[quickphilosophy] Re: Fodor on Concepts I: The set-up
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2010 23:09:23 -0000
--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@...> wrote:
>
>
> Walter writes:
>
> > > > The argument is this:
> > > >
> > > > 1. Concept pragmatism makes concept possession an intrinsically
> > > > epistemic condition.
> > > >
> > > > 2. If concept possession is intrinsically epistemic, then mental states
> > > > are intrinsically subject to epistemic evaluation.
> > > >
> > > > 3. Whatever is intrinsically subject to epistemic evaluation implies the
> > > > possibility of an evaluator and may thus be said to be
> > > > interpretation-dependent.
> > > >
> > > > 4. To be interpretation-dependent is akin to being mind-dependent.
> > > >
> > > > 5. Therefore, the facts of psychology, unlike, say, the facts of geology
> > > > are mind-dependent.
> > > >
> > > > For what it's worth, not only is there quite a bit of hand-waving
> > > > going on here, but nobody?whatever their view of the nature of
> > > > concept possession?would (or should) deny that the facts of
> > > > psychology are mind-dependent in some way that the facts of geology are
> > > > not in the first place.
> > >
> > > Yes and no. Searle sees nothing wrong with having a scientific account
> > > of ontological subjectivity that has nothing to do with epistemology.
> > > For Fodor's part, he sees nothing wrong with the idea that we might get a
> > > science of psychology without epistemology either.
> > >
> > > My question is why you write that there is hand-waving when Fodor's
> > > argument (as you put it above) seems crystal clear?
> > >
> >
> > I don't think (2) actually follows from (1), I don't think it follows from
> > something's being "subject to" epistemic evaluation that thing must be
> > "interpretation dependent," and I don't think it's obvious that what is
> > "interpretation dependent" must be "mind-dependent." Finally, as
> > indicated, I think many of the facts of psychology are in fact
> > mind-dependent, anyhow.
>
>
> Why can't 2 be true regardless of its not following from 1.?
>
You're right--it could be, but if "intrinsically epistemic" suggests that there
will be some epistemic test that will be sufficient to prove concept
possession, only behaviorist BCPers will buy it. I think Ron is right that
there's a similarity to Searle's CR argument here. If you deny there's
anything missing about understanding in the CR, you'll likely be a BCPer of the
type Fodor could kick around. And we both know there are such people around.
So, again, I think the paper would have been better if he'd restricted his
attack to behaviorists. I'd have been more sympathetic, anyhow--though I now
think he'd need to do more to rule out that possibility I discussed in my other
post today, that there just has to be "enough" compositionality around for
language comprehension.
What I mean is, the behaviorist BCPer might (though I'm not sure) STILL have
the response available that he can get "generativity" in spite of a few
Fodoresque counter-examples like the night-flying bluebird. All he needs is
some/enough compositional concepts. (Again, I probably should think about this
more before posting--I'm likely missing something.)
W
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