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@...> wrote: > > Right: without it is. >  > There might be two cases: >  > 1. Someone X claims to have a concept, but can't sort on the concept. > 2. Someon Y claims X has a concept, but X can't sort on the concept. >  > Both are problematic. >  > In (1), X really can't show the concept possessed. At most X can say that he > has the concept of a dieseldown, but can't sort dieseldowns. What kind of > contemplation can X enjoy with this concept? How can X know that he's > contemplating dieseldowns, when he's not even sure that he's not > contemplating a Meyer lemon, a lugnut, or an echidna? Thus, in (1) no example > could be given that could convince us. It would just be X's assertion. In > this case, Fodor's paper could have been just one sentence. >  > In (2), the concept could be explained by Y, and Y could also show that X > can't sort the concept explained. But, how can Y show that X has the concept? > Here, I think the only chance Y has of demonstrating the point is to argue > that somehow X has a subconscious concept of, say, a dieseldown, and shows > some behaviors that are definitive of dieseldown-concept possession. But, > confronted by examples of dieseldowns and non-dieseldowns, X gets befuddled, > withdraws, and can't sort them. It's a possible line of attack. One > sometimes sees in sociological research arguments to the effect that there > exists within a population proclivities that are delineable but not assented > to by the individuals in the population. Everyone says, sure I'd vote for a > woman police chief, but then she loses in the general election. That sort of > thing. It would require an involved argument. But, I could see where the > unconscious concept could be shown in a population, but I still > wonder if there isn't a fundamental contradiction in showing it for a > person, such as X. I wonder if in hoping to establish this point, that Y > would not have to point to examples of X interacting with dieseldowns and > non-dieseldowns, and that this would simply be an unconsciously expressed > epistemic criterion. If Y doesn't point to examples like this, where there is > at least Mr. X and a dieseldown sometimes, how can Y show that X has the > concept? >  > Thanks! > --Ron > How about BEAUTY? Couldn't I have that concept without being able to sort beautiful things? KNOWLEDGE is another problematic one for a sorting criterion, I think. W